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Abstract 
 
Recent research has contributed to characterize a network of brain regions known as 
the Default Mode Network (DMN), including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), which is active when individuals remember the past, imagine the future, take 
the perspective of others, as well as during mental navigation and spontaneous 
cognition (mind wandering). It is not clear, however, which is the specific role of 
different nodes of the DMN during mental time travel (MTT) and mind wandering. 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate whether the vmPFC plays a 
crucial role during DMN-related cognitive processes, such as episodic memory, future 
thinking, and mind wandering. Experiment 1 revealed that a damage to the vmPFC 
provokes the disruption of past and future MTT and a decreased ability to imagine 
future other-related episodes. These findings suggest a causal role of vmPFC in 
remembering the past and imagining the future. Its role extends to imagining events 
that are not self-relevant indicating that vmPFC is crucial for the imagination of 
complex experiences alternative to the current reality, which serves construction of 
both self-relevant and other-relevant events. This hypothesis was confirmed in 
experiment 2. Findings showed that a lesion to vmPFC disrupts also the ability to 
construct complex atemporal scenarios. However, unlike the control groups, vmPFC 
patients had more difficulties in imagining future compared to fictitious experiences, 
suggesting that vmPFC is even more critical for the simulation of personal future 
episodes, when a sense of subjective time is involved. In experiment 3, the 
involvement of vmPFC in simulating future experiences was confirmed and it revealed 
that these results are not explained by the disruption of non-episodic capabilities, such 
as narrative and working memory abilities. Furthermore, experiment 4 explored the 
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effect of a lesion to vmPFC on the occurrence of mind wandering. A damage to the 
vmPFC provokes a decreased propensity to mind-wander, showing that vmPFC 
supports spontaneous thoughts that allow a shift of attention from the current activity 
toward internal mentation. Experiment 5 confirmed the involvement of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in supporting mind wandering. Using the transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) to inhibit the mPFC we could decrease the intensity of 
mind wandering in males. Together, these results point out the fundamental role of 
vmPFC in allowing human beings to escape the here and now, whether it occurs 
deliberately or spontaneously. 
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1 General introduction 
 
The frontal lobes occupy almost one third of the cortical area of the brain in 
humans (Mesulam, 2002). The cortex of the anterior part of the mammalian brain is 
commonly called the prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex enlarged in size with 
phylogenetic development and reached the maximal development in humans. The 
greater size of the human prefrontal cortex may indicate that this cortex is the substrate 
for cognitive functions of the highest order (Fuster, 2008). The prefrontal cortex is a 
collection of neocortical areas that interact through projections with subcortical areas, 
sensory, and motor systems (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Different areas within the 
prefrontal cortex may have different functions. Two main networks are present in the 
prefrontal cortex: a dorsolateral parietal system that is related to working memory and 
related cognitive functions, and a ventromedial system that is linked to memory, 
motivation, visceral functions, and emotions (Mesulam, 2002).  
Of special interest in this thesis is the ventral part of the medial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC). The vmPFC is centered along the inferior portion of the medial wall of the 
frontal lobe, however, the precise borders of the vmPFC are not always well-defined 
(Zald and Andreotti, 2010). Öngür and Price (2000) defined two networks within the 
human orbital and medial prefrontal cortex: the orbitofrontal network that includes 
Broadmann Areas (BAs) 12 and 13, and the medial frontal network that comprises the 
BAs 9, 10, 11, 24, 25, and 32 (Ongür and Price, 2000; Nieuwenhuis and Takashima, 
2011).  Most of vmPFC, which is the area of interest in this dissertation, is included in 
the medial frontal network. In some cases a damage to vmPFC can be caused by the 
rupture of an aneurism in the anterior communicating artery (ACoA), located at the 
circle of Willis at the ventral portion of the brain. Possible consequences of lesions to 
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the vmPFC are memory deficit, confabulation, and changes in personality (DeLuca and 
Diamond, 1995). The ventral frontal damage can also provoke deficits in behavioral 
control (Bechara et al., 1994) and decision making (Fellows and Farah, 2007).   
The vmPFC is part of a network of brain regions, called the Default Mode 
Network (DMN), that is particularly active when individuals remember past events, 
imagine future events, and, in general, simulate experiences alternative to the present in 
a spontaneous or deliberate manner (Shulman et al., 1997; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; 
Mazoyer et al., 2001; Hassabis et al., 2007a; Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; 
Spreng and Grady, 2010). Based on these studies (see also chapters 2, 3, and 4), it is 
possible to hypothesize that the vmPFC is critical for supporting the ability to travel 
mentally in time, i.e., remember past events and imagine future events, and to mind-
wander, i.e., shifting one's attention to mental contents unrelated to the current activity. 
In the current dissertation we aimed to answer different experimental questions about 
the role of vmPFC in MTT and mind wandering using a lesion approach. Is vmPFC 
crucially involved in MTT, and, if so, is vmPFC equally important for supporting the 
capability to remember the past and to imagine the future? Is vmPFC critical for 
projecting oneself in time and for imagining other-related experiences? Does vmPFC 
support the construction of complex atemporal experiences? Is it possible that non-
episodic abilities mediated by vmPFC, such as narrative and working memory abilities, 
affect episodic construction in patients with vmPFC damage? Finally, is vmPFC critical 
for allowing individuals to escape from the here and now in a spontaneous manner, as it 
occurs while individuals mind-wander during a task?  
In the next three chapters, I will delineate the theoretical concepts and the studies 
on the neural bases of MTT and mind wandering (see chapters 2, 3, and 4). Next, five 
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experiments will be described through which we aimed to answer the aforementioned 
experimental questions. 
In experiment 1 (chapter 5), I studied how vmPFC patients and healthy controls 
remember personal past events and imagine personal future events at different 
timeframes, and how they imagine events that may happen to a “close” other (family 
member) or a “distant” other (President of the Italian Republic). Compared to the 
healthy controls, vmPFC patients were impaired at constructing both past and future 
events, indicating that vmPFC is critical for MTT. Patients, however, were also 
impaired at imagining other-related events, suggesting that self-relevance may not be a 
critical factor in explaining vmPFC‟s involvement in allowing individuals to mentally 
escape from the here and now. 
In experiment 2 (chapter 6), to test whether vmPFC is crucial for episodic future 
thinking (EFT), or it is critical for supporting the construction of any kind of atemporal 
complex experiences, I studied how patients with focal lesion to vmPFC, control 
patients with lesions outside the vmPFC (mainly occipital), and healthy individuals 
imagine future and fictitious experiences. Compared to the control groups, vmPFC 
patients were impaired at imagining both future and fictitious experiences, indicating a 
general deficit in constructing novel experiences. Unlike the control groups, however, 
vmPFC patients had more difficulties in imagining the future compared to fictitious 
experiences.  
In experiment 3 (chapter 7), I explored the possibility that differences in 
imagining the future between vmPFC patients and healthy controls are due to non-
episodic abilities such as the capability to verbally describe a complex scenario and 
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maintain it in working memory. To test these hypotheses, we asked vmPFC patients and 
healthy participants to imagine future episodes using pictures as cues or to perform a 
picture description task in two conditions: in the presence of a picture (description 
condition) or in absence of a picture after an observation phase (working memory 
condition). Results show that poor performance in imagining the future in vmPFC 
patients is not fully explained by a deficient capability to describe complex images or to 
maintain them in working memory. Indeed, group differences in imagining the future 
remain also when we controlled for these variables.   
In experiment 4 (chapter 8), mind wandering and its phenomenology have been 
examined in vmPFC patients, control patients with lesions not involving the vmPFC, 
and healthy individuals. Participants performed three tasks varying in cognitive 
demands (Smallwood et al., 2009). While doing the tasks, they were asked to report the 
degree to which their thoughts were on-task or off-task and classify the contents of their 
off-task thoughts. vmPFC patients engaged in mind wandering less frequently than both 
control groups, whereas no significant difference was found between the two control 
groups. Importantly, the content of mind wandering experienced by vmPFC patients 
was never future-related. These findings suggest that vmPFC is a fundamental hub of a 
set of brain regions that supports mind wandering.  
In experiment 5 (chapter 9), the role of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in 
sustaining spontaneous cognition was investigated using transcranial direct current 
stimulation. An activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis was conducted for 
investigating which brain areas are associated with mind wandering experiences. Next, 
in order to check the specificity of medial prefrontal involvement in spontaneous 
cognition, mind wandering experiences were collected before and after the 
10 
 
administration of transcranial direct current stimulation on mPFC (brain area location 
was chosen upon the ALE meta-analysis results) (mPFC-tDCS), and on a control medial 
occipital cortex region (OC-tDCS). A sham group was also included. We found that 
cathodal stimulation on the mPFC reduced the intensity of mind wandering. This effect 
was not present for OC-tDCS and sham groups and emerged specifically in male 
participants.  
Finally, after the description of the aforementioned experiments, a general 
discussion will follow (chapter 10). 
 
2 Mental time travel 
2.1 Remembering the past and imagining the future: theoretical concepts 
 
Mental time travel (MTT) is a term conceived by Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) 
and it refers to the capability to mentally (re-)create experiences staged in the past or in 
the future. This phenomenon is called MTT because is similar to a mental journey that 
covers specific past episodes or specific future experiences. Travelling mentally 
backwards in time means to recall episodic memories that derive from events personally 
experienced (Tulving, 1983, 1985). Episodic memory refers to individuals' ability to 
retrieve past events from one‟s life, it is about happenings personally experienced in 
particular places at particular times, about the “what”, “where”, and “when” they 
occurred (Tulving, 1985, 2001). Episodic memory is often defined in contrast to 
semantic memory which is the memory for general knowledge of the world, such as 
concepts, vocabulary, and facts, no longer tied to the context of acquisition (Tulving, 
1972, 1985). Remembering the past and communicating past episodes to other 
individuals is advantageous for human beings. It permits to exchange fundamental 
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information, avoid making again previous mistakes, make effective decisions, and 
maintain social relationships (Alea and Bluck, 2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). 
Episodic future thinking (EFT) is the capability to mentally travel into the future 
and envisioning oneself participating in future experiences. EFT is a pervasive 
phenomenon in daily life and often it involves inner speech and mental imagery 
(D‟Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; Demblon and D‟Argembeau, 2014). Imagining the 
future allows individuals to reach their goals, cope with future problems, regulate 
emotions, and make adaptive decisions (Atance and O‟Neill, 2001; Quoidbach et al., 
2009; Szpunar, 2010).  
There are some capacities that may be necessary to engage in MTT (Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 2007). It is critical to create a mental “space” that permits a combination 
of different pieces of information. A possible candidate ability for supporting the 
combination of different pieces of information is working memory, which allows 
maintenance and manipulation of information, such as episodic, perceptual, and 
emotional details. The elements (details) that are recombined together for simulating 
future events likely come from declarative memory (Schacter and Addis, 2007). The 
main characters of the events during a temporal mental journey can be oneself and/or 
other individuals. In order to simulate others‟ actions it is essential to have knowledge 
about their beliefs, goals, and desires. This level of knowledge permits to understand 
that individuals‟ mental states are not rigid and can change in the past, present, and 
future. In order to imagine future scenarios the ability to evaluate different alternatives 
and judge their desirability and likelihood is needed. Finally, simulations of past and 
future events are often communicated using language and narrative abilities. The 
communication to others of past and future events has important social functions, for 
12 
 
instance maintaining relationships, teaching, informing others, and arising empathy 
(Alea and Bluck, 2003).  
Another property that characterizes the ability to travel mentally in time is 
autonoetic consciousness (self-knowing consciousness), that is the understanding of the 
extended existence of the self in the past, present, and future (Tulving, 1985; Wheeler et 
al., 1997). Tulving distinguished autonoetic consciousness from noetic consciousness 
which refers to the awareness of existence of the world, objects, events, and their 
regularities, and from anoetic consciousness that describes the simple awareness of 
external stimuli that does not allow to escape mentally from the here and now (Tulving, 
1985, 2001). Autonoetic consciousness was hypothesized to be supported by the frontal 
lobes (Wheeler et al., 1997).  
A possible link between episodic memory and EFT derives from the idea that 
remembering an episode is a constructive process and not a mere repetition of the past 
(Bartlett, 1932). Indeed, memory does not store perfect replicas of experiences but it is a 
constructive process in which pieces of information from different sources are 
assembled together. A critical evidence that memory is a constructive process come 
from the observation of typical memory errors and distortions that result from 
mistakenly combining pieces of information, for example, remembering to have 
purchased something that you did not. It is common to make such mistakes while 
remembering past episodes, and precisely the constructive and flexible nature of 
memory comes at the cost of vulnerability to distortions and errors (Schacter et al., 
2011; Schacter, 2013). Because the constructive nature of episodic memory makes it 
highly flexible and adaptive, it was hypothesized that the function of the constructive 
aspects of episodic memory is to allow individuals to simulate events that might occur 
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in the future (Schacter and Addis, 2007). Indeed, Schacter and Addis (2007) proposed 
that construction of future events relies on recombining elements of past episodes, 
which draws on relational processes (constructive episodic simulation hypothesis). 
Evidence for the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis comes from a study by 
Addis and colleagues (2009a). Using a recombination paradigm in which details from 
participants‟ personal past experiences were recombined for imagining past and future 
events, authors found evidence of a common network active during remembering and 
imagining events in prefrontal regions, temporal lobe and parietal areas. These results 
suggest a common nature of remembering and imagining the future, which reflect the 
flexible nature of memory and the possibility that episodic past elements are employed 
to construct future episodes. 
A concept that incorporates MTT but extends it to encompass other forms of 
simulations is self-projection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). Self-projection is defined as 
the capacity to shift perspective from the immediate environment to alternative 
scenarios, such as remembering the past and imagining the future, but also conceiving 
the viewpoint of others and mental navigation. Buckner and Carroll (2007) 
hypothesized that there is a brain network of fronto-temporal-parietal areas that enables 
self-projection. Authors observed that this network is very similar to the DMN that is a 
set of brain regions that includes the mPFC, the posterior cingulate cortex/restrosplenial 
cortex, the medial and lateral temporal lobes, and the posterior inferior parietal lobes, 
active during relatively passive task and states, such as observing a fixation cross on a 
computer screen (e.g, Raichle et al., 2001). The similarity between self-projection 
network and the DMN raises the possibility that default mode of cognition that occurs, 
for example, during passive states, is characterized by a shift from perceiving the 
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external environment to internal modes of cognition, that involve, for instance, 
simulating future experiences and remembering past episodes (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007). Buckner and Carroll (2007), similarly to Schacter and Addis (2007) with their 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, hypothesized that self-projection depends 
on memory systems because past experiences represent the ground on which alternative 
experiences are created. The self-projection hypothesis and the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis share assumptions regarding the use of episodic information to 
simulate mental experiences. However, the self-projection hypothesis focuses on 
explaining the common ability to project the self in other times or other places, for 
instance when there is a transposition of the reference point, from here to there, from 
now to then, and from the self to others (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). On the other hand, 
the constructive episodic hypothesis focuses more on describing and explaining the 
process of constructive recombination of elements from memory necessary for 
constructing future experiences.   
Hassabis and Maguire (2007) proposed another process, named scene 
construction, that may account for the similarities in the brain networks activated by 
different cognitive functions, such as MTT, navigation, and taking the perspectives of 
others. Scene construction is defined as a process that generates, visualizes, and 
maintains coherent scenes in the mind's eye. It was hypothesized that in order to 
imagine the future it is necessary to transfer the self in time (Atance and O‟Neill, 2001). 
However, Hassabis and Maguire (2007) argued that individuals also imagine novel 
fictitious scenarios that are not temporal or self-relevant, for example imagining a white 
sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay, and showed that this ability, too, relies on the 
similar brain network hypothesized to be active during MTT. Therefore, Hassabis and 
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Maguire pointed out that rather than self-projection, the process of scene construction is 
better able to account for similarities in brain activation during MTT, theory of mind, 
mental navigation, and default mode of cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). They 
hypothesized a crucial role of hippocampus in scene construction because it allows to 
process spatial information and bind together elements for constructing an imagined 
complex scenes. In support to the scene construction hypothesis, Hassabis and 
colleagues showed that remembering imagined or real memories and imagining new 
atemporal experiences recruited a common brain network including the medial temporal 
lobes (MTLs), posterior parietal cortices, and vmPFC (Hassabis et al., 2007a), those 
brain areas are also hypothesized to be involved in self-projection (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007).  
Here, the possible processes that underlie remembering autobiographical events and 
imagining future experiences were considered: autonoetic consciousness, episodic 
simulation, self-projection, and scene construction. All of them have been proposed to 
account for the similar neural bases of remembering the past and imagining the future. 
In the next two paragraphs, the neural bases of remembering the past and imagining the 
future are delineated, reporting evidence from neuroimaging and clinical studies in 
humans. 
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2.2 Neural bases of remembering the past and imagining the future: neuroimaging 
studies 
 
Similar processes were hypothesized to underlie the abilities of remembering the 
past and imagining the future (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; 
Schacter and Addis, 2007). Commonalities in the neural activity between EFT and 
episodic memory were observed across different neuroimaging studies (Okuda et al., 
2003; Addis et al., 2007, 2009a; Szpunar et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Spreng et 
al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Viard et al., 2011). In the previous paragraph we 
have delineated processes possibly underlying those commonalities. MTT and 
autonoetic consciousness focus on the importance of the temporal factors in explaining 
the similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future. Indeed, 
remembering past events and imagining the future have common neural bases because 
both activities involve the capacity to project oneself in time. However, other kind of 
mental simulations may have features in common with imagining future experiences, 
even though time is not involved, for example when individuals imagine to be in a 
different place (Schacter et al., 2012). Self-projection and scene construction can 
account also for these other forms of mental simulation, such as mental navigation, the 
construction of fictitious experiences, and taking the perspective of others, that are not 
related to temporal factors.   
An evidence in favor of the autonoetic consciousness and MTT processes, 
comes from a study by Nyberg and colleagues (2010). In that neuroimaging study 
participants were required to remember a recent walk or imagine a future, present, or 
past walk along the same path. Brain activity during remembering a walk, and 
imagining past and future walks were compared with brain activity while participants 
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were asked to take a mental walk along the same route in the present. Nyberg et al. 
(2010) showed that the parietal cortex, middle frontal gyrus, cerebellum, and thalamus 
were commonly engaged while participants remember and simulate the walks in the 
past or future compared to taking the same walk in the present. These results support the 
hypothesis that some brain regions are involved in MTT, thus, specifically when the 
temporal factor is considered. In another study (Arzy et al., 2008) participants were 
asked to change their self-location in time to the past, the now, or the future, and then to 
determine whether events happened before or will happen after the imagined self-
location in time. Three brain regions were found to be recruited for self-location in time: 
the occipitotemporal cortex, the temporoparietal junction, and the anteromedial 
temporal cortex. Similar results were found in a related study by Arzy and colleagues 
(2009). Moreover, Szpunar et al. (2007) asked participants to remember past events and 
imagine specific future events, or imagine events involving a familiar individual. There 
was an overlap in activity associated with specific past and future events in the 
frontopolar and MTL regions, and posterior cingulate cortex. However, these regions 
were not active when imagining a familiar individual, suggesting that those brain areas 
are specifically critical for constructing personal experiences staged in time. Together 
these studies demonstrate that a set of brain regions is active specifically when 
individuals travel mentally in time, favoring the importance of temporal processes in 
explaining why common brain regions support the ability to escape from the here and 
now. 
On the other hand, there are proofs about the existence of an atemporal 
perspective that may explain common brain activation while remembering the past and 
imagining the future (Schacter et al., 2012). Thus, the same common set of brain regions 
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that are active during MTT could maintain any kind of mental simulation, also 
atemporal in nature. For instance, in a study by Spreng and colleagues (Spreng et al., 
2009) the correspondence of neural activations across neuroimaging studies for 
autobiographical memory, EFT, mental navigation, and theory of mind was assessed 
using ALE meta-analyses. The authors analyzed the statistically significant concordance 
of activated voxels across neuroimaging experiments for each domain. Then, a 
conjunction analysis was employed to assess correspondence across domains by 
identifying whether clusters from different studies on different kinds of mental 
simulation converge across brain structures. The results provide evidence supporting the 
existence of a core set of brain regions within the DMN (see paragraph 2.1 and chapter 
4) that underlie remembering, EFT, navigation, and theory of mind, suggesting the idea 
that common brain activation found during MTT may also be found for other kind of 
mental simulations that do not necessarily involve travelling mentally in time. In a study 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, Addis and colleagues (Addis et al., 2009a) found a 
functional network, similar to the DMN (see paragraph 2.1 and chapter 4), that included 
aspects of mPFC, inferior frontal gyrus, MTL, polar and posterior temporal cortex, 
medial parietal cortex and cerebellum, commonly engaged in simulating events that 
might have happened in the past and future experiences, suggesting once again that any 
kind of mental simulation is capable to activate brain regions within the DMN. 
Considering a different atemporal perspective, a possible explanation of the common 
brain activity during remembering the past and imagining the future could be that both 
capacities rely on scene construction (see paragraph 2.1). In a study we mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, participants were asked to recall recent episodic memories, retrieve 
fictitious experiences previously constructed, and imagine new atemporal experiences. 
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Common activations were found in the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, 
retrosplenial cortex, and posterior parietal cortex, the middle temporal cortices, as well 
as the vmPFC. These results suggest that brain regions that are active during 
remembering real events are also engaged in imagining other kind of complex 
experiences (e.g., fictitious). This evidence supports the idea about the close relation 
between memory and imagination, irrespectively of the temporal factor. 
As mentioned previously, several experimental findings support the common 
activation of brain regions while remembering the past and imagining the future, 
demonstrating that similar processes support both activities. For example, Okuda and 
colleagues (2003) showed that some brain areas, such as the superior frontal gyrus and 
parahippocampal gyrus, showed equivalent level of activations during imagining the 
future and remembering the past. Additionally, common networks were found to 
underlie past and future events during construction and elaboration phases (Addis et al., 
2007). Participants were required to recall a past event or imagine a future event in two 
phases, construction and elaboration. In the construction phase, individuals searched for 
and re/constructed past and future events, and once they had an event in mind, in a 
subsequent elaboration phase, they retrieved or imagined supplementary details. 
Authors employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine patterns 
of neural activity associated with the construction and subsequent elaboration phases of 
past and future events. During the construction phase past and future events recruited 
commonly hippocampus, inferior parietal lobule, middle occipital gyrus, and superior 
occipital gyrus/cuneus. On the other hand, the elaboration of past and future events was 
associated with the activation of the frontopolar and inferior parts of the mPFC (BAs 10 
and 11), temporal pole and middle temporal gyrus, hippocampus, parahippocampal 
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gyrus, cingulate/retrosplenial regions, precuneus, and inferior parietal lobule. Moreover, 
in the study by Szpunar et al. (2010) we mentioned previously, the acts of envisioning 
the future and remembering the past revealed identical timecourses of activation in the 
mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, medial temporal cortex, and occipital cortex.  
Despite the common brain activity that occurs while remembering the past and 
imagining the future, there is also evidence about possible asymmetries when the two 
abilities are compared with each other. For instance, it was demonstrated that prefrontal 
and medial temporal areas show increases in activity while imagining the future relative 
to recollecting the past (Okuda et al., 2003). Moreover, Addis and colleagues (2007) 
revealed that the maximal difference in brain activation for past vs. future events was 
found in the event construction phase. Great activity was found in the frontal pole and 
the hippocampus during the construction of future events relative to the construction of 
past experiences. Also Szpunar et al. (2007) showed several regions that were more 
active for future compared to past events (but not vice versa), such as middle frontal 
gyrus, medial posterior parietal cortex, and posterior cerebellum. Altogether these 
results suggest that within the core network of brain regions that is commonly engaged 
in remembering the past and imagining the future some areas may support preferentially 
only one aspect of MTT, for instance, the ability to simulate novel experiences.  
The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (see 2.1) may explain the 
greater neural activity for future relative to past events. It may reflect the more 
extensive constructive processes required by imagining future events relative to 
remembering past events (Addis et al., 2009a; Schacter et al., 2012). Indeed, imagining 
future experiences requires that details derived from past experiences are recombined to 
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construct a novel future experience, which increases cognitive demands compared to 
just recall already happened events. 
Together, these studies suggest that remembering the past and imagining the 
future are based on similar processes and share neural substrates. A fronto-temporo-
parietal network of brain regions, including the mPFC, shows activation during both 
remembering the past and imagining the future and this network has commonalities with 
the DMN. However, differences in brain activity that emerged in imagining the future 
and remembering the past may suggest that some brain areas, for example frontal 
regions and the hippocampus, are more engaged while imagining future events. 
Evidence for similarities and differences in remembering the past and imagining the 
future was shown also in clinical studies, which is the topic of the next paragraph. 
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2.3 Neural bases of remembering the past and imagining the future: clinical studies 
 
Additional evidence for the common neural bases of episodic memory and future 
thinking comes from neuropsychological studies on patients. It is well known that 
patients with damage to the hippocampus and related structures in the MTL have 
impairments in episodic memory (e.g., Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004). For example, 
patients with MTL and/or hippocampal damage have often intact perceptual abilities 
and intellectual functions, however, they may be amnesic and have severe deficits at 
recalling events from their past. For example, when patients with MTL lesions are asked 
to retrieve and describe past events, their recall episodes were lacking in detail when 
compared to healthy participants (e.g., Race et al., 2011). Tulving (1985, 2002) 
presented the case of an amnesic patient, K.C., who suffered from severe amnesia due to 
the result of closed head injury, which had produced damage to a number of brain 
regions including the medial temporal and frontal lobes. Patient K.C. had intact general 
personal knowledge, for instance he could remember the names of the schools he 
attended, and he had also intact non-personal knowledge, so that he could describe how 
the Statue of Liberty looked like. Interestingly, his amnesia was present with a parallel 
deficit in imagining personal future experiences. For instance, when the experimenter 
asked K.C. what he would be doing the following day, he answered that he did not 
know, and declared that his mind was completely blank. Another famous case of 
memory loss, patient D.B., supports the hypothesis that episodic memory is the 
foundation that allows to imagine the future (Klein et al., 2002). Patient D.B, who 
received a diagnosis of cardiac arrest with presumed anoxic encephalopathy, had a deep 
difficulty in remembering events and imagining what his experiences might be like in 
the future, but retained the ability to think about non-personal past and future events. In 
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particular, patient D.B. and healthy participants were presented with words and were 
asked to think of a specific personal event related to each word from any time in their 
past. They were instructed to provide a brief verbal description of each memory and to 
date the memory as accurately as possible. Patient D.B. was unable to recollect 
experiences from any point in his life. Moreover, a questionnaire requiring participants 
to recollect personal events from their past and to imagine personal events in their future 
was administered. D.B.‟s episodic impairment was reflected in his performance on both 
the past and future versions of this task. Patient D.B. was often not able to provide an 
answer, and the few answers he provided were judged implausible. For example, D.B. 
stated that he was going to visit his mother, who in fact had died almost 20 years earlier. 
Finally, participants in the same study were asked to focus on public domain issues: 
they were asked to describe events that had taken place during the past 10 years, and 
events they believed likely to take place over the next 10 years. D.B.‟s responses were 
judged correct and plausible, suggesting intact ability to recall and imagine novel non-
personal general events (Klein et al., 2002). Once again, a patient was described with 
intact general knowledge about events, however, he was not able to recall personal 
specific episodes and to imagine personal future experiences, similarly to patient K.C. 
In another study by Andelman and colleagues (Andelman et al., 2010), patient M.C., 
with bilateral hippocampal damage, was found to have difficulties in recalling personal 
past events, especially events occurred in the last years. To assess the patient‟s ability to 
imagine future experiences the same questionnaire on personal future events used by 
Klein and colleagues (2002) was administered. Patient M.C. exhibited persistent 
difficulties in the ability to envision and plan for her personal future. However, her 
general knowledge and semantic memory were intact. Interestingly, a study published 
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by Hassabis and colleagues (2007b) showed that amnesic patients, with bilateral 
hippocampal damage, not only have difficulties at imagining future episodes, but also at 
imagining novel fictitious, atemporal experiences. Indeed, the authors found that 
amnesic patients were impaired, compared to healthy controls, at imagining and 
descripting any novel scenario. Descriptions of the constructed experiences provided by 
participants were scored across a number of ratings to assess their event construction 
richness. A composite score that measured the overall richness of the imagined 
experience was calculated from four subcomponents: information content (number of 
details for each event), participants‟ ratings on sense of presence and vividness, a spatial 
coherence index (assessing the spatial integrity of the imagined scene), and a scorer‟s 
rating on the overall quality of the constructed experiences. Hippocampal patients‟ 
descriptions were fragmented and lacked spatial coherence: patients showed a 
diminished overall quality of the constructed experiences and also a decreased spatial 
coherence index compared to healthy controls in both future and fictitious experiences. 
Thus, hippocampal amnesia causes a deficit in imagining new experiences and authors 
pointed out that the role of the hippocampus extends beyond reliving past experiences, 
encompassing not only the imagination of future experiences, but more generally, it is 
engaged in the construction of fictitious experiences. The hippocampus may support 
scene construction, which is the ability to create and maintain spatial coherent complex 
scenes (see paragraph 2.1). In the literature, other clinical studies revealed parallel 
deficits in remembering the past and imagining the future in patients with MTL lesions. 
For instance, Race and colleagues (2011) found that amnesic patients with MTL 
damage were impaired at constructing detailed narratives about personal past and future 
events. Patients and healthy participants were required to recollect specific personal 
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events from the past (e.g., graduation ceremony) and imagine specific personal events in 
the future (e.g., winning the lottery). Participants were instructed to describe the event 
in as much detail as possible. In another condition, participants were shown drawings of 
scenes and they were instructed to tell a story about what was going on in the scene. 
Narratives were scored using the Autobiographical Interview scoring (Levine et al., 
2002): narratives were segmented into distinct details and then each detail was 
categorized as an episodic detail or a non-episodic detail (semantic, repetitions, and 
meta-comments). Episodic details are those that pertained directly to the main event 
described by the participants, they are specific to time and place, and are considered to 
reflect episodic re-experiencing. Non-episodic details do not belong to specific episodes 
and depict general knowledge and facts, ongoing events, and extended states of being. 
Amnesic patients with MTL damage were impaired at constructing detailed narratives 
about personal past and future events producing fewer episodic details compared to 
those provided by healthy participants. Moreover, future thinking performance 
correlated with episodic memory performance, showing an association between episodic 
memory and EFT. However, MTL patients possessed preserved ability to construct 
narratives (i.e., describe the content of pictures verbally) (Race et al., 2011), suggesting 
that MTL patients impairment is not associated with a general deficit in narrative 
abilities (Race et al., 2013; but see Zeman et al., 2013). Different results were found by 
Squire et al. (2010), who examined patients with amnesia (hippocampal and MTL 
lesions) and healthy participants. They administered an adapted version of the 
Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002) to patients with hippocampal damage, 
one MTL patient, and healthy controls. The authors evaluated their capacity for 
constructing autobiographical memories and future experiences (remote and recent 
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memories, and episodes that may occur in the near future). They found that the episodic 
recall of recent events was affected in amnesic patients with hippocampal lesions and in 
the patient with MTL lesion compared to healthy participants, however, the recall of 
remote events and the imagination of future episodes were preserved in patients, 
suggesting that those abilities may depend on other brain structures than the MTL. 
 Indeed, other brain structures have been found to support MTT. The frontal lobes 
were hypothesized to support autonoetic consciousness (Wheeler et al., 1997), a process 
considered necessary for remembering the past and imagining the future (see 2.1 and 
2.2). It is interesting to note that patient K.C., the clinical case we mentioned before, 
who showed impaired ability to recall personal past experience and imagine personal 
future events, had extensive lesions not only in the medial-temporal areas but also in the 
frontal lobes. In a study on patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI), participants were 
instructed to recall or imagine events from different time periods (1 month, 5 years, and 
10 years). Recalled and imagined events were scored following the Autobiographical 
Interview scoring (Levine et al., 2002). TBI patients recalled and imagined fewer 
episodic details compared to those recalled and imagined by healthy controls, reflecting 
impaired episodic memory and impaired EFT. In contrast, semantic details were 
unimpaired in TBI patients‟ simulation of past and future events. These results suggest 
the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in episodic memory and EFT (Rasmussen and 
Berntsen, 2014). Other studies show that the ventral part of the prefrontal cortex may be 
specifically involved in MTT. Levine (2004) described patients with ventral prefrontal 
damage who were impaired, relative to controls, in remembering personal past episodes. 
Patients‟ reports lacked in episodic details, but contained a normal number of non-
episodic details. On the other hand, patients with dorsolateral prefrontal damage 
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produced similar amount of episodic details compared to controls, but an elevated 
amount of non-episodic details. These findings demonstrate a possible specific 
involvement of the ventral part of the frontal lobe in retrieving specific past episodes, 
however, in that study EFT was not assessed. In other studies, Levine et al. (Levine et 
al., 1998a, 1998b) described patient M.L., who suffered damage to the right ventral 
frontal cortex after a TBI. Patient M.L. developed retrograde amnesia for episodic and 
semantic information and M.L.‟s impaired abilities encompassed also strategy 
application that has been linked to self-regulation and EFT (Atance and O‟Neill, 2001). 
A further evidence of possible memory impairment in patients with damage to the 
ventral part of the mPFC is that they may exhibit a particular disorder of memory, 
named “confabulation”, involving false recall and recognition of events that did not 
actually happen (Kopelman, 1987; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; Gilboa et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, confabulation may also involve EFT. For example, Dalla Barba and 
colleagues (1997) reported a case of a patient, who developed an amnesic-confabulatory 
syndrome following a rupture of an aneurism of the ACoA. Evaluation showed that 
patient‟s confabulations were related to tasks requiring to access personal past or 
personal future events (see also Cole et al., 2014). For instance, when the experimenter 
asked patient G.A. what she will be doing tomorrow, she answered she will go shopping 
alone by car, but she actually never did that after her disease. These findings 
demonstrate, again, a link between remembering events and imagining future episodes 
in a disorder specifically related to the frontal lobes: confabulation that is typically 
present in past events but may emerge also in EFT. 
It is important to note that not all studies on the involvement of frontal lobes in 
MTT show the same parallelism between remembering the past and imagining future 
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experiences. An example of asymmetry in the performance of simulating past and future 
events is the study by de Vito et al. (2012). They investigated non-amnesic patients with 
Parkinson‟s Disease (PD), who might have a mild cognitive deficit, in order to 
understand whether they possess a future thinking deficit. PD patients underwent 
assessment of the frontal lobe functions, by the mean of the Frontal Assessment Battery, 
in order to study a possible link between executive abilities and EFT. PD patients 
showed a decrement in episodic details when imagining future experiences but not when 
remembering past events. PD patients in this study performed normally also in 
constructing fictitious novel scenarios. Interestingly, EFT deficit was associated with 
score on the sensitivity to interference task, a test included in the Frontal Assessment 
Battery. The authors pointed out that the involvement of executive functions in the 
generation of episodic future experiences may suggest a specific involvement of the 
frontal lobe in EFT. Moreover, this study shows that future thinking deficits does not 
represent a specific feature of amnesia. Another experiment demonstrating a differential 
engagement of brain regions in MTT studied cases of frontotemporal dementia. In 
patients with behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia, deficits were found in 
imagining the future and remembering the past. However, performance in remembering 
past events and imagining future episodes correlates with the degree of atrophy in 
distinct brain regions: disruption of future thinking correlates with atrophy of 
frontopolar, medial temporal regions, and lateral temporal and occipital cortices, on the 
other hand, remembering deficit correlated with atrophy in medial prefrontal regions 
(Irish et al., 2013). Weiler and colleagues (2010) described two patients with lesions in 
the medial dorsal thalamus, which is densely connected with prefrontal cortex, who 
could remember personal past events but had difficulties imagining future events. The 
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authors attributed this finding to the increased strategic retrieval/recombination 
demands of EFT compared to remembering (Weiler et al., 2011). Interestingly, patients‟ 
deficits were even more marked when they had to imagine events happening to other 
people (e.g., Angela Merkel), which may require retrieving/recombining details from 
more, and more disparate, memories (Weiler et al., 2011). Again, these results show the 
possible involvement of prefrontal areas in supporting MTT and suggest that different 
brain regions within the prefrontal cortex may underlie different component processes 
of MTT. Consistently with the aforementioned literature, it has been hypothesized that 
the frontal cortex has the specific role in allowing individuals to anticipate and plan the 
future (Ingvar, 1985; Atance and O‟Neill, 2001; Fuster, 2008). For instance, patient R. 
with a frontal lobe lesion, described by Stuss (1991), showed intact general knowledge 
about the future, however, she was not able to use that knowledge for making decisions 
about her future (Atance and O‟Neill, 2001). Furthermore, a lesion to the ventral part of 
the mPFC may be sufficient for provoking a disruption of decision making about the 
future, suggesting an inability to consider and anticipate future experiences. Research 
on patients with lesions to the vmPFC showed that patients appear “myopic” to the 
future consequences of their choices (Bechara et al., 1994). Bechara and colleagues 
created a gambling task  requiring to choose cards from four decks, of which two led to 
a high initial gain of money, followed by higher losses (disadvantageous decks). 
Choosing cards from the other two decks resulted in a small immediate gain, followed 
by smaller unpredictable losses. Patients with lesions to the vmPFC tend to select more 
cards from the disadvantageous decks. vmPFC patients were described as insensitive for 
future consequences because they were guided by immediate outcomes. In another 
study (Fellows and Farah, 2005) patients with lesion to vmPFC showed a short future 
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time perspective: they tended to conceive future events closer in time compared to 
events imagined by healthy and brain-damaged controls. Indeed, personal future time 
perspective was reduced following vmPFC damage, while participants with dorsolateral 
prefrontal damage did not differ from controls, suggesting that the shortened future time 
perspective is a specific consequence of a lesion to the vmPFC. In another study vmPFC 
patients showed steeper Temporal Discounting (TD) than healthy and brain-damaged 
controls (Sellitto et al., 2010). In this last study, participants chose between an amount 
of a reward that could be received immediately and an amount of reward that could be 
received after some specified delay. Lesions to the vmPFC increased preference for 
small-immediate over larger-delayed rewards compared to healthy controls and patients 
with lesion to non-frontal areas. These results may be due to vmPFC patients inability to 
envision future experiences, which would lead to prefer the more salient immediate 
reward. vmPFC patients would be deprived of the anticipation of the future reward that 
is necessary for decision-making (Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino, 2011). Together these 
findings show that when the frontal damage encroaches the ventral part of the mPFC, 
this can affect the ability to make effective future decisions and may provoke a 
decreased capability to anticipate future experiences.  
Other studies showed also a possible involvement of the parietal lobe in supporting 
MTT. Berryhill and colleagues (Berryhill et al., 2007) evaluated autobiographical 
memory in patients with bilateral parietal lesions and they showed that the patients‟ 
recollections lacked richness and specificity when they were asked to recall freely 
memories from different points in time (free recall). In contrast, the patients were not 
impaired in their ability to answer specific questions regarding particular memories. In a 
subsequent study, Berryhill et al. (2010) examined autobiographical memory, EFT and 
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imagination of atemporal experiences in patients with bilateral posterior parietal lesions 
(PPC patients) and unilateral prefrontal lesions (PFC patients). PPC patients exhibited 
free recall impairment in remembering autobiographical episodes, replicating previous 
findings, and they showed also impaired performance in imagining future and fictitious 
experiences. These results suggest that the parietal lobe is important for constructing 
any kind of complex experiences, irrespectively of the temporal feature. On the other 
end, the PFC patients (with unilateral lesions) demonstrated intact autobiographical 
memory retrieval but impaired construction of future and fictitious experiences, 
suggesting an involvement of the prefrontal cortex in constructing novel experiences, 
but not in episodic memory. On the whole, these results in clinical populations 
confirmed empirical findings from neuroimaging studies (see 2.2) and consolidate the 
idea about the involvement of a set of brain regions in deliberate MTT, including 
temporal, frontal, and parietal brain areas (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and 
Maguire, 2007, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012). Some studies (e.g., Berryhill et al., 2010; 
de Vito et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2013; Weiler et al., 2011) that showed the differential 
engagement of brain regions in remembering past events and imagining future 
experiences, raise questions about what brain areas may support specifically only the 
simulation of future or, alternatively, the retrieval of past events. Until this point the 
characteristics of deliberate MTT have been delineated, however, MTT may also occurs 
spontaneously, for example during mind wandering. The next sections are dedicated to 
the conceptualization and the neural bases of mind wandering. 
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3 Mind wandering 
3.1 Mind wandering: theoretical concepts 
 
Individuals‟ minds tend to wander and produce thoughts that are self-generated, and 
typically related to inner experiences, without a clear link with the perceptual external 
environment (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006, 2015; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Inner 
experiences of self-generated thoughts may be task-related or task-unrelated. Thus, 
these experiences can occur as part of a task (task-related), for instance making a task-
related decision that depends on an internal representation. More frequently, they can 
happen independently from a task (task-unrelated), such as when individuals mind-
wander while performing an activity, or while resting without any task to perform 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). During mind wandering 
individuals' minds drift away from the ongoing task toward inner thoughts, fantasies, 
and feelings unrelated to the task at hand (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). For 
example, while washing the dishes one may think spontaneously about going shopping 
the day after. It is important to underline that mind wandering is not an external 
distraction, such as, while performing a task our attention focuses on a phone that is 
ringing (external stimulus). An external distraction, even if it is not a thought related to 
the task, it is not self-generated but it is guided by external perception (Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2006, 2015; Schooler et al., 2011). Therefore, mind wandering experiences 
are not derived directly from an external stimulus, they form a train of endogenous 
thoughts (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013).  
Because mind wandering is so evanescent and independent from external stimuli 
specific methods to study this phenomenon have been carefully developed. A common 
method for investigating mind wandering is thought sampling, that is the assessment of 
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the inner experience of an individual as he or she is completing an experimental task. 
The measures of mind wandering used in empirical investigations can be grouped into 
two categories: probe-caught mind wandering and self-caught mind wandering. In 
probe-caught mind wandering, individuals are interrupted during the performance of a 
task and asked to report their experiences. These probe-caught mind wandering episodes 
can be recorded using a computer or through a verbal report. Probe-caught measures 
were used to examine mind wandering with two different methods. In the first method, 
the individual is trained to recognize an example of mind wandering and he or she is 
probed throughout a task to determine whether mind wandering episodes occur using 
yes/no judgments (e.g., Schooler et al., 2005). A second method requires participants to 
report what was passing through their mind right before the thought probe. These verbal 
reports are recorded and can be coded by the experimenters on whether they are on-task 
(task-related) or off-task thoughts (mind wandering) (Smallwood et al., 2003). On the 
other hand, in self-caught mind wandering, participants are asked to monitor their 
awareness for off-task thoughts and to report whenever mind wandering episodes occur 
(Cunningham et al., 2000). Self-caught mind wandering requires individuals to become 
aware of the content of their inner experiences while doing a task. Another way to 
collect mind wandering experiences is the retrospective method. The data are collected 
at the end of a task by the use of questionnaires, without interruption of the natural 
course of the task (e.g., Barron et al., 2011). Finally, an open-ended method can also be 
employed to collect data on mind wandering experiences by asking participants to 
describe in their own words what they experienced during a task (Baird et al., 2011) 
without imposing categories that constrain participants‟ reports (Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2015).  Mind wandering experiences can also be probed in ecological settings. 
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For example, participants can be asked to carry pagers during their day. An individual‟s 
experience is sampled at random intervals through an electronic device (e.g., 
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). When probed, the participant is asked to describe 
thoughts, providing details on the nature of the inner experience (Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2006) 
Our daily lives are rich with thoughts that emerge without a direct relationship to the 
here and now. This phenomenon occurs often and occupies an high amount of time 
during daily life, around 30% of the awaking hours (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth 
and Gilbert, 2010). In a study about the contents of mind wandering (Delamillieure et 
al., 2010) authors found that inner experiences of participants during rest, while 
participants were asked to let their thoughts come and go, indicate a dominance of 
mental imagery and inner speech. A majority of participants reported retrospective 
memories or prospective thoughts, or both, suggesting that when participants were let to 
think freely they often produced spontaneous memories and future-related thoughts. The 
contents of mind wandering episodes involved often thoughts that allow individuals to 
escape from the here and now, therefore, they are often temporally-related, and even 
more often future-related (Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011b; Song and Wang, 2012). For 
instance, it has been demonstrated that when engaged in a task low in cognitive 
demands, for example tasks with a low demands on working memory or attentional 
resources, individuals are more prone to experience mind wandering about the future. In 
one experiment, Smallwood and colleagues (2009) asked participants to perform three 
computerized tasks in which numbers were presented one by one. Participants 
performed a choice reaction time (CRT) task during which they were asked to 
determine whether the stimulus was odd or even. They underwent a working memory 
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task in which they were required to indicate whether the number presented before a 
target stimulus had been odd or even. Moreover, they were also asked to perform a 
passive viewing task, during which they watched numeric digits appearing on the 
screen. During all tasks, they were asked to describe their mental state at thought probes 
and classified the temporal focus of their thoughts. Participants showed a prospective 
bias: they experienced high frequency of thoughts about the future whenever the task 
environment allowed them sufficient attentional resources to do it. These results 
suggested that mind wandering towards the future needs additional resources to occur 
and these resources are used when they are available, that is, when the current task is 
not demanding. A study about mind wandering experience in Chinese participants 
demonstrated how phenomenology of mind wandering is similarly also across different 
cultures (Song and Wang, 2012). In that study, authors used a questionnaire to 
investigate mind wandering experiences during daily life through probes appearing on 
participants‟ mobile phones. Participants had to indicate whether they were mind-
wandered and answer questions about mind wandering experiences‟ characteristics, for 
example, the contents of mind wandering in terms of episodic or semantic components 
and temporal orientation of thoughts. Among Chinese participants, the episodic mind 
wandering had the highest proportion and the results showed that episodic mind 
wandering was future biased: the future-oriented episodes were more frequent than 
those with other time-orientations. Another study investigated contents of mind 
wandering (Stawarczyk et al., 2013). Authors studied mind wandering with thought-
probes during the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 
1997). During SART, non-target stimuli were presented, one stimulus at a time, and 
participants were required to respond manually to each non-target stimulus. Sometimes, 
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a target stimulus was presented and it required a manual response to be retained. SART 
was divided in different blocks and mind wandering was assessed after each block. 
After the SART completion, participants were asked to rate each mind wandering 
episode on various dimensions, including their representational format, structuration 
and intentional aspect, repetitiveness, abstractness, and emotional valence. On average, 
mind wandering episodes involved a moderate amount of visual imagery and inner 
speech, they did not belong to a structured sequence of thoughts and their occurrence 
was not intended. Moreover, mind wandering content was mostly realistic and concrete, 
and moderately important. Finally, most of the reported mind wandering episodes did 
not involve thoughts that occur repetitively, and their affective content was neutral. In 
particular, their results show that future-oriented mind wandering episodes, which were 
more frequent than other temporal categories, involve inner speech and are more self-
relevant, concrete, structured, and intended than non-future-oriented mind wandering 
episodes. Together, these results demonstrate the consistency of the prospection bias 
across studies that investigate mind wandering and show also the variety of 
characteristics of mind wandering experiences across participants and experiments. 
3.1.1 Psychological hypotheses of mind wandering 
 
There are four main psychological hypotheses that can explain the occurrence of 
mind wandering: the current concerns hypothesis, the decoupling hypothesis, the 
executive failure hypothesis, and the meta-awareness hypothesis (Smallwood, 2013).  
The current concerns hypothesis argues that the experience of mind wandering 
occurs because the individual has goals, wishes, and desires that are not related to the 
perceptual current moment. Thus, mental life is guided by salient experiences, and 
37 
 
whenever the current environment lacked of salient information, self-generated thoughts 
emerge. In a situation where the environment is full of salient perceptual information, 
for example while listening to an interesting and engaging talk, external events guide 
the attention to perception (Klinger et al., 1973). Automatic processing of current 
concerns may produce the content of mind wandering. Current concerns are processes 
active during the time one has a goal, those concerns may trigger the engagement in 
mind wandering, so that the main goal of an individual changes from paying attention to 
the current environment to thinking of a personal relevant goal, for example, when an 
individual imagine to go to the mall and to buy a necessary item while he or she is 
washing the dishes (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). 
A second hypothesis that explain mind wandering is the decoupling hypothesis. It 
assumes that certain mental processes are common to self-generated and externally 
maintained trains of thought (Antrobus et al., 1970; Teasdale et al., 1995; Smallwood 
and Schooler, 2006). Mental processes are described as decoupled when the beginning 
of their activity is not directly related to an external event. Mental processes can serve 
overlapping functions during self- and externally triggered thoughts. For example, the 
process of executive control can help the maintenance of self-generated thought 
similarly to when it maintains cognition guided by an external task (Smallwood et al., 
2007). The decoupling hypothesis assumes that executive resources, which can maintain 
also attention to the external environment, are useful to support the continuity of an 
internal train of thoughts (Teasdale et al., 1995; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; 
Smallwood et al., 2012). Evidence for this hypothesis come from studies on 
spontaneous thoughts and their relation with the disruption of sensory external attention. 
When mind wandering occurs attention to the external stimuli diminishes, suggesting 
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that mind wandering may “steal” executive resources from the external environment in 
order to survive (Mcvay and Kane, 2010; Smallwood et al., 2011a). For example, in a 
study by Smallwood and colleagues (2008) participants performed a computerized 
SART divided in blocks. At the end of each block of stimuli a thought probe was 
presented to collect on-task and off-task (mind wandering) experiences. Event-related 
potentials, generated by the non-target stimuli as a function of whether they preceded a 
marker of mind wandering or on-task experiences, were recorded. Authors found 
evidence that when the mind wanders there is a reduction in the cognitive analysis 
applied to the task. In particular, the amplitude of the P300, that is an index of the 
amount of attentional resources directed towards a stimulus, was reduced for non-targets 
presented during mind wandering compared to periods during which participants‟ 
thoughts were classified as on-task. These results show that during mind wandering 
attentional resources are less directed to the task, and are employed instead to support 
mind wandering.   
The executive failure hypothesis proposes that mind wandering is a form of 
distraction and when the attention control system fails to maintain attention to the task, 
self-generated information unrelated to the task may become prevalent. This hypothesis 
proposes that mind wandering reflects a failure of the executive-control system to 
adequately fight interfering thoughts that are generated and maintained automatically 
(Mcvay and Kane, 2009, 2010). Mcvay and Kane argued that if mind wandering 
demands resources, as it is hypothesized by the decoupling hypothesis, individuals with 
greater resources, for example working memory capacity, should mind-wander more 
often than do those with fewer resources. However, Mcvay and Kane found that people 
with high working memory capacity reported mind wandering less frequently during 
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demanding tasks than do individuals with low working memory capacity (Mcvay and 
Kane, 2009), suggesting that greater working memory resources may help individuals to 
be less prone to distractions, and so less prone to mind wandering, and more engaged in 
the current task.  
Another hypothesis argues that meta-awareness, that is the capacity to have explicit 
knowledge of the current contents of consciousness, is an important process related to 
mind wandering (Schooler, 2002; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al., 
2011). The meta-awareness hypothesis points out that the capacity to represent the 
contents of consciousness allows the individual to identify conscious thoughts that 
deviate from the desired goal. One possibility is that meta-awareness can help the 
identification of mind wandering and the consequent re-engagement of the attention to 
the main task (Schooler et al., 2011). This happens, for example, during meditation, 
when dynamic fluctuations between states of being focused on meditation and mind 
wandering occur. Meta-awareness may be critical for catching the mind engaged in a 
wandering state and for re-directing the attention to a meditative condition (Schooler et 
al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Another possibility is that meta-awareness does not 
contribute to the end of mind wandering episodes, that may terminate for other reasons 
such as for an external stimulus, but meta-awareness aids to reconstruct previous 
conscious experiences (inner cognition) retrospectively. After having delineated the 
processes that may maintain and regulate the mind wandering, to better understand this 
phenomenon it is necessary to spend few words for explaining which the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of engaging in mind wandering are.  
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3.1.2 The costs and benefits of mind wandering 
 
Studies suggest that mind wandering produces costs and benefits for individuals 
(Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). For instance, while 
individuals read they may report a high incidence of mind wandering episodes. When 
participants are asked to read a text and are periodically probed with questions 
regarding whether their thoughts are on or off-task, mind wandering frequency 
correlates negatively with reading comprehension (e.g, Schooler et al., 2005). As we 
mentioned before, a task typically used to collect mind wandering experiences is the 
SART (Robertson et al., 1997), during which thought probes are presented asking 
participants to report and classify their thoughts. The effects of mind wandering during 
performance of the SART can be observed by examining errors and reaction times. 
Mind wandering rates are correlated with SART errors, variability on reaction times, 
and omissions (Allan Cheyne et al., 2009). Therefore, mind wandering might provoke 
errors of sustained attention, such as failing to notice an infrequent target. Moreover, 
mind wandering disrupts performance also in tests of working memory. In one 
experiment by Mrazek et al. (2012) participants completed versions of the operation 
span task (OSPAN), reading span task (RSPAN), and symmetry span task (SSPAN). 
Participants completed the three tasks during which sets of letters to be remembered 
were presented in alternation with a secondary unrelated task (secondary tasks consisted 
of: verifying the accuracy of an equation for OSPAN, verifying the meaningfulness of a 
sentence for RSPAN, and verifying the vertical symmetry of an image for SSPAN). 
Mind wandering was assessed during each span task. Authors showed that performance 
on each task was negatively correlated with the number of mind wandering episodes 
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occurring during the task. Together, these results demonstrate that mind wandering 
disrupts performance in tasks of different nature.  
On the other hand, producing thoughts unrelated to the task at hand may help 
individuals in some circumstances. The self-generated thoughts that occur during mind 
wandering are often focused on the future, as we mentioned previously, hence, a 
function of mind wandering may be the anticipation and planning of personal relevant 
future goals (Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010). Thus, thinking about the future will 
permit individuals to be prepared to future aims, to overcome future obstacles, and to 
make effective decisions. Another advantageous effect of mind wandering is the ability 
to generate creative thoughts. For instance, Baird and colleagues (2012) studied the 
relation between mind wandering and creative thinking. Participants were required to 
generate as many unusual uses as possible for a common object, such as a brick, in a 
certain amount of time (Unusual Uses Task, UUT). After completing the baseline UUT, 
participants were assigned to one of four conditions. In three conditions the baseline 
UUT was followed by an incubation period. During the incubation period, one group of 
participants performed a demanding 1-back working memory task, in a second 
condition participants performed an undemanding CRT task (0-back) requiring 
infrequent responses and in another condition participant were asked to rest. In the 
fourth condition participants did not receive any break between sessions. Next, the UUT 
task was repeated in all four condition (either after the break or right after the baseline). 
In all conditions, after the break mind wandering was assessed. The study demonstrated 
that taking a break involving an undemanding task, during which more mind wandering 
episodes occurred, improved creativity more than did taking a break involving a 
demanding task, resting, or taking no break. The authors argued it is possible that 
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specific kinds of unrelated thoughts may facilitate creative problem solving. Another 
possible positive effect of mind wandering is to allow individuals to place their 
experience in a meaningful context, thus, they can integrate experiences into a 
meaningful narrative. For instance, mental simulation have been linked to enhanced life 
meaning. Simulating mental experiences that transcend the here and now may induce 
individuals to increase the sense of coherence and meaning of their own life (Waytz et 
al., 2015). Finally, mind wandering may also be useful by providing mental breaks to 
overcome monotonous tasks (Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013; Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2015). 
Now that the characteristics of mind wandering have been described it is critical to 
know which brain regions support mind wandering.  
 
3.2 Neural bases of mind wandering 
 
Initial investigation on the neural bases of mind wandering comes from two 
experiments by McGuire, Paulesu, Frackowiak, and Frith (1996). In those two 
experiments participants performed language tasks. In a first study participants were 
asked to perform overt and silent articulations and tongue movements, or they were 
asked to rest and empty their minds. In a second study, participants read single words 
silently, aloud or they read words aloud while another person was saying the words. In 
both studies, immediately after each scan, subjects were asked to rate the frequency of 
thoughts unrelated to the task or unrelated to their immediate environment (mind 
wandering). The authors demonstrated that the frequency of mind wandering 
experienced during the scans correlated mainly with mPFC activity and also with the 
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inferior temporal gyrus activity, estimated using positron emission tomography (PET) 
scans. After that, other studies explored the relationship between mind wandering and 
brain activity using magnetic resonance imagining (MRI) techniques. For instance, a 
study revealed that rest (during which an high frequency of stimulus unrelated thoughts 
was found), as compared to a tone detection task, was associated with increased activity 
in many brain regions mainly in the left hemisphere, such as the orbital frontal and 
rostral-ventral anterior cingulate cortex, dorsal prefrontal cortex, parahippocampus, 
angular gyrus, posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex. Authors hypothesized that during 
rest individuals may track the passage of time, plan future actions, or retrieve episodic 
information (Binder et al., 1999). In another study (McKiernan et al., 2003, 2006), the 
frequency of mind wandering experiences was collected during an auditory target 
detection task in a mock scan. Task difficulty was manipulated within each of three 
factors: stimulus presentation rate, target discriminability, and memory load. It has been 
shown that during tasks composed by targets easy to detect participants produced about 
twice thoughts unrelated to the task compared to a more difficult task (targets difficult 
to detect). In this study, correlations between mind wandering frequency and brain 
deactivation induced by the task were calculated, which revealed strong correlations in 
the posterior parieto-occipital cortex, fusiform gyrus, anterior cingulate gyrus, and 
middle frontal gyrus. The authors interpreted the results suggesting that those brain 
regions are engaged in cognitive processing during resting conditions, and this cognitive 
processing is interrupted in the presence of an exogenous task (McKiernan et al., 2003, 
2006). An important study on mind wandering, which linked mind wandering to the 
DMN activity, revealed a significant positive correlation between the frequency of mind 
wandering and the change in blood-oxygen-level dependent signal in several regions 
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observed when participants performed practiced (high incidence of mind wandering) 
compared to novel blocks (Mason et al., 2007). To investigate the relation between 
brain activity and mind wandering, the authors trained participants on blocks of verbal 
and visuospatial working-memory tasks (practiced blocks). Moreover, some other new 
blocks were administered (novel blocks). The verbal working memory task involved 
remembering and manipulating 4-letter sequences. After a 4-letter sequence was 
displayed, an arrow indicated if the string should be referenced in the forward or 
backward direction. The participants were then prompted by the appearance of one of 
the four letters contained in the string and they were to indicate the position at which the 
letter appeared in the string displayed before. The visuospatial task involved 
remembering and manipulating finger-tapping patterns. A key-press sequence to follow 
was displayed and it was indicated whether the key-press sequence should be performed 
in the forward or backward direction. Among trials a fixation was displayed (baseline). 
Proportion of thoughts participants classified as mind wandering varied by block type 
(baseline, practiced, or novel): participants reported a greater proportion of mind 
wandering experiences during the baseline blocks than during both practiced blocks and 
novel blocks. Participants reported a significantly greater proportion of mind wandering 
experiences during the practiced blocks than during the novel blocks. fMRI results 
showed that activity in brain regions belonging to the DMN was greater during high-
incidence of mind wandering periods. Activation was found in the mPFC, superior 
frontal gyri, anterior cingulate, posterior cingulate, precuneus, angular gyrus, insula, 
superior temporal, and middle temporal gyri. These findings demonstrated that activity 
observed in the DMN is associated with mind wandering and that reductions in 
processing demands, performing practiced versus novel sequences, were accompanied 
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by an increment in both mind wandering and in activity of the DMN (Mason et al., 
2007). Consistent results about the involvement of DMN in mind wandering come also 
from other experiments (Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). In particular, 
Christoff and colleagues explored the brain recruitment that occurs when the mind 
wanders away from the main task asking participants to report also how aware they 
were about the mind wandering experience. To collect mind wandering reports 
participants were presented with thought probes while performing a SART. Each 
thought probe asked subjects two questions: whether their attention was focused on the 
task or off-task, and whether or not they were aware of where their attention was 
focused. Unawareness was defined to subjects as the experience of not recognizing that 
mind wandering had occurred until the probe was presented. The interval of time 
directly preceding a probe was classified as on-task or off-task according to 
participants‟ response to the thought probe. Off-task intervals were divided into mind 
wandering with meta-awareness and mind wandering in the absence of meta-awareness. 
Errors in SART provided a behavioral index of mind wandering, hence, the interval 
preceding each target was categorized according to the subject‟s response as either 
correct or incorrect. During episodes of mind wandering (off-task thoughts), compared 
with episodes of being on-task, the recruitment of both default and executive network 
regions was observed. Activations were observed in the most prominent DMN regions, 
including the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24/32), the precuneus, and the 
temporoparietal junction. Also executive regions were activated: the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, temporopolar cortex, inferior and 
middle temporal gyri, anterior insula, and caudate nucleus, suggesting a processing 
overlap between mind wandering and central executive resources. Moreover, authors 
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examined brain recruitment preceding errors. Activations were observed in DMN 
regions: the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and vmPFC (BAs 10 and 11). Both 
mind wandering and errors were preceded by activation in the DMN, suggesting a 
convergence between subjective and behavioral measures of mind wandering. 
Interestingly, brain recruitment in DMN and executive network was strongest when 
mind wandering occurred in the absence of meta-awareness. These findings 
demonstrate that mind wandering disrupts more task performance when it occurs 
without meta-awareness (Christoff et al., 2009).  
An attempt to investigate different kind of cognition that occurs during mind 
wandering was performed by Stawarczky and colleagues (2011). They classified 
conscious experiences that can occur while participants perform a task requiring 
attention. In order to clarify the role of the brain activation in mind wandering compared 
to external attention, participants reported their experiences while they performed the 
SART. Thus, four possible responses to thought-probes were included, corresponding to 
the four classes of conscious experiences. Conscious experiences that can occur while 
performing a task were defined along two dimensions: task-relatedness and stimulus-
dependency. These two dimensions define the classes of conscious experiences: task-
related and stimulus-dependent (being completely focused on the current task), task-
related and stimulus-independent (thoughts related to the appraisal of the task), task-
unrelated and stimulus-dependent (external distractions), and task-unrelated and 
stimulus-independent (mind wandering). Authors found that reports of task-unrelated 
experiences (mind wandering and external distractions) were associated with increased 
activity in the mPFC, the posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, and the posterior 
inferior parietal lobule, all regions within the DMN. Interestingly, increased activity in 
47 
 
midline DMN regions was also associated with reports of stimulus-independent 
conscious experiences, independently of whether the content of these thoughts was 
related to the SART or not. Specifically, mind wandering episodes were associated with 
the highest degree of DMN activity but external distractions and task-related 
interferences (thoughts related to the appraisal of the task) were also associated with 
higher DMN activity compared to being focused on the task. This result suggests that 
these brain regions underlie cognitive processes active during both attention toward 
external stimuli and internal thoughts. Authors concluded that DMN is not a unified 
system but different regions may support different kind of cognition. 
Together, these studies provided evidence for the importance of areas belonging to 
the DMN in supporting mind wandering. These regions partially overlap with those 
found to be involved in deliberate MTT, for example the mPFC, the posterior cingulate, 
and temporal areas. The next section will focus on the DMN, its discovery and its 
function in spontaneous and deliberate cognition. 
 
4 The brain‟s default network (DMN) 
 
The DMN is a set of brain regions in which activity increases when individuals are 
at rest or perform relatively undemanding tasks, for instance while they are fixating a 
cross on a computer screen. These regions are more activated during passive conditions 
than during an ongoing task. This can be interpreted as due to the fact that during rest 
individuals may perform some forms of mental operations that leads to brain activations 
(Shulman et al., 1997; Binder et al., 1999; Mazoyer et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). 
The DMN was originally defined by patterns of deactivation during tasks of goal-
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directed cognition compared to passive conditions. The core regions that compose the 
DMN are vmPFC, posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, inferior parietal lobule, 
lateral temporal cortex, dMPFC, and hippocampal formation (Buckner et al., 2008). 
Attention was driven to the DMN‟s discovery in 2001 with papers written by 
Raichle and colleagues (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). However, also 
before those papers, other authors explored the possibility that spontaneous thinking 
makes an important contribution to the rest state (Ingvar, 1985; Andreasen et al., 1995; 
Shulman et al., 1997). Ingvar (1985) and Andreasen et al. (1995) observed that the rest 
state was associated with dynamic mental activity (Buckner et al., 2008). It was 
suggested that the regions of the DMN are involved in remembering episodes, and 
planning (Andreasen et al., 1995; Binder et al., 1999).  Later, it has been shown that the 
brain regions across the DMN were functionally related and they work in a coherent 
system (Greicius et al., 2003).  
Studies have linked activity within the DMN to two main functions: monitoring of 
the external environment (the sentinel hypothesis) or internal mentation (Buckner et al., 
2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). The sentinel hypothesis argues that passive conditions 
allow the individuals to monitor the external environment. It hypothesizes that activity 
within the DMN reflects attention to the external environment, when individuals 
monitor the environment for stimuli or significant events (Shulman et al., 1997; 
Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). A first evidence that supports this hypothesis is that task-
induced deactivation in the DMN is most pronounced during tasks that involve foveal as 
compared to parafoveal or peripheral stimuli (Shulman et al., 1997). Secondly, under 
some circumstances, performance on sensory processing tasks correlates positively with 
DMN activity. Hahn et al. (2007), for example, observed that the DMN was linked to 
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high levels of performance on a target-detection task but only for a diffuse attention 
condition where targets appeared at possible multiple locations, this result was not 
present when attention was cued to a specific location. These results suggest that 
regions within the DMN are active when attention focuses broadly on the environment 
and support the sentinel hypothesis. 
However, in addition to broadly monitoring the external environment, during 
passive tasks participants commonly engage in internal cognitive processes, for 
instance, the generation of mental images, remembering past experiences, and 
simulating future situations. The internal mentation hypothesis suggests that the DMN 
permits self-reflective thought, which can activate medial prefrontal regions within the 
DMN (Buckner et al., 2008). In line with the idea that mPFC has a role in self-reflective 
processing, it has been found that imagining scenarios related to personal goals was 
associated with increased activity in ventral part of the mPFC relative to imagining non-
personal experiences (Abraham et al., 2008; D‟Argembeau et al., 2010b). vmPFC shows 
greater patterns of activation for self-related judgments relative to other-related 
judgments (van der Meer et al., 2010; Murray et al., 2012). In addition, the mPFC 
mediates the self-reference effect in memory tasks, that is the advantage to remember 
better self-related information than other-related information (Philippi et al., 2012). A 
damage to the mPFC abolishes the self-reference effect, suggesting that the mPFC may 
facilitate the representation of the self-relevance (Philippi et al., 2012). These results 
suggest an involvement of the mPFC, a key node of the DMN, in supporting thoughts 
that are self-reflective. The DMN also includes the hippocampal formation and regions 
that have been found important for supporting episodic remembering and EFT (see 2.2 
and 2.3; Buckner and Carroll, 2007). It is possible, therefore, that the DMN underlies 
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the ability to construct mental simulations. Andreasen et al. (1995) realized the 
correspondence between autobiographical memory and the DMN, showing that many 
regions of the DMN were active during autobiographical memory retrieval, including 
the vmPFC, dMPFC, posterior cingulate, inferior parietal lobe, lateral temporal cortex, 
and hippocampal formation (Maguire, 2001; Svodoba et al., 2006). Several studies 
reported the involvement of regions within the DMN not only in remembering the past, 
but also in imagining the future (see 2.2, 2.3; Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; 
Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007). Moreover, regions within the DMN are active 
when individuals simulate other kind of mental experiences, for instance, when they 
take the perspective of others (see Spreng et al., 2009). The internal mentation 
hypothesis is also consistent with the functional fractionation of the DMN (Buckner et 
al., 2008). Indeed, Andrews-Hannah and colleagues (2010b) revealed distinct 
components of the DMN while participants were making personal decisions framed into 
the present or into the future. Firstly, in order to study the architecture of the DMN, 
intrinsic functional connectivity MRI was used to extract low-frequency spontaneous 
blood oxygenation level-dependent fluctuations within a set of a priori DMN regions. 
The results revealed that a core set of regions, including posterior cingulate cortex and 
anterior medial prefrontal cortex, is linked to two separate subsystems. One subsystem, 
named the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) subsystem, includes the dMPFC, 
temporoparietal junction, lateral temporal cortex, and temporal pole. The second 
subsystem, called the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, includes the vmPFC, 
posterior inferior parietal lobule, retrosplenial cortex, parahippocampalcortex, and 
hippocampal formation. In a second experiment, authors studies the functional 
contributions of each component of the DMN. Participants were asked to answer 
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multiple choices questions about self or non-self that were framed in the future or in the 
present. For example, future self questions asked about hypothetical autobiographical 
events that were to be experienced by the participant (e.g., “Think about where you will 
be and who you will be with tomorrow afternoon during lunch. Who will you be eating 
lunch with: no one, your significant other, or someone else?”). For the future non-self 
questions, participants were asked questions that required semantic knowledge about the 
future (e.g., “In two days, a sporting event will be televised by reporters in the 
southwest United States. Is the type of sport more likely to be: rodeo, baseball, or 
another type of sport?”) (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b). The dMPFC subsystem was 
engaged when participants made self-referential judgments about their present situation 
or mental states. Based also on previous findings (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2003; Gusnard et 
al., 2001; Ochsner et al., 2004), authors hypothesized that the dMPFC subsystem may 
support self-judgments and mental state inference of others. In contrast, the MTL 
subsystem was preferentially engaged during episodic judgments about the personal 
future. In general, those brain areas are fundamental for past and future autobiographical 
thinking, episodic memory, and contextual retrieval (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 
These findings support the internal mentation hypothesis about the involvement of the 
DMN in the creating mental simulation. Several studies support the hypothesis that the 
DMN maintains spontaneous cognition (see 3.2; Binder et al., 1999; Mason et al., 2007; 
Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Indeed, it was observed that while 
individuals mind-wander the DMN is active and it has previously been suggested that 
during mind wandering episodes individuals tend to escape from the here and now (see 
3.1 and 3.2).  
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It is worth noting that many kinds of mental simulation show the common activation 
of the mPFC, that is part of the DMN (see 2.2 and 3.2). For example, a functional 
connectivity analysis (Spreng and Grady, 2010) revealed that activity of the mPFC was 
correlated with activity in other regions in the DMN during autobiographical memory, 
EFT, and theory of mind tasks. Moreover, several neuroimaging studies indicates that 
the mPFC, and in particular the vmPFC, is involved in EFT and episodic memory 
retrieval (Gilboa, 2004; Addis et al., 2007, 2009a; Summerfield et al., 2009; Bonnici et 
al., 2012), and also in constructing atemporal experiences (Hassabis et al., 2007a). In 
detail, there is evidence from neuroimaging studies that the ventral part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex is engaged while constructing complex scenarios (Hassabis and 
Maguire, 2007), supporting future affective simulations (Benoit et al., 2014), when 
thinking about the self in time (D‟Argembeau et al., 2010b), and during mind wandering 
(Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a) (see also 1, 2.2 and 3.2). Together, 
these results lead to an interesting question: is activity in vmPFC necessary for different 
forms of deliberate and more automatic forms of mental simulation? This is the question 
we begin to answer with this thesis project. 
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5 Experiment 1 - Ventromedial prefrontal damage causes a pervasive 
impairment of episodic memory and future thinking 
[This study has been published in Bertossi E., Tesini C., Cappelli A., Ciaramelli E., 
Neuropsychologia, 2016] 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Human beings can imagine vividly episodes that happened to them in the past and 
episodes that may occur in their future, this capacity is called mental time travel (MTT; 
see chapter 2). MTT may have positive effects on wellbeing and decision-making. For 
example, future-oriented thought increases the overall level of happiness (Quoidbach et 
al., 2009), and reduces temporal discounting (TD), that is the tendency to devalue a 
reward as the delay until its delivery increases, which may result in preferences for 
smaller-immediate over larger-later rewards (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 
2011). 
Remembering the past and imagining the future rely on a common “core” 
network of brain regions, including the vmPFC. As mentioned previously (see chapter 
4), these brain regions also take part in the DMN, a network of brain regions 
particularly active when individuals tend to switch their attention inward, for example 
towards memories, desires, and plans for the future (see 2.1 and 2.2). Other evidence for 
the common neural bases of episodic memory and future thinking comes from cases of 
patients with brain damage (see 2.3). For instance, amnesic patients with MTLs damage 
or bilateral parietal lobe damage are as deficient in imagining novel experiences as they 
are in remembering past experiences (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; Hassabis et al., 
2007b; Berryhill et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011).  
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The structural overlap between remembering and imagining personal events can 
be interpreted in functional terms: as two instances of MTT, they may share MTT‟s 
component processes (see 2.1), such as “autonoetic consciousness” (Tulving, 1985; 
Wheeler et al., 1997), and “self-projection” (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). Remembering 
past and imagining future events, however, also commonly engage general constructive 
processes needed to access and recombine stored episodic details (Schacter et al., 2008, 
2012) and generate the spatial context for these details to reside (“scene construction”; 
Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). These processes are necessary for MTT, but not specific 
to MTT, because any experience, whether self-relevant or not, and whether located in 
the past, the future, or atemporal, equally needs to be assembled and staged (whereas 
MTT refers specifically to mental time travel in subjective time; Wheeler et al., 1997).  
Differences in brain activity between past and future MTT have also been noted, 
for example in frontopolar, dorsomedial, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices, which 
were more active during construction of future compared to past events (Okuda et al., 
2003; Addis et al., 2007; Benoit and Schacter, 2015). These differences have been 
generally related to the higher demands EFT (compared to remembering) places on 
constructive processes, requiring the flexible recombination and integration of details 
from multiple episodes into an event not experienced before (Schacter et al., 2012). A 
few reports have investigated the causal role of prefrontal cortex in episodic memory 
and future thinking (see also 2.3). Berryhill and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that 
patients with lesions to the lateral prefrontal cortex were impaired at imagining novel 
experiences, however they possess preserved autobiographical memory. Patients with 
Parkinson‟s disease show intact episodic remembering but impaired future thinking, 
with the degree of impairment related to executive functioning (de Vito et al., 2012). 
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Weiler and colleagues (2011) described patients with lesions in the medial dorsal 
thalamus, which is connected with prefrontal cortex, who could remember personal past 
experiences but had difficulties at imagining future episodes. Interestingly, patients‟ 
deficits were even more marked when they had to imagine events happening to other 
people. Moreover, patients with traumatic brain injury involving prefrontal cortex show 
deficits in both remembering the past and imagining the future (Rasmussen and 
Berntsen, 2014). Also, frontotemporal dementia causes a similar impairment in past and 
future MTT, although EFT and remembering deficits correlate with atrophy in 
frontopolar and medial prefrontal cortices, respectively (Irish et al., 2013). These 
findings suggest that prefrontal cortex is involved in MTT, but different regions of 
prefrontal cortex may mediate different processes of MTT. 
In this experiment we focus on vmPFC. Many lines of research have suggested a 
possible involvement of vmPFC in future thinking (see 1, 2.3, and 4). Patients with 
lesion to vmPFC (vmPFC patients) show a short future time perspective (Fellows and 
Farah, 2005), they appear “myopic” to the future consequences of their choices 
(Bechara et al., 1994), and show steeper TD than healthy and brain-damaged controls 
(Sellitto et al., 2010). Moreover, vmPFC patients may exhibit a disorder of memory, 
named “confabulation”, involving false recall and recognition of events that did not 
actually happen (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; Gilboa et al., 2006), indicating that past 
MTT is also compromised. 
 The first aim of the present work is to investigate whether vmPFC is critically 
and equally involved in past and future MTT. A second aim of the study relates to the 
fact that MTT is strongly connected to the self and identity (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000), and that vmPFC is known to be strongly implicated in self-related 
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processing (e.g., D‟Argembeau, 2013). Considering that vmPFC is implicated in MTT 
and in self-related processing, we predicted that this region would be crucial to 
remember personal past events and imagine personal future ones, but not to conceive 
events happening to others. To test our hypotheses, we studied how vmPFC patients and 
healthy controls remember personal past events and imagine personal future events at 
different timeframes, and how they imagine events that may happen to a “close” other 
(family member) or a “distant” other (President of the Italian Republic). 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
 Participants included 7 patients with vmPFC damage (vmPFC patients; 7 males, 
age: M = 44.1, SD = 12.6; years of education: M = 10.8, SD = 2.7) and 11 healthy 
individuals (11 males, age: M = 41.6, SD =11.9; years of education: M = 11.2, SD = 
2.5), matched to patients in terms of age (t = - 0.43, p = 0.68), and education (t = 0.26, p 
= 0.80). Patients were recruited at the Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. vmPFC patients‟ lesions were the results of the rupture of 
an aneurysm of the ACoA in 5 cases, and traumatic brain injury (TBI) in 2 cases. 
Lesions were bilateral in all cases, though often asymmetrically so (see Figure 1). 
Included patients were in the stable phase of recovery (at least 1 year post-morbid), 
were not receiving psychoactive drugs, and had no other diagnosis likely to affect 
cognition or interfere with the participation in the study (e.g., significant psychiatric 
disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular disease). As well, the healthy 
individuals were not taking psychoactive drugs, and were free of current or past 
psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. Participants gave informed 
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consent to take part in the study, according to the Declaration of Helsinki (International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee of the 
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna. 
 
5.2.2 Lesion analysis 
Patients‟ individual lesions, as shown in the most recent magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI; N = 3) or computerized tomography (CT; N = 4) images, were manually 
drawn by a neurologist (not involved in the present study, and blind to task 
performance) directly on each slice of the normalized T1-weighted template MRI scan 
from the Montreal Neurological Institute provided with the MRIcro software (Rorden 
and Brett, 2000) (see also Karnath et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2008; Tsuchida and Fellows, 
2012). This template is approximately oriented to match Talairach space (Talairach and 
Tournoux, 1988) and is distributed with MRIcro. The standard template provides 
various anatomical landmarks to help experts plot the size and localization of the lesion 
using structural features such as sulci and gyri as guides. This manual procedure 
combines segmentation (identification of lesion boundaries) and registration (to a 
standard template) into a single step, with no additional transformation required 
(Kimberg et al., 2007). Manual segmentation/registration procedures have the limit to 
rely greatly on anatomical expertise, and to be subjective in nature. On the other hand, 
they circumvent problems frequently encountered by automated normalization 
procedures, such as (1) warping scans from individuals with brain injury, which may be 
affected by structural distortions related to the lesion and not easily compensated for 
(e.g., ventricular enlargement, large regions of atypical voxel intensity values, artifacts 
induced by the presence of metallic clips), and (2) combining subjects scanned with 
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different imaging modalities (e.g., MRI vs. CT) (see Fiez et al., 2000; Kimberg et al., 
2007). With respect to (1), when tracing lesions relative to scans with a surgical clip 
present in which artifacts made it difficult to observe damaged tissue, if damage was 
evident above and below the slices containing clip artifacts, then it was extrapolated that 
the lesion also included the region occupied by the clip (see also Ghosh et al., 2014). As 
for (2), when registering lesions documented in scans with slice thickness different from 
that of the standard template (1 mm), if damage was evident in two consecutive slices of 
the original image, then it was extrapolated that the lesion also included the region in 
between, and drawn on the corresponding slices of the template. MRIcro software was 
used to estimate lesion volumes (in cc) and to generate lesion overlap images.  
Figure 1 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in vmPFC patients. 
Brodmann's areas (BA) affected in the vmPFC group were areas BA 10, BA 11, BA 24, 
BA 25, BA 32, BA 46, BA 47, with region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M 
= 19.70 cc, SD = 11.62, about 30% of BA 11‟s volume), BA 10 (M =  14.20 cc, SD = 
4.24, about 38% of BA 10‟s volume), and BA 32 (M = 8.05 cc, SD = 2.98, about 25% 
of BA 32‟s volume). 
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Figure 1. Extent and overlap of brain lesions. The figure represents vmPFC patients‟ 
lesions projected on the same seven axial slices and on the sagittal view of the standard 
Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines on the sagittal view 
are the positions of the axial slices, and the white numbers belong to the axial views are 
the z-coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping 
lesions. Maximal overlap occurs in BA 11, 10, and 32. The left hemisphere is on the left 
side. 
 
5.2.3  Neuropsychological assessment 
A standardized neuropsychological assessment showed that vmPFC patients‟ 
general cognitive functioning was generally preserved, as indicated by the average 
scores obtained in the Mini Mental State Examination and the Raven Standard Matrices 
(see Table 1). Patients reported normal scores also in verbal and spatial short-term 
memory, as well as in working memory tests. Executive functions were generally 
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preserved, with the exception of performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 
suggesting a deficit in cognitive flexibility. We note that TBI patients evinced 
marginally lower semantic fluency (Mann-Whitney Z = 1.93, p = 0.09) and working-
memory performance compared to ACoA patients ( t = -2.53, p = 0.06, Crawford and 
Garthwaite, 2002). Long-term memory was weak. In the Buschke–Fuld Test (Buschke 
and Fuld, 1974), a standardized list learning task involving free recall, patients exhibited 
a highly pathological score (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), and performance in a prose-
passage recall task was poor, although within the normal limits (Spinnler and Tognoni, 
1987) (see Table 1). Patients did not show spontaneous confabulation, based on clinical 
evidence, their behavior in real life, and interviews with family members: patients did 
not confabulate without apparent prompting (Kopelman, 1987) or act upon erroneous 
memories (Schnider, 2008). 
vmPFC patients (but not healthy controls) also completed a computerized TD 
task (Sellitto et al., 2010). In a series of trials, patients chose between an amount of 
(hypothetical) money that could be received immediately (e.g., 20 Euros) and another 
amount that could be received after a delay (40 Euros). Participants made five choices at 
six delays: 2 days, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year. Using a staircase 
procedure, the amount of the immediate reward was adjusted based on the participant‟s 
choices, to estimate the rate at which the subjective value of a reward decays with time. 
This was assessed through two indices: the TD parameter k (Green and Myerson, 2004), 
and the area under the empirical discounting curve (AUC) (Myerson et al., 2001). To 
estimate k, the hyperbolic function SV = 1/(1 + kD), where SV = subjective value 
(expressed as a fraction of the delayed amount), and D = delay (in days), was fit to the 
data to determine the k constant of the best fitting TD function, using a nonlinear least-
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squares algorithm. The larger the value of k, the steeper TD, the more participants were 
inclined to choose small-immediate rewards over larger-delayed rewards. To calculate 
AUC, delays and subjective values were first normalized: delays were expressed as a 
proportion of the maximum delay (360 days), and subjective values were expressed as a 
proportion of the delayed amount (40 Euros). Delays and subjective values were then 
plotted as x and y coordinates, respectively, to construct a discounting curve. Vertical 
lines were drawn from each x value to the curve, subdividing the area under the curve 
into a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid was calculated as (x2 - x1)(y1 + 
y2)/2, where x1 and x2  are successive delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective values 
associated with these delays (Myerson et al., 2001). The AUC is the sum of the areas of 
all the trapezoids, and varies between 0 and 1. The smaller the AUC, the steeper TD. 
 
5.2.4  Stimuli 
 Twenty four cue words (frequency: M = 65.04, SD = 105.55; imageability: M = 
5.89, SD = 0.5; concreteness: M = 5.84, SD = 0.96; familiarity: M = 6.65, SD = 0.08), 
were selected from Burani et al. (2001), and allocated randomly to 4 lists of 6 words 
which did not differ significantly in frequency, imageability, concreteness, or familiarity 
(Kruskall-Wallis H < 1.96, p > 0.58 in all analyses). The assignment of the lists to the 4 
experimental sessions (3 self-related, 1 other-related), the assignment of the different 
cue words within each list to different timeframes (see below), as well as the order of 
administration of the different time-frames, were determined randomly for each 
participant.  
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Table 1. vmPFC patients‟ clinical information. 
vmPFC patients: P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 Mean (ES) 
SRM  35 33 42 21 47 42 34 36.3 (3.1) 
MMSE 25 28 28 21* 29 24 29 26.3 
Verbal Judgments 44 54 40 48 45 58 52 48.7 (2.6) 
Corsi test:         
   Span 4 6 5 3* 7 5 6 5.1 (2.7) 
   Supra span 26.6 28.5 27.9 3.3* 28.7 16.9 27.8 22.8 (3) 
DigitSpan 5 7 6 7 7 5 6 6.1 (3.7) 
Working Memory:         
   Misses 2 1 7* - 1 0 4* 2.5 
   False alarms 4* 8* 0 - 3 17* 0 5.3 
Buschke-Fuld LTM 26 * 126 82*  67*  56*  35* 103 70.7 (0.6*) 
Prose recall 13.5 13.8 8 6.3 7 3.3* 13.5 9.3 (1.6) 
Tower of London test: 
 
        
Number of moves 
 
 
(moves 
46 44 38 100* 31 22 44 46.4 
WCST         
   Perseverative errors 
 
 
 
28 64 * 37*  - 76 * 60*  32* 49.5 
Stroop test:         
   Errors 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 1 0.2 
Verbal fluency:         
   Phonemic 30 26 25 23 20 19 33 25.1(1.7) 
   Semantic 51 45 35 30 55 39 39 42(3) 
TD rates:         
    K 0.157 0.001 0.1212 0.00005 0.0164 0.007 0.0741 0.05 
   AUC 0.15 0.8 0.29 0.98 0.39 0.5 0.18 0.47 
 
Note. Uncorrected scores. SRM = Standard Raven Matrices; MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination; 
LTM = long-term memory score; WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; TD = Temporal Discounting; k 
= temporal discounting parameter; AUC = area under the curve. Dashes indicate data not available. 
Asterisks indicate performance below the normal limits. Values in bold denote patients with Traumatic 
Brain Injury. In the last column, we report mean uncorrected scores, and, in brackets, mean Equivalent 
Score (ES), when available. The ES ranges from 0-4, with 0 = pathological performance, 1 = borderline 
performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance. 
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5.2.5  Episodic memory and future thinking task 
 We used an adaptation of the Crovitz task (Crovitz and Schiffman, 1974), 
comprising both a self-related condition (18 events administered in 3 separate sessions) 
and an other-related condition (6 events in 1 session). To prevent fatigue, participants 
received the 4 experimental sessions in 4 different days, at least 1 week apart. 
 
5.2.5.1  Self-related condition 
 Participants remembered personal past events and imagined personal future 
events in as much detail as possible in response to cue words (Crovitz and Schiffman, 
1974; Addis et al., 2007). All events had to be specific in time and place, and have 
lasted minutes or hours, but not more than a day. Future events had to be plausible, but 
novel. In each trial, the instructions specified (1) the type of task (“recall past event” or 
“imagine future event”), (2) the timeframe for past events (“yesterday”, “last year”, or 
“5 years ago”) or future events (“tomorrow”, “next year”, or “in 5 years”), and (3) the 
cue word. Participants were told to use the cue-words flexibly: the event did not have to 
strictly involve the named object; participants could freely associate so that they would 
be successful in generating an event. Moreover, if a cue-word proved completely 
ineffective in eliciting any event, participants could choose another cue-word from an 
additional list of 24 cue words matched in frequency, familiarity, concreteness and 
imageability to the original cue-words (p > 0.09 in all cases).  
 Participants recounted the event they had in mind for 3 minutes (recall phase), 
then a probe appeared to encourage greater usage of details (i.e., “Do you want to add 
something?”), and participants could add detail to their descriptions for an additional 
minute. Participants then rated the events on a Likert scale ranging from 1-8 for (a) 
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vividness (1, “not vivid”; 8, “extremely vivid”), (b) valence (1, “very negative”; 8, 
“very positive”), (c) current emotion (i.e., the emotion felt at the time of 
recalling/imagining the event: 1, “not intense”; 8, “extremely intense”), (d) past/future 
emotion (i.e., the emotion felt at the time of the past event/that would be felt if the 
future event occurred: 1, “not intense”; 8, “extremely intense”), (e) personal importance 
of the event (1, “not important ”; 8, “extremely important/life-changing”), (f) feeling of 
re/pre-experiencing (1, “not at all”; 8, “completely”), (g) temporal connectedness (i.e., 
the perceived similarity of the current self to the self in the past/future event: 1, “very 
different”; 8, “exactly the same”), and (h) visual perspective (field vs. observer 
perspective). 
 In each experimental session, participants remembered 3 events (happened 
“yesterday”,  “last year”, and “5 years ago”) and imagined 3 future events (to happen 
“tomorrow”, “next year” or “in 5 years”), for a total of 18 events (9 past and 9 future 
events).  
 
5.2.5.2  Other-related condition 
  Participants imagined future events that may occur in 1 year to a close other (a 
family member; 3 events) and a distant other (the President of the Italian Republic, who 
at the time of testing was Giorgio Napolitano; 3 events) using words as cues. All events 
in the close other condition had to pertain to the same family member, whom 
participants chose at the beginning of the session. Procedures in the other-related 
condition were similar to those in the self-related condition, with the exception that the 
cueing slide specified whether the subject had to imagine a future event happening to a 
“family member” or “Giorgio Napolitano”. Participants then rated the event across a 
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number of different categories. Ratings from (a) to (e) were identical to those in the self-
related condition. Participants also rated other-related events for (f) others‟ emotions 
(i.e., the emotions the other would feel if the event happened: 1, “not intense”; 8, 
“extremely intense”), (g) others‟ temporal connectedness (i.e., the similarity between 
the other‟s current self and the other‟s self during the future event, as perceived by the 
participant: 1, “very different”; 8, “exactly the same”), and (h) similarity to the self (i.e., 
the degree to which the participant feels similar to the close/distant other: 1, “very 
different”; 8, “exactly the same”). 
5.2.6 Scoring  
 Testing sessions were recorded to enable transcription and later scoring of 
participants‟ reports. Participants‟ records were scored using the Autobiographical 
Interview protocol developed by Levine et al. (2002). Briefly, for each trial, the central 
event was identified and, if more than one event was mentioned, the event described in 
more detail was considered the main event. Each event was divided into distinct details 
(unique bits of information), and these details were classified as internal (episodic 
details) or external (semantic information, repetitions, and information not specific to 
the main event).  
 Two raters, blind to group membership and to the hypothesis of the study, scored 
the transcripts independently. A main rater scored all events, and a second rater scored 
1/3 of self-related and 1/3 of other-related events. Inter-rater reliability for internal and 
external details between the two raters were assessed with intra-class correlation 
(McGraw et al., 1996), which indicated high agreement between the two scorers. 
Coefficients for internal and external detail of self-related events were 0.97 and 0.95, 
respectively, and 0.98 for both internal and external details of other-related events.  
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5.2.6.1 Self-referential processing scoring 
 As suggested by a referee, we also coded self-relevant past and future events for 
self-references and references to other people (as in Kurczek et al., 2015). The first 
author marked all references to people and groups of people in both the subject (e.g., I 
went to Chianti) and object position of a sentence (e.g., the waiter handed red wine to 
me). References coded as self-references included first person singular and first person 
plural pronouns and possessive cases (Italian equivalents of I, me, my, mine, we, us, 
our, ours, etc). References to others included third person singular and third person 
plural pronouns and possessive cases (Italian equivalents of he, him, she, her, you, 
yours, they, them, theirs, etc). Repetitions of self and other references contained in a 
false start (e.g, I I went to Chianti) were counted only once. One difference between 
Italian and English is that in Italian the verb’s desinence identifies the subject even if 
the pronoun is not explicitly stated (e.g., both “io andai” and “andai” mean “I went”), 
and it is the context that specifies whether it is more appropriate to make the pronoun 
explicit or not. Thus, also verbs with no personal pronouns expressed counted as 
self/other references in our scoring. We calculated a self-reference index as: Self 
references / (Self references + Other references) as in Kurczek et al. (2015).  
 
5.2.7  Confabulated details 
 We checked the truthfulness of all events produced by vmPFC patients asking a 
close relative to provide corroboration. Erroneous details in demanding memory tasks 
are formally considered a measure of provoked confabulation (Kopelman, 1987; 
Schnider et al., 1996), which is dissociable from spontaneous confabulation (Schnider, 
2008). However, assessing provoked confabulation in vmPFC patients is important to 
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qualify their memory abilities. Confabulations in the past/future were defined as internal 
or external details representing information incongruous with the autobiographical 
history/possible future actions of the patient (or the close and distant other) or with an 
incorrect time reference, e.g., recalling an alleged accident at the luna park, imagining a 
future trip with a car already sold (Dalla Barba et al., 1997; Moscovitch and Melo, 
1997). We did not check the truthfulness of events produced by healthy controls. 
 
5.2.8 Statistical analyses 
 For each event, internal and external details were tallied. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that the effect of general probe was very slight in comparison to free recall of 
both self-related and other-related events. Therefore, for clarity, we report the data 
collapsed across the free recall and general probe phases. For each condition, the details 
were averaged across the 3 events, separately for internal and external categories. The 
main analyses were conducted on patients‟ complete reports, including both veridical 
and confabulated details. Internal and external confabulatory details were separated 
from the non-confabulatory details for further analysis (see Confabulation sections). 
Statistical analyses on details were performed using analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Given that subjective ratings, were, in most cases, non-normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov d > 0.42, p < 0.05), these were analyzed using non-parametric 
statistics. Between-group differences were assessed with Mann-Whitney U tests, and 
within-group differences were assessed using Friedman ANOVAs and Wilcoxon 
matched pairs tests. We report results significant at p < 0.05, two-tailed.  
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Self-related condition 
5.3.1.1  Details 
 vmPFC patients produced fewer personal past (7.7 vs. 9.0) and personal future 
events (8.6 vs. 9.0) than controls, though group differences were not significant (Mann-
Whitney Test: p = 0.15 in both cases), likely due to ceiling effects in healthy controls. 
Patients and controls used a similar number of extra cue-words to construct past (0.38 
vs. 0.21) and future events (0.32 vs. 0.10) (p > 0.15 in both cases). 
 Figure 2 shows that vmPFC patients provided fewer internal details for both past 
and future events than healthy controls, for all time-frames. In contrast, vmPFC patients 
and controls produced a similar number of external details across conditions (see Figure 
3). A repeated-measure ANOVA on the number of details with Group (vmPFC patients, 
healthy controls), Time (past, future), Distance (1 day, 1 year, 5 years), and Detail 
(internal, external) as factors revealed significant main effects of Group (F(1,16) = 8.67, p 
= 0.009), Time (F(1,16) = 16.81, p = 0.0008), and Detail (F(1,16) = 22.34, p = 0.0002), 
which were qualified by a significant Group x Time x Distance x Detail interaction (F(2, 
32) = 4.48, p = 0.02). We followed-up on the 4-way interaction running ANOVAs on 
internal and external details separately, with Group, Time, and Distance as factors.  
 The ANOVA on the number of internal details showed a main effect of Group 
(F(1,16) = 10.02, p = 0.006): vmPFC patients produced fewer internal details compared to 
healthy controls (13.80 vs. 25.51). A main effect of Time also emerged (F(1,16) = 13.47, 
p = 0.002): both groups provided more internal details for past compared to future 
events (23.03 vs. 18.88). The interaction Group X Time X Distance was marginally 
significant (p = 0.08). This interaction refers to the fact that patients appeared 
particularly impaired in recalling events happened 5 years ago, the most remote time 
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period we probed (14.1 vs. 29.4; p = 0.01), in line with evidence of vmPFC‟s 
involvement in remote memory coding (Bonnici et al., 2012). Less significant group 
differences emerged for events happened 1 year ago (13.4 vs. 26.5; p = 0.03), and to 
occur in 5 years (11.1 vs. 23.6; p = 0.03) or 1 day (11.7 vs. 24.7; p = 0.03). The same 
ANOVA on the number of external details showed a main effect of Distance (F(2,32) = 
4.40, p = 0.02), such that both groups provided fewer external details while describing 
events 1 day apart than 1 year apart (9.60 vs. 11.93; p = 0.04) or 5 years apart (9.60 vs. 
12.60; p = 0.01), while no significant difference was found between events 1 year and 5 
years apart (p = 0.54). The same results were obtained removing TBI patients from the 
vmPFC sample
1
, and removing an outlier (i.e., for the 1 year ago condition) from the 
healthy control sample. 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Confabulation 
A content analysis revealed that 5 vmPFC patients produced some confabulatory 
details in recalling past events, whereas only one patient confabulated while imagining 
future events. We attribute the higher propensity to confabulate for the past than for the 
future to the fact that imagining the future was less strict than remembering the past in 
terms of timeframe constraints: a past event either happened 1 year or 5 years ago, 
whereas the same future event may be plausible whether it happens in one year or in 5 
years. Indeed, most confabulated details originated from attributing “true” memories to 
the wrong timeframe.  
                                                          
1
 Given that our patient sample included 2 TBI patients, and that TBI patients may have different neuropsychological 
profiles than ACoA patients, we ran again the ANOVA excluding TBI patients from the sample, to make sure the 
results were not driven by these patients. We confirmed our results. There was significant Group x Time x Distance x 
Detail interaction (F(2,28) = 4.86, p = 0.01). Separate ANOVAs on internal and external details revealed that vmPFC 
patients provided fewer internal details than healthy controls (12.6 vs. 25.5; F(1,14) = 8.88, p = 0.01) but a similar 
number of external details (10.8 vs. 12; F(1,14) = 0.35, p = 0.56). Additionally, we found no significant differences in 
the number of internal or external details between ACoA and TBI patients across conditions (Mann-Whitney Z > -
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The number of confabulatory details was highly variable across patients. For 
past events (collapsing across time periods), the number of confabulated internal details 
per event ranged from 0 to 8.66 (mean = 3.53, corresponding to 25% of internal details, 
SD = 3.52), and the number of confabulated external details ranged from 0 to 8.33 
(mean = 2.12, corresponding to 21% of external details, SD = 3.09). The patient with 
the highest proportion of confabulated details (90% of internal details and 79% of 
external details) was an ACoA patient who had suffered from spontaneous 
confabulation in the past. The only patient that confabulated about the future produced 6 
confabulatory internal details and 4 external details (collapsing across time periods) 
(40% and 50% of his internal and external details, respectively). This was a TBI patient 
with no history of spontaneous confabulation. An ANOVA on the number of 
confabulated details with Detail, Time, and Distance as factors only evinced a 
marginally significant effect of Detail (p = 0.066), such that more internal than external 
details were confabulated.  
Importantly, the presence of confabulation did not affect the results regarding 
group differences in episodic remembering and future thinking reported above. Indeed, 
we re-ran the ANOVA excluding confabulated details and obtained the same results: 
vmPFC patients provided fewer internal details than healthy controls at each time 
frame, whereas external details were as frequent as in healthy subjects. 
In sum, these results show that vmPFC patients produced fewer internal details for 
both past and future events but a similar amount of external details than healthy 
controls, indicating an impairment in both remembering and imagining personal events.  
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Figure 2. Mean number of internal details by group and timeframe in self-related 
condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). Circles indicate 
performance of individual participants. Triangles denote TBI patients.  
 
Figure 3. Mean number of external details by group and timeframe in self-related 
condition. Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean (SEM). Circles indicate 
performance of individual participants. Triangles denote TBI patients.  
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5.3.1.2  Self-referential processing 
An ANOVA on the self-reference index with Group, Time, and Distance as 
factors yielded a significant Group X Time interaction (F(1,16) = 7.11, p = 0.02): vmPFC 
patients evinced a higher self-reference index than healthy controls for past events (0.82 
vs. 0.69, p = 0.01), and a normal self-reference index for future events (0.75 vs. 0.74; p 
= 0.78). Healthy controls tended to incorporate more self-references in future than in 
past events, whereas vmPFC patients showed the opposite tendency (p = 0.07 in both 
cases). The effect of Distance was marginally significant (F(2,32) = 2.92, p = 0.07), such 
that participants tended to use more self-references during events distant 1 day than 5 
years (0.78 vs. 0.72, p = 0.03).  
Thus, at odds with Kurczek et al. (2015), vmPFC patients in the present study 
showed an increased tendency to use self-references, at least for past events. A possible 
interpretation of this finding is that vmPFC patients‟s self is mainly located in the past 
(as opposed to the future), consistent with their impaired future thinking (e.g., Sellitto et 
al., 2010). It is not clear, however, why this would not apply to vmPFC patients 
described in Kurczek et al. (2015). We propose another interpretation of inflated self-
referencing in vmPFC patients, based on patients‟ autobiographical memory abilities. 
During autobiographical memory retrieval (as well as future thinking), individuals first 
access general autobiographical knowledge (e.g., lifetime periods/repeated events, such 
as “when I was in Toronto”, “In the summer I always go to the beach”), and use it to 
probe specific events (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; D’Argembeau and Mathy, 
2011). Specific personal events may contain many characters (resulting in both self-
references and other-references), but the higher order information used to access 
personal events is typically self-related (D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011). We argue, 
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therefore, that difficulties accessing specific events in our vmPFC patients (not present 
in Kurczek et al. (2015)’s patients) resulted in retrieval of more instances of 
autobiographical knowledge across repeated retrieval attempts, hence more self-
references. That we observed increased self-referencing for past but not future events is 
consistent with the observation that events happened 5 years ago tended to be the most 
difficult to retrieve for vmPFC patients, and that provoked confabulation (commonly 
associated with effortful retrieval) was most pronounced for past events. If this 
interpretation is viable, then one should observe more semantic details in vmPFC 
patients than in healthy controls, at least for past events. Semantic details are the sub-
category of External details under which personal semantic knowledge would be scored. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, an ANOVA on semantic details with Group, Time and 
Distance as factors evinced a significant Group x Time x Distance interaction (F(2,32) = 
3.44, p = 0.04): vmPFC patients provided more semantic details for past events 
occurred 5 years ago than healthy controls (7.52 vs. 4.61, p = 0.04). No other difference 
was significant (p > 0.10 in all cases). 
 
5.3.1.3 Ratings 
 Subjective ratings were substantially similar between patients and controls. The 
only between-group difference emerged in the valence of past episodes happened 1 year 
ago (z = -2.13, p = 0.03), which were more positive in patients than in controls (6.38 vs. 
5.50). Thus, the group differences in MTT previously discussed were unlikely to be due 
to differences in the events selected.  
 We also inspected potential differences in ratings within each group between 
past and future events and depending on time distance. There were a number of results 
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worth noting (see Table 2 for the complete list of ratings and comparisons). Future 
events were rated as higher in personal importance than past events by vmPFC patients 
(4.85 vs. 3.76, z = 2.03, p = 0.04), and, though marginally, healthy controls (4.98 vs. 
4.46, z = 1.68, p = 0.09). In both vmPFC patients and controls, events‟ importance 
improved with time distance, for both future events (vmPFC patients: χ2 = 8, p = 0.02; 
controls: χ2 = 7.54, p = 0.02), and, though less significantly, past events (vmPFC 
patients: χ2 = 7.14, p = 0.03; controls: χ2 = 5.19, p = 0.07). That is, both groups 
considered episodes to happen in 5 years more important than those to happen in 1 day 
(vmPFC patients: z = 2.37, p = 0.02; controls: z = 2.66, p = 0.008), and episodes 
occurred 5 years ago marginally more important than those happened 1 day ago 
(vmPFC patients: z = 2.03, p = 0.04; controls: z = 1.68, p = 0.09). Interestingly, in both 
vmPFC patients and healthy controls, temporal connectedness declined with time 
distance, for both future (vmPFC patients: χ2 = 10.33, p = 0.006; healthy controls: χ2 = 
15.95, p = 0.0003) and past events (vmPFC patients: χ2 = 9.65, p = 0.008; healthy 
controls: χ2 = 19.62, p = 0.00005). Thus, both groups considered the current self as 
more similar to their self in events to occur in 1 day (vmPFC patients: z = 2.20, p = 
0.03; healthy controls:  z = 2.76, p = 0.006) or in 1 year (vmPFC patients: z = 2.20, p = 
0.03; healthy controls: z = 2.18, p = 0.03) than in 5 years. The same pattern was found 
for past events: both groups judged their current self as more similar to their self in 
episodes occurred 1 day ago (vmPFC patients: z = 2.20, p = 0.03; healthy controls: z = 
2.93, p = 0.003) or 1 year ago (vmPFC patients: z = 1.99, p = 0.04; healthy controls: z = 
2.93, p = 0.003) than 5 years ago. Thus, in both vmPFC patients and healthy controls, 
events more distant in time tended to refer to more important experiences than events 
closer in time, and future/past selves were perceived as progressively more different 
75 
 
from the current self with time. Despite the general absence of differences in past and 
future events‟ characteristics between groups, patients and controls differed in their 
ability to re-experience events. For healthy controls, the feeling of re-experiencing past 
events (χ2 = 8.4, p = 0.01) was modulated by time distance, such that events occurred 1 
day ago were re-experienced more strongly than events occurred 5 years ago (z = 2.55, 
p = 0.01). No such modulation of re-experiencing was observed in vmPFC patients (p = 
0.61).  
Table 2. Mean ratings for self-related events by group and timeframe. Standard errors 
of the mean are in brackets. 
  Past Future 
  1 day 1 year 5 years 1 day 1 year 5 years 
Vividness HC 6.70(0.32) 6.47(0.39) 6.39(0.35) 6.65(0.29) 5.96(0.35) 6.21(0.29) 
 vmPFC 5.90(0.43) 6.57(0.48)  5.43(0.75) 5.52(0.45) 5.74(0.56) 5.48(0.48) 
Valence HC 5.20(0.32) 5.50(0.25) ˄ 5.12(0.50) 5.48(0.33) ɸ 4.88(0.52) 5.98(0.37) 
 vmPFC 4.69(0.68) 6.38(0.31) 5.33(0.46) 5.88(0.31) 4.74(0.60) 6.72(0.40) 
Current emotion HC 5.21(0.51) 5.80(0.40) 5.88(0.44) 5.30(0.54) 5.26(0.48) 5.59(0.44) 
 vmPFC 4.36(0.73) 5.57(0.68) 5.43(0.89) 5.38(0.31) 5.26(0.69) 5.33(0.38) 
Past/future 
emotion 
HC 5.82(0.42) 6.65(0.24) 6.36(0.40) 5.61(0.56) ɸ 6.35(0.35) 6.76(0.25) 
 vmPFC 4.43(0.58) ɸ 6.07(0.38) 6.86(0.44) 6.02(0.56) 6.74(0.46) 6.29(0.42) 
Importance HC 3.97(0.37) 4.73(0.40) 4.68(0.53) 4.21(0.41) ɸ 5.05(0.45) 5.70(0.32) 
 vmPFC 2.71(0.50) ɸ 3.90(0.45) 4.67(0.52) 4.26(0.48) ɸ 4.76(0.49) 5.52(0.54) 
Feeling of re-/pre-
experiencing 
HC 6.50(0.38) ɸ 6.35(0.39) 5.83(0.46) 6.49(0.44)  5.91(0.42) 6.01(0.41) 
 vmPFC 5.50(0.64) 6.24(0.80) 5.71(0.87) 6.09(0.66) 5.43(0.77) 5.71(0.79) 
Temporal 
connectedness 
HC 7.68(0.18) ɸ 6.95(0.19) 5.01(0.40) 7.82(0.18) ɸ 6.64(0.30)  5.89(0.32) 
 vmPFC 7.88(0.08) ɸ 6.88(0.52) 4.95(0.59) 7.48(0.26)ɸ 6.79(0.29)  5.67(0.52) 
Visual perspective HC 1.36(0.21) 1.36(0.21) 1.30(0.21) 1.30(0.21) 1.36(0.24) 1.42(0.24) 
 vmPFC 1.00 1.00 1.09(0.09) 1.09(0.09) 1.09(0.09) 1.10(0.10) 
 
Note: HC = healthy controls; vmPFC = vmPFC patients. Statistical comparisons: ˄ = significant group 
difference; ɸ = significant difference among past (symbol in past columns) or future (symbol in future 
columns) timeframes. 
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5.3.2 Other-related condition 
vmPFC patients produced fewer close other‟s events (2.9 vs. 3) and distant 
other‟s events (2.9 vs. 3) than healthy controls, though differences were not significant 
(all p values > 0.32), probably due to ceiling effects in controls. Patients and controls 
used a similar number of extra cue-words to construct close (0.4 vs. 0) and distant 
other‟s events (0.1 vs. 0) (p > 0.32 in all cases).  
 
5.3.2.1 Details 
Figure 4, representing the mean number of internal and external details by 
participant group and character (self, close other, distant other), shows that vmPFC 
patients provided fewer internal details for all conditions compared to healthy controls, 
while they used a similar number of external details. We conducted an ANOVA on the 
number of details with Group, Character (self, close other, distant other), and Detail 
(internal, external) as factors. We included the data about imagining personal episodes 
to happen in 1 year (already analyzed above) in this ANOVA for comparison purposes. 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Group (F(1,16) = 5.52, p = 0.03), and a main 
effect of Detail (F(1,16) = 11.23, p = 0.004), which were qualified by a significant Group 
x Detail interaction (F(1,16) = 9.10, p = 0.008). To follow-up on the interaction, we 
conducted separate ANOVAs on internal and external details. The ANOVA on internal 
details showed a main effect of Group (F(1,16) = 8.89, p = 0.009): vmPFC patients 
produced fewer internal details compared to healthy controls (11.57 vs. 21.88).  
The ANOVA on external details only showed a main effect of Character (F(2,32) = 4.48, 
p = 0.02), such that the amount of external details was higher in the close compared to 
77 
 
the distant other condition (13.83 vs. 8.80, p = 0.003). The same results were obtained 
removing TBI patients from the vmPFC sample.
2
 
 
5.3.2.1.1 Confabulation 
Confabulated details in future experiences of a close other were observed only in 
one patient (2 internal details and 2.66 external details, corresponding to 10% and 11% 
of internal and external details, respectively), the only patient who had confabulated 
during personal future events to happen in 1 year, where he had confabulated 9.66 
internal details and 8 external details (74 and 80% of internal and external details, 
respectively). None confabulated about distant other events. Because of the overall 
paucity of confabulation for future events, we do not comment on the relative 
propensity to confabulate self-relevant vs. other-relevant events. Again, excluding 
confabulated details from the main analyses did not alter the results.  
Thus, contrary to our hypotheses, these findings indicate that vmPFC also 
impairs episodic simulation of future events happening to others, suggesting that self-
relevance is not critical to explain vmPFC‟s involvement in MTT. In fact, if we re-ran 
the primary ANOVA on data from the self-related condition with Group, Time, 
Distance and Detail as factors adding the number of internal and external details in the 
distant-other condition as covariates, the original effect of Group and the original 4-way 
interaction were no longer significant (p > 0.19 in both cases). This finding suggests 
that deficits in processes shared by the distant-other and the self-condition, such as core 
                                                          
2
 We obtained the same results excluding TBI patients from the analysis. There was a significant Group x Detail 
interaction (F(1,14) = 9.83, p = 0.007): separate ANOVAs on internal and external details showed that vmPFC patients 
provided fewer internal details than healthy controls (9.6 vs. 21.9, F(1,14) = 9.67, p = 0.008), but a similar number of 
external details (10.7 vs. 11.5; F(1,14) = 0.11, p = 0.74). Additionally, there were no significant differences in the 
number of internal or external details between ACoA and TBI patients across conditions (Mann-Whitney: Z > -1.36; 
p > 0.19 in both cases). We note that TBI patients tended to provide more internal details than ACoA patients for 
events happening to the close other (18.3 vs. 8.3, Mann-Whitney: Z = -1.94, p = 0.09). 
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constructive processes, may be sufficient to explain differences in MTT between 
vmPFC patients and controls.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean number of internal and external details (for future events to occur in 1 
year) by group and character. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
Circles indicate performance of individual participants. Triangles denote TBI patients.  
 
5.3.2.2 Ratings 
As for self-related events, subjective ratings for other-related events were 
substantially similar between groups. There were only a difference in valence, such that 
vmPFC patients rated distant other‟s events as less positive than healthy controls (z = 
2.52, p = 0.01), and in close others‟ emotions, such that vmPFC patients considered the 
close other to be less emotionally affected by the event than did healthy controls (z = 
2.12, p = 0.03). 
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We analyzed the differences in subjective ratings across different characters (self, 
close other, distant other). A number of results were worth noting (see Table 3 for the 
full set of ratings and comparisons). First of all, both vmPFC patients (z = 2.20, p = 
0.03) and, though marginally, healthy controls (z = 1.84, p = 0.07) considered 
themselves as more similar to the close other than the distant other, suggesting that all 
participants complied with the instructions and differentiated between the close and 
distant other. Consistently, the emotions felt while imagining events were modulated by 
the character in both vmPFC patients (χ2 = 9.09, p = 0.01) and controls (χ2 = 7.61, p = 
0.02): both groups reported more intense anticipated emotions for events happening to 
themselves (vmPFC patients: z = 2.20, p = 0.03; healthy controls: z = 2.65, p = 0.008), 
and, marginally, the close other (vmPFC patients: z = 1.82, p = 0.07; healthy controls: z 
= 2.29, p = 0.02) compared to the distant other. Events‟ vividness, too, was modulated 
by the character in vmPFC patients (χ2 = 12, p = 0.002), such that patients experienced 
personal episodes and episodes involving the close other as more vivid than those 
involving the distant other (self vs. distant other: z = 2.37, p = 0.02; close vs. distant 
other: z = 2.37, p = 0.02). Differences in vividness were not present in healthy controls 
(p = 0.78), likely due to ceiling effects (see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Mean ratings for other-related events to happen in 1 year by group and 
character. Self-related ratings are reported for comparison purposes.  
 
 
 Distant other Close other Self 
Vividness HC 5.88(0.29) 6.03(0.32) 5.96(0.35) 
 vmPFC 4.19(0.88) ɸ 5.10(0.79) 5.74(0.56) 
Valence HC 5.94(0.35) ˄ 5.30(0.53) 4.88(0.52) 
 vmPFC 4.41(0.45) 5.71(0.41) 4.74(0.60) 
Current emotion HC 4.57(0.64) 5.64(0.54) 5.26(0.48) 
 vmPFC 3.67(0.78) 5.17(0.81) 5.26(0.69) 
Future emotion HC 4.54(0.63) ɸ 6.33(0.40) 6.35(0.36) 
 vmPFC 3.98(0.97) ɸ 5.64(0.73) 6.74(0.46) 
Importance HC 5.24(0.47) 4.73(0.47) 5.05(0.45) 
 vmPFC 4.24(0.46) 4.19(0.51) 4.76(0.49) 
Temporal connectedness HC 7.27(0.33) ɸ 7.30(0.23) 6.64(0.30) 
 vmPFC 6.83(0.38) 6.07(0.62) 6.79(0.29) 
Others' Emotions HC 6.24(0.55) ɸ 7.15(0.36) ˄ - 
 vmPFC 5.36(0.52) 5.83(0.63) - 
Personal connectedness HC 3.18(0.55)  5.18(0.46) - 
 vmPFC 2.57(0.95) ɸ 5.43(0.73) - 
Note: HC = healthy controls; vmPFC = vmPFC patients. Statistical comparisons: ˄ = significant group 
difference; ɸ = significant differences among characters. Standard errors of the mean are in brackets. 
 
5.3.3 MTT and TD: exploratory analyses 
Given that TD behavior has been related to EFT in healthy individuals (Peters 
and Büchel, 2010), we investigated the relation of TD and MTT in vmPFC patients. 
Would patients with the stronger abilities to imagine future events be also those that 
discount the future less steeply? To test this hypothesis, we assessed the correlation 
between TD measures and an index of the tendency to access self-related future events 
episodically, calculated as (Future internal details/Future external details)/(Past internal 
details/Past external details). We controlled for episodic remembering to obtain a 
relatively pure index of patients‟ ability to project themselves into the future, as opposed 
to an index of the efficiency of the episodic memory system in general. This “future 
episodicity index” reflects patients‟ tendency to access the future episodically, taking 
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into account their overall episodic memory abilities. It is worth noting that the future 
episodicity index was not different between vmPFC patients and controls (t = -0.40, p = 
0.70), consistent with the fact that patients were equally impaired in episodic 
remembering and future thinking. The future episodicity index correlated significantly 
with both AUC (r = 0.82, p = 0.02) and k (r = -0.78, p = 0.03, two-tailed): the more 
vividly patients imagined personal future events, the more inclined they were to choose 
large future rewards over smaller-immediate rewards, meaning less steep TD. We note 
that no correlation emerged between AUC or k and the (future) internal/external details 
ratio for other-related events (collapsing across the close and distant other conditions) (p 
> 0.53 in both cases).  
 
5.3.4. MTT and vmPFC: exploratory analyses 
We investigated whether MTT abilities correlated with lesion volume in vmPFC. 
Brain lesions of vmPFC patients overlapped maximally in BAs 32, 11, and 10. By using 
partial correlation analyses, we investigated whether the number of internal and external 
details (collapsed across past and future self-related conditions), and the future 
episodicity index correlated with lesion volume in each of the three BAs, partialing out 
the effect of lesion volume in the other two BAs. We found that lesion volume in BA 32 
correlated significantly (r = -0.93; p = 0.02, two-tailed) and lesion volume in BA 11 
correlated marginally (r = - 0.88, p = 0.05, two-tailed) with the future episodicity index, 
such that patients with bigger lesions were relatively less inclined to imagine the future 
as rich in episodic detail. In contrast, we did not find any significant correlation between 
lesion volume and the number of internal or external details (all p values > 0.27, two-
tailed). As well, lesion volume was not related to the number of internal detail, external 
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details, or to the internal/external details ratio relative to other-related events (collapsing 
across the close and distant other condition) (p > 0.59 in all cases).  
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of the correlation between the Area under the curve (AUC) in the 
temporal discounting (TD) task and the Future episodicity index in vmPFC patients. 
Triangles denote TBI patients. 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot of the correlation between lesion volume in BA 32 (panel A) and 
in BA 11 (panel B) and the Future episodicity index. Triangles denote TBI patients. 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
This study investigated the involvement of vmPFC in remembering personal past 
events and imagining personal future events, as well as in imagining future experiences 
of close and distant others. We found that vmPFC patients are impaired in remembering 
personal past events, and the same difficulty appears for future events, and at any 
timeframe, indicating a pervasive impairment of MTT. For both past and future events, 
vmPFC patients provided fewer internal (episodic) details than healthy controls but a 
similar number of external details, indicating a selective impairment of the episodic 
memory system. vmPFC patients also produced confabulatory details, especially while 
remembering past events. These consisted mainly of fragments of true memories 
misattributed to the wrong timeframe, which is reminiscent of confabulating patients‟ 
problems at suppressing currently irrelevant memory traces (Schnider, 2008; see also 
Ciaramelli and Ghetti, 2007), and tendency to “recast” habits/repeated events as specific 
events (Serra et al., 2014). Interestingly, vmPFC patients‟ objective deficit in producing 
episodic details was accompanied by an irregular subjective experience of remembering 
(see also Ciaramelli and Ghetti, 2007), in that events that had occurred one day vs. 5 
years prior did not differ in terms of the feeling of re-experiencing they engendered.  
Previous research had shown results in line with ours. Moscovitch and Melo 
(1997) found impoverished descriptions of personal past (as well as historical) events in 
patients with presumed damage or dysfunction of the vmPFC using the Crovitz task (see 
also Ghosh et al., 2014). Levine (2004) showed that patients with ventral prefrontal 
damage produce fewer internal details but a similar number of external details than 
healthy controls during autobiographic memory retrieval, “presumably reflecting a state 
of consciousness partially stripped of the benefits of MTT and relatively constrained to 
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the here and now” (Levine, 2004, p. 61). Our findings indicate that vmPFC damage 
precludes both past and future MTT, adding to previous evidence that deficits in 
episodic memory can be associated with specular difficulties in imagining future 
experiences (reviewed in Schacter et al., 2012). Contrary to our hypotheses, however, 
damage to vmPFC also reduced internal details during simulation of others‟ 
experiences, suggesting that vmPFC is crucial for event construction even when self-
related processing is not.  
Before discussing our results further, it is worth noting that these are unlikely to 
be due to blatant problems, on the vmPFC patients‟ part, with the representation of time 
or self, with the hypotheticality inherent to MTT, or with task instructions. In fact, 
several findings regarding event detail and phenomenology were remarkably similar 
between vmPFC patients and controls, and need be emphasized. First, all participants 
produced more internal details for past than for future events (see also Addis et al., 
2008; D‟Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004), consistent with the fact that real events 
typically contain more detail than imagined events (Johnson et al., 1988). Across 
groups, personal importance was greater for future events, which are relevant to the 
achievement of one's goals, than for past events (D‟Argembeau and Van der Linden, 
2004; Addis et al., 2008). Moreover, both groups rated events distant in time as more 
personally important than events close in time. Possibly, whereas everyday events come 
to mind easily while looking for events close in time, constructing distant events 
requires more intense framing of memory search, for example based on goals 
characterizing lifetime periods (e.g., “when I was a PhD student…”), leading to the 
retrieval of relatively meaningful events (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
D‟Argembeau and Mathy, 2011). That vmPFC patients showed these normal 
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modulations of events‟ features with time strongly suggests they did attempt MTT, and 
did so towards specific points of subjective time (as opposed, for example, to merely 
recast past memories as future events).  
As well, several areas of preserved self-related processing need be noted. 
vmPFC patients, as well as controls, were aware that their current self was likely more 
similar to their self in one year than in five years, and their temporal connectedness was 
not different from the controls‟. As well, patients felt more similar to the close than to 
the distant other, and reported more intense emotions and more vividness for self-
related compared to other-related events. Again, this set of findings suggest that vmPFC 
patients differentiated between themselves, close others, and distant others, and could 
reflect on hypothetical selves.  
Having established that vmPFC patients were able to differentiate between the 
self and others, and that they attempted MTT towards specific points in time, it remains 
to be explained why they could not construct specific events. This was unlikely to be 
due to a general problem in detail generation: vmPFC patients produced a normal 
number of external details. Moreover, verbal fluency measures were within the normal 
range in vmPFC patients. Additionally, vmPFC patients show normal discourse 
cohesion and coherence (Kurczek and Duff, (2012), and were found normally able to 
recount fairy tales and bible stories (Gilboa et al., 2006), which suggests preserved 
narrative abilities. Turning to more specific accounts, the fact that patients had 
difficulties with both self-related and other-related events suggests that self-related 
processing is not the primary factor driving vmPFC‟s involvement in MTT. That is, 
vmPFC patients‟ deficit does not seem one of “self”- projection (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007), as it is apparent also when there is no explicit request for the self to be projected 
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in a different time/place/perspective. One could argue that participants may still project 
themselves in the perspective of the protagonist while simulating others‟ event. This, 
however, should happen more while simulating events happening to close than to 
distant others (Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012), yet vmPFC patients‟ performance was not 
modulated by others‟ closeness. Thus, we are not inclined to qualify vmPFC patients‟ 
deficit as one of self-projection.  
We propose that vmPFC is needed to conceive any complex experience that is 
decoupled from the current perceptual environment. Imagining any event, including 
personal past and future events, as well as events in which we are not involved, requires 
retrieval of episodic details and semantic information to be assembled (“episodic 
simulation”; Schacter et al., 2012, 2008) and staged in a spatial context (“scene 
construction”; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). vmPFC has long been implicated in 
strategic retrieval processes needed to constrain memory search, and monitor the 
appropriateness of recovered memories (Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; Gilboa et al., 
2006). vmPFC might work in concert with the MTLs during event (re)construction, 
searching and monitoring episodic and semantic memories to be edited for recall, or 
combined flexibly to picture novel events. vmPFC, indeed, supports the integration of 
individual episodes‟ elements into common representations (Benoit, Szpunar, & 
Schacter, 2014; see also Zeithamova et al., 2012). Of course, construction of self-
relevant vs. other-relevant events would require different proportions of episodic 
(autobiographical) and semantic memories. Both activities, however, demand retrieval 
and integration of individual details, and the construction of a coherent scene. Recently, 
we have found that damage to vmPFC impairs imagination of both future and fictitious, 
atemporal experiences (Bertossi et al., 2016a), which reinforces our view of vmPFC as 
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involved in core constructive processes needed to simulate any complex event, whether 
located in time or not, self-relevant or not. Interestingly, patients with lesions in the 
occipital cortex were able to construct novel experiences (Bertossi et al., 2016a), 
suggesting that impaired event construction in vmPFC patients is not merely the effect 
of brain damage on performance in an effortful task, but rather the effect of damage 
inflicted on a well-delineated system for event construction (Hassabis and Maguire, 
2007; Schacter et al., 2012), of which vmPFC and the MTLs are crucial, interconnected 
nodes (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b).   
Further studies are needed to specify the nature of the contribution of vmPFC 
and the MTLs to event construction. vmPFC is critical for appropriate processing of 
schema-related information (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Ghosh et al., 2014). During 
scene construction, this region may help activate/maintain stable schematic 
representations of relevant events (e.g., the typical day at the beach) around which to 
construct a specific event, for example by pointing to related, context-relevant past 
experiences to use as source of details (Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013). A failure in 
activating/maintaining schema-related knowledge may explain the production of events 
poor of episodic quality in vmPFC patients. We note that vmPFC patients did not 
generally endorse schema-irrelevant details (see also Bertossi et al., 2016). Even when 
confabulating, they recounted very typical experiences (dinners with friends, days at the 
park, etc.), though with few details, some of which misplaced in time. One patient stated 
that the day after he would have pruned all the trees of his garden. This was inconsistent 
with the fact that at the moment he could not move his hand properly. Whether this 
reflects impaired monitoring of details based on self-schema, or the attribution of a past 
memory (he used to pruned his trees) to the wrong timeframe, is not clear. In this work, 
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we asked participants to imagine (but not remember) events happening to others. A 
more systematic investigation of both retrieval and imagination of self- and other-
related events may help highlight the relation between confabulation and schema-related 
processing: because the self-schema is a particularly robust cognitive schema (Craik et 
al., 1999), a deficit in processing schema-related information should have a greater 
impact on the construction of self-related compared to other-related events. The status 
of confabulation may also be relevant. We tested vmPFC patients without spontaneous 
confabulation. It is possible, however, that vmPFC patients with spontaneous 
confabulation would provide experiences that would deviate from schema-related 
knowledge (Ghosh et al., 2014; Gilboa et al., 2006), and be implausible (see Cole et al., 
2014). 
EFT is one device (among many) humans use to escape the here and now 
(Boyer, 2008; Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino, 2011). The vivid simulation of future 
experiences (e.g., submitting a paper) may help resist the saliency of immediate rewards 
(e.g., listening to music all day), contrasting TD (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 
2011). In a previous study, we have shown that vmPFC patients have steep TD (Sellitto 
et al., 2010, including 3 of the patients described here). Although gathered from a 
relatively small group of patients, correlation analyses in the present study showed that 
the more impaired vmPFC patients were at imagining personal future events vividly, the 
steeper TD was, suggesting a relation between TD behavior and mnemonic processes 
mediated by vmPFC. Interestingly, both future MTT in this study and TD in Sellitto et 
al. (2010) correlated with lesion volume in BA 11 and BA 32, two crucial nodes of the 
core network (Benoit and Schacter, 2015). One possibility is that these two regions 
mediate processes implicated in future thinking selectively. Benoit and Schacter (2015), 
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however, have shown that BA 10 is the vmPFC sub-region preferentially associated 
with EFT. Moreover, in a previous work we have found that lesion volume in BA 11 
predicted imagination of future and fictitious experiences as well (Bertossi et al., 
2016a). Another possibility, which we favor, is that BA 11 and BA 32, as part of the 
core network, mediate constructive processes needed for both past and future MTT 
(Benoit and Schacter, 2015), but are especially sensitive to experimental conditions that 
load maximally on those processes (e.g., future thinking). Indeed, even though we have 
highlighted a possible link between impaired future MTT and steep TD, we expect that, 
based on their pervasive event construction impairment, vmPFC patients would be 
equally impaired in mental operations requiring simulation of the past, for example 
counterfactual thinking (Gomez Beldarrain et al., 2005; De Brigard et al., 2013). 
vmPFC patients have impaired regret during decision-making (Camille et al., 2004), 
which supports this speculation.  
One further aspect of the results needs consideration before concluding. A recent 
report has shown preserved self-projection but reduced self-referencing in vmPFC 
compared to controls (Kurczek et al., 2015), while we are showing impaired self-
projection with increased self-referencing (for past events). Two key differences 
between the studies may help interpret this important discrepancy. First, we looked at 
free recall of “entire” events ( i.e., lasting minutes or hours, not more than a day; in line 
with e.g., Addis et al., 2008, 2007; de Vito et al., 2012; Race et al., 2011), whereas 
participants in Kurczek et al. (2015) were guided to focus on circumscribed “fragments” 
of already selected events, and the analyses were restricted to those specific fragments. 
The two procedures, therefore, placed different demands on (and scored differently) the 
event construction phase. Second, vmPFC patients in the present study exhibited 
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impaired declarative memory (e.g., on the Buschke-Fuld list learning task), whereas 
vmPFC patients tested by Kurczek et al. (2015) had relatively intact declarative 
memory. vmPFC, therefore, may be crucial to assemble complex (extended) events, 
probably mediating episodic memory processes (e.g., search, binding) that also operate 
during more traditional episodic memory tasks, such as list learning (see also Maguire 
and Mullally, 2013). The nature of the task and the degree of patients‟ episodic memory 
impairment may also, at least in part, explain the divergent findings on self-referencing. 
vmPFC patients in the present study had difficulties accessing specific personal 
episodes. This resulted in the retrieval of relatively more instances of higher order 
autobiographical memory structures (e.g., personal semantic knowledge) during event 
construction, which was apparent for past events. While specific episodes may involve 
many characters (resulting in both self- and other-references), personal semantic 
knowledge is typically self-referenced. A difficulty in accessing specific events, 
therefore, may translate in inflated self-referencing scores. Clearly, this is not expected 
if patients are normally able to access specific events, or if the task (or the scoring 
method) places less weight on the event construction phase, as we think is the case in 
Kurczek et al. (2015).  
To conclude, we have shown that MTT is heavily impaired vmPFC patients, 
indicating that vmPFC is a crucial neural substrate of MTT, consistent with fMRI 
evidence. Given that vmPFC patients‟ impairment extended to the imagination of events 
happening to others, we propose that vmPFC is crucial for the construction of complex 
events alternative to the current reality, which enables simulation of both self-relevant 
and other-relevant events. This deficit constrains vmPFC patients into the present 
moment, with an abstract representation of their past and future but no possibility to re-
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experience or pre-experience specific events. The correlation between MTT abilities 
and TD, however, suggests that training patients to construct and experience specific 
future events may improve their future-based decisions.  
6 Experiment 2 - Stuck in the here and now: construction of fictitious 
and future experiences following ventromedial prefrontal damage 
[This study has been published in Bertossi E., Aleo F., Braghittoni D., Ciaramelli E., 
Neuropsychologia, 2016] 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It is typical of the human mind to detach occasionally from the present to imagine 
alternative scenarios, including future events (e.g., job interview in two days), past 
events (e.g., graduation two years ago), or merely fictitious experiences (e.g., being on 
the beach, not at work). Most frequently, such imaginative acts are future-focused, and 
goal-oriented (Smallwood et al., 2009; D‟Argembeau et al., 2011).  
There is much interest, therefore, in revealing the cognitive and neural bases of 
EFT. fMRI studies have shown that EFT engages regions that are also activated by 
episodic memory (see 2.1 and 2.2), including medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate 
cortex, frontal pole, angular gyrus, and MTLs (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; 
Szpunar et al., 2007). The functional significance of this overlap has been related to 
component processes that EFT shares with episodic remembering, including processes 
specifically related to MTT, such as “autonoetic consciousness” (Wheeler et al., 1997), 
as well as constructive processes needed to simulate any event, whether or not located 
in subjective time, such as the ability to generate and visualize coherent spatial contexts 
(“scene construction”; Hassabis et al., 2007b), and to recover and integrate the distinct 
92 
 
elements constituting the event (Schacter et al., 2008) (see 2.1). In the previous 
experiment we have shown that MTT is heavily impaired in vmPFC patients, indicating 
that vmPFC is a crucial neural substrate of MTT, consistent with fMRI evidence. Given 
that vmPFC patients‟ impairment extended to the imagination of events happening to 
others, we propose that vmPFC is crucial for the construction of complex events 
alternative to the current reality, which enables simulation of both self-relevant and 
other-relevant events. To test whether vmPFC is crucial for EFT, and contribute to 
elucidate its mechanistic role in EFT, we studied how patients with focal lesion to 
vmPFC, control patients with lesions outside the vmPFC (mainly occipital), and healthy 
individuals imagine future and fictitious experiences. 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 16 patients with brain damage and 12 healthy individuals 
(see Table 4 for demographic information). Patients were recruited at the Centre for 
Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. Patients were selected 
on the basis of the location of their lesion evident on MRI or CT scans. 
Seven patients had lesions involving the vmPFC (vmPFC patients; see Table 4 for 
demographic information). Lesions were the results of the rupture of an aneurysm of the 
ACoA in 6 cases, and traumatic brain injury in 1 case. Lesions were bilateral in all 
cases, though often asymmetrically so (see Figure 7). Nine patients were selected on the 
basis of having damage that did not involve the vmPFC (control patients). In this group, 
lesions were unilateral in 7 cases (in the left hemisphere in 3 cases, and in the right 
hemisphere in 4 cases), and bilateral in 2 cases, and were all caused by ischemic or 
hemorrhagic stroke. Lesion sites mainly included the occipital cortex and the occipito-
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temporal area, and extended into the posterior lateral aspect of the temporal lobe (4 
cases), the lateral frontal (1 case) and parietal cortex (1 case), and the cerebellum (2 
cases). Included patients were in the stable phase of recovery (at least 3 months post-
morbid), were not receiving psychoactive drugs, and had no other diagnosis likely to 
affect cognition or interfere with the participation in the study (e.g., significant 
psychiatric disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular disease). There was no 
significant difference in lesion volume between vmPFC patients and non-FC patients 
(53 vs. 35 cc, Mann-Whitney Z = 1.22, p = 0.25). The healthy control group comprised 
12 individuals matched to the patients on mean age, education, and gender. Control 
participants were not taking psychoactive drugs, and were free of current or past 
psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. Participants gave informed 
consent, according to the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology, 
University of Bologna.  
 
6.2.1.1  Neuropsychological profile  
 
Patients‟ general cognitive functioning was generally preserved, as indicated by 
the scores they obtained in the Raven Standard Matrices (RMS), the phonemic fluency 
test (PF), and the digit span test (DS), which were within the normal range in all cases, 
and similar between the patient groups (Mann-Whitney Z > -0.17, p > 0.86 in all cases) 
(see Table 4). vmPFC patients also received a more extensive neuropsychological 
evaluation aimed at qualifying their cognitive profile further. vmPFC patients reported 
normal scores in verbal short-term memory (Mean equivalent score (ES) = 3.86. Note 
that the equivalent score ranges from 0 = impaired performance, and 1 = borderline 
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performance, to 2 - 4 indicating normal performance) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), 
spatial short-term memory (ES = 2.86) (assessed with Digit Span and Corsi test, 
respectively), and working memory, assessed with the 2-back task from the Test Battery 
for Attentional performance (TEA) (T-score = 41, cut-off = 30) (Zoccolotti et al., 1994; 
Zimmermann and Fimm, 2002). Patients also exhibited normal performance in several 
tests tapping executive functions, such as the Tower of London test (T-score = 42) 
(Culbertson and Zillmer, 2000), phonemic (ES = 1.71) and semantic  fluency (ES = 
3.57), and the Stroop test (mean number of errors = 1.64, cut off > 7.5) (Spinnler and 
Tognoni, 1987). vmPFC patients, however, showed a borderline performance in the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which was characterized by many perseverative responses 
(T = 30), suggesting a deficit in cognitive flexibility. Long-term memory was weak: In 
the Buschke–Fuld Test (Buschke and Fuld, 1974), that is a standardized selective-
reminding list learning task involving free recall, patients exhibited a highly 
pathological Consistent Long Term Retrieval score (ES = 0) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 
1987). Performance in a prose-passage recall task was weak but within the normal limits 
(ES = 1.71) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). 
vmPFC patients did not show spontaneous confabulation, as indicated by clinical 
evidence and interviews with family members: patients did not confabulate without 
apparent prompting (Kopelman, 1987) or act upon erroneous memories (Schnider, 
2008). However, their autobiographical memory was poor. Recently, we have tested 
episodic remembering and future thinking formally in a group of 7 vmPFC patients (see 
Experiment 1; including 4 of the patients tested here) using a modified Crovitz 
procedure (Crovitz and Schiffman, 1974; Bertossi et al., 2016b). Using words as cues, 
vmPFC patients and healthy controls remembered personal past events and imagined 
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personal future events at different time frames (events happened 5 years/1 year/1 day 
ago and events that may happen in 1 day/1 year/5 years), and also imagined future 
events that may happen (in 1 year) to a close or distant other. Consistent with fMRI 
evidence (e.g., Addis et al., 2007), patients produced fewer internal details but a similar 
number of external details for both past and future events. vmPFC patients were 
impaired across all temporal conditions, but recall of events happened 5 years ago 
tended to be the most impaired, in line with vmPFC‟s involvement in remote memory 
coding (Bonnici et al., 2012). Despite the absence of spontaneous confabulation, 
patients produced erroneous details in the Crovitz procedure (on average, 15% of all the 
details produced). These details were incongruous with the autobiographical 
history/possible future actions of the patient or had an incorrect time reference, e.g., 
recalling an alleged accident at the amusement park, imagining a future trip with a car 
already sold (Dalla Barba et al., 1997; Moscovitch and Melo, 1997). Erroneous details 
in demanding memory tasks are formally considered a measure of provoked 
confabulation (Kopelman, 1987; Schnider et al., 1996), which is dissociable from 
spontaneous confabulation (Schnider, 2008). We observed erroneous memory details 
mainly during recall of past events, and rarely during imagination of future events, 
likely due to the fact that imagining the future was less strict than remembering the past 
in terms of timeframe constraints: a past event either happened 1 year or 5 years ago, 
whereas the same future event may be plausible whether it happens in one year or in 5 
years. Importantly, eliminating erroneous details from patients‟ reports did not alter our 
main finding of a comparable impairment in episodic remembering and future thinking 
in vmPFC patients (Bertossi et al., 2016b).  
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Table 4. Participants‟ demographic and clinical information  
Group N 
Age 
(Years) 
Education 
(Years) 
Sex SRM PF DS 
vmPFC 
patients 
7 50.43(2.63) 12.14(1.30) 7 M 35.86(2.86) 26(1.71) 6.14(3.86) 
Control 
patients 
9 53.89(4) 11.89(1.39) 9 M 34.14(3.14) 34(2.75) 6.12(3.75) 
HC 12 51.17(2.98) 11.50(0.84) 12 M - - - 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; HC = healthy controls; M = male; SRM = Standard 
Raven Matrices; PF = phonemic fluency; DS = digit span. For SRM, PF, and DS, we report the mean 
uncorrected scores and, in brackets, the mean equivalent score (with 0 = pathological performance, 1 = 
borderline performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance). For age and education, the values in brackets are 
standard errors of the mean.    
 
6.2.2 Lesion analysis 
For each patient, lesion extent and location was documented using the most 
recent clinical computerized tomography (CT; N = 4 vmPFC patients, 2 control 
patients) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI; N = 3 vmPFC patients, 7 control 
patients). Lesions were traced by a neurologist with experience in image analysis 
directly on the T1-weighted template MRI scan from the Montreal Neurological 
Institute provided with the MRIcro software (Rorden and Brett, 2000; available at 
http://www.mricro.com/mricro). This scan is normalized to Talairach space. 
Superimposing each patient's lesion onto the standard brain allowed us to estimate the 
total brain lesion volume (in cc). Figure 7 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions 
in vmPFC patients. Brodmann's areas (BA) affected in the vmPFC group were areas BA 
10, BA 11, BA 24, BA 25, BA 32 (subgenual portion), and BA 47, with region of 
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maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 23.56 cc, SD = 13.90), BA 10 (M = 13.38 cc, 
SD = 8.37), and BA 32 (M = 7.06 cc, SD = 3.34). 
 
Figure 7. Extent and overlap of brain lesions. The figure represents vmPFC patients‟ 
lesions projected on the same seven axial slices and on the sagittal view of the 
standard Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines on the 
sagittal view are the positions of the axial slices, and the white numbers under the 
axial views are the z-coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of 
overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurs in BA 11, 10, and 32. The left 
hemisphere is on the left side. 
6.2.3 Scene construction task 
We used a scene construction task adapted from Hassabis et al. (2007b). In all 
trials, participants were required to imagine novel experiences in as much detail as 
possible in response to short cue descriptions, read by the experimenter, and referring to 
11 scenarios. Six out of the 11 scenarios required to imagine fictitious experiences, with 
no requirement for MTT, and not explicitly self-relevant  (“fictitious scenarios”, e.g., 
„„Imagine you‟re standing in the middle of a bustling street market. I want you to 
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describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your 
senses including what you can see, hear and feel”). Fictitious scenarios were the 
„market‟, „port‟, „beach‟, „museum‟, „pub‟, and „forest‟ scenarios used in Hassabis et al. 
(2007b). Differently, five out of the 11 scenarios required to imagine plausible personal 
future experiences (future scenarios; e.g., “Imagine the next time you‟ll meet a friend. I 
want you to describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as possible 
using all your senses including what you can see, hear and feel”). These corresponded to 
the „next meeting with a friend‟, „next weekend‟, and „next Christmas‟ scenarios from 
Hassabis et al. (2007b), plus two scenarios we added in order to match the number of 
future and fictitious scenarios more closely and compare the two types of scenario. 
Whereas the future scenarios in Hassabis et al. (2007b) were generally located in the 
near future (within the next year), the items we added refer to a farther future (10 years) 
(“Imagine something that will happen while you take a walk in your home town in 10 
years…”, “Imagine your birthday in 10 years…”).  
Participants described the imagined experiences until they came to a natural end. 
In line with Hassabis et al. (2007b), the examiner (author F.A.), blind to the hypotheses 
of the study (but not to group membership), was allowed to use general probes aimed at 
encouraging further description and make sure participants felt like anything else could 
be added  (e.g., “can you see anything else in the scene?”), but could not introduce any 
concept not mentioned by the subject. For all scenarios, participants were explicitly told 
not to recount a memory but to create something new. After each scenario, participants 
rated the constructed experiences across a number of different categories, including 
sense of presence (1, “I did not feel like I was there at all;” 5, “I felt strongly like I was 
really there”), perceived salience (1, “I couldn‟t really see anything;” 5, “extremely 
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salient”), difficulty (1, “very easy”; 5, “very difficult”), and similarity to a memory (1, 
“nothing at all like a memory”; 5, “exactly like a memory”). Finally, participants were 
presented with a list of twelve sentences and had to state whether each sentence 
described or not their image of the scenario (e.g. “I could see it as one whole scene in 
my mind‟s eye”). These probe questions were designed to estimate the spatial integrity 
of the scene (see below).  
To avoid fatigue, participants were generally tested in two separate sessions, 
about one week apart. Each session contained a similar number of future and fictitious 
scenarios, and the order of administration of the scenarios was randomized for each 
participant. Two healthy controls and two control patients were not available to be 
tested in two different days, and therefore received the two testing sessions in the same 
day, with an interval of about 3 hours. Testing sessions were recorded to enable 
transcription and later scoring of participants‟ reports. 
 
6.2.4  Scoring 
Participants‟ records were scored as in Hassabis et al. (2007b). For each trial, we 
calculated an Experiential Index (EI) indicating the overall richness of the constructed 
experience. The EI ranges between 0 and 60, as it is calculated as the sum of four 
subcomponents: content (score ranges between 0 and 28), participant ratings (sum score 
from two scales ranges between 0 and 8), spatial coherence index (score ranges between 
0 and 6), and quality judgment (score ranges between 0 and 18).  A description of each 
subcomponent is included in the next paragraphs.  
For the content score, each scenario description was segmented into a set of 
statements. Every statement was classified as belonging to one of four categories: 
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entities present (EP, e.g., objects, people, animals present in the scenarios), sensory 
descriptions (SD, e.g., “the chair is made of wood”), spatial references (SPA; e.g., 
“behind the bar”), and thoughts/emotions/actions (TEA, e.g., “I felt lonely”). For each 
subcategory, details were summed and the score was capped at a maximum of 7. 
Therefore, the total possible content score for each experience was 28 (note, however, 
that we obtained similar results using the uncapped data) (Hassabis et al., 2007b).  
The spatial coherence index (SCI), a measure of the spatial integrity of the 
imagined scene, was derived from the responses to 12 questions requiring patients to 
describe the “spatial quality” of the experiences they had constructed: 8 statements 
indicated that aspects of the scene were integrated (e.g. “I could see it as one whole 
scene in my mind‟s eye”), and 4 statements indicated that aspects of the scene were 
fragmented (e.g. “It wasn‟t so much a scene as a collection of separate images”). One 
point was assigned for each integrated statement selected, and one point was subtracted 
for each fragmented statement selected. These values were summed but rescaled 
(normalized around zero) to range between -6 (spatially fragmented) to 6 (spatially 
coherent). Only positive values, however, were included in the EI score so as not to 
overpenalize fragmented descriptions (Hassabis et al., 2007b).  
Participants‟ ratings of sense of presence and perceived salience, each originally 
ranging from 1 to 5, were rescaled to range from 0 to 4 before being included in the EI.  
The Quality Judgment (QJ) is the scorer's assessment of the overall quality of the 
constructed experience. The scorers were requested to rate how well they felt the 
description induced a detailed „„picture‟‟ of the scenario in their own mind‟s eye.  
Originally ranging from 0 (no picture at all) to 10 (extremely rich picture) to avoid a 
complicated rating, the QJ was rescaled between 0 and 18 to be included in the EI 
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calculation (see Hassabis et al., 2007b). We calculated the EI separately for fictitious 
and future scenarios. Two raters, blind to the aim of the study and to group membership, 
independently scored the scenarios of all but 2 participants (one of the two scorers was 
no longer available at the time the last two participants were tested). Agreement 
between scorers was high (Cronbach‟s α > 0.83 in all cases). The average scores from 
the two scorers or the single scores (in 2 cases) were subjected to statistical analyses.  
 
6.2.5  Statistical analyses 
The dependent variables violated in most cases normality or homoscedasticity 
assumptions and therefore the data were analyzed using non-parametric tests. Kruskal–
Wallis one-way ANOVA were used to assess group differences. Subsequently, to 
determine which group difference drove the main effects, we used Mann–Whitney‟s z-
tests between each patient group and the control group and between the two patient 
groups as post hoc tests. To assess differences in performance between future and 
fictitious conditions within individual groups, we used the Sign test. To compare the 
difference in performance between future and fictitious scenarios across groups, we 
calculated, for each relevant measure and each participant, the difference (Δ) in the 
scores attained in fictitious vs. future scenarios. For example, the difference in the 
experiential index (EI) was calculated as ΔEI = EI for fictitious scenarios – EI for future 
scenarios. Δ-scores, too, were analyzed using Kruskal–Wallis one-way analyses of 
variance, and Mann–Whitney‟s z-tests as post-hoc tests. In all cases, we report the two-
tailed significance value.   
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6.3 Results 
 
Considering the three original near-future items and the two far-future items we 
added separately did not change our results meaningfully, and therefore, for clarity, we 
present the results collapsed across the five future scenarios. It is worth noting, 
however, that participants (1.45 vs. 1, Sign test: z = 3.34, p = 0.0008), including vmPFC 
patients (2.5 vs. 1.86, Sign test: z = 2.04, p = 0.04), rated imagining far-future events as 
more difficult than imagining near-future events. This finding is worth noting: it 
suggests that participants did indeed attempt MTT, and did so towards specific points of 
subjective time, showing a good comprehension of task requirements. Far-future events, 
however, were also rated as more similar to a memory than near-future events (2.9 vs. 
2.03, Sign test: z = 4.40, p = 0.00001). Possibly, individuals tended to solve the harder 
problem of imagining far (compared to near) future events by resorting to memories of 
past events to a greater extent. This precluded a direct comparison of far-future and 
near-future events. An analysis of the content of vmPFC patients‟ constructed future 
and fictitious experiences excluded the presence of (provoked) confabulation: in all 
cases, patients imagined future and fictitious experiences congruent with their possible 
future actions (as confirmed by family members) and with the suggested settings.   
 
6.3.1 Experiential Index 
Figure 8 and Table 5 show the Experiential index (EI) by participant group and 
type of scenario, and Tables 6a and 6b show examples of constructed future and 
fictitious experiences in vmPFC patients and healthy as well as brain-damaged controls. 
As is evident, vmPFC patients showed a reduced EI in both fictitious and future 
scenarios compared to the control groups. The ANOVA on the EI for future scenarios 
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revealed a significant effect of Group (H = 11.02, p = 0.004). Post hoc comparisons 
showed that vmPFC patients had a reduced EI for future scenarios compared to healthy 
controls (z = -3.38, p = 0.0002), and control patients (z = -2.38, p = 0.02), whereas there 
were no differences between healthy controls and control patients (p = 0.65). The same 
analysis on the EI for fictitious scenarios revealed similar results: There was a 
significant effect of Group (H = 9.82, p = 0.007), indicating that vmPFC patients had a 
reduced EI compared to healthy controls (z = -3.30, p = 0.0003), and control patients (z 
= -2.06, p = 0.04), with no differences between the control groups (p = 0.86). 
Importantly, the EI for future and fictitious scenarios were highly correlated in either 
vmPFC patients (rSpearman = 0.86, p = 0.01), control patients (rSpearman = 0.80, p = 0.01), 
and healthy controls (rSpearman = 0.62, p = 0.03). These findings confirm that imagining 
fictitious and future experiences share important cognitive bases, and indicate that the 
vmPFC is crucial for both abilities.   
Figure 8, however, also suggests that constructing rich future experiences posed 
challenges to vmPFC patients beyond those involved in constructing fictitious 
experiences. Indeed, the EI for future scenarios was significantly lower than that for 
fictitious scenarios in vmPFC patients (z = 2.27, p = 0.02), but not in healthy controls (p 
= 0.39) or control patients (p = 1). In order to compare directly the differences between 
imagining fictitious and future experiences across participant groups, we focused on the 
ΔEI (EIFictitious - EIFuture). There was a significant difference in ΔEI across groups (H = 
8.32, p = 0.02): ΔEI was significantly higher in vmPFC patients than in healthy controls 
(z = 2.70, p = 0.005) or control patients (z = 2.17, p = 0.03), whereas no significant 
differences emerged between the control groups (p = 0.28). Thus, even though the 
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vmPFC patients were generally impaired at imagining novel experiences, these patients 
were relatively more impaired at imagining future compared with fictitious experiences. 
Having established that the EI is reduced in vmPFC patients, in the following 
sections we focused on the EI subcomponents separately, to qualify vmPFC patients‟ 
scene construction impairment, as well as the possible source for their relative 
disadvantage in constructing future vs. fictitious experiences. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean Experiential Index scores by participant group and type of scenario. 
Bars represent standard errors of the mean (SE). * p < 0.05. 
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Table 5. Constructed experience performance 
 
vmPFC patients Control patients Healthy controls 
 Fictitious Future Fictitious Future Fictitious Future 
EI 32.52(1.73) 26.15(2.27) 40.87(2.98) 40.70(3.56) 42.57(1.35) 40.41(1.17) 
Contents        
   EP 4.82(0.37) 4.21(0.32)  5.24(0.47) 5.35(0.48) 6.34(0.19) 5.69(0.30) 
   SPA 1.26(0.18) 0.94(0.13) 2.17(0.46) 2.58(0.56) 2.15(0.32) 2.42(0.28) 
   TEA 5.79(0.45)  5.59(0.49) 6.05(0.62) 6.27(0.33) 6.64(0.20) 6.74(0.13) 
   SD 5.81(0.11)  3.71(0.49) 5.64(0.52) 5.29(0.54) 6.26(0.31) 5.66(0.34) 
QJ 8.72(0.50) 6.38(0.77) 12.07(1.01) 11.72(1.21) 12.85(0.54) 12.09(0.36) 
Ratings       
   Sense of 
Presence 2.74(0.26) 2.57(0.23) 3.17(0.22) 3.27(0.23) 2.99(0.15) 2.93(0.11) 
   Perceived 
salience 2.64(0.22) 2.29(0.21)  3.00(0.17) 3.04(0.25) 3.00(0.17) 2.85(0.16) 
   SCI 0.74(0.34)  0.46(0.29)  3.54(0.51) 3.18(0.64) 2.35(0.35) 2.02(0.32) 
   Difficulty 1.86(0.22)  2.11(0.34)  0.78(0.24) 0.76(0.19) 1.14(0.23) 0.98(0.19) 
   Similarity 
to a 
memory 2.62(0.12) 2.74(0.15) 2.43(0.27) 2.24(0.29) 2.72(0.12) 2.27(0.17) 
Note. EI = Experiential Index, EP = Entity Presence, SPA = Spatial Reference, TEA = 
Thought/Emotion/Action, SD =  Sensory Description, QJ = Quality Judgment, SCI = Spatial Coherence 
Index. The values in brackets are standard errors of the mean. 
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Table 6a. Examples of fictitious constructed experiences from two vmPFC patients (P1 
and P2), a healthy control subject, and a brain-damaged subject. We use brackets to 
indicate information added to clarify the significance of some detail, or when omitting 
information that may help identify individual patients. We use brackets to highlight the 
experimenter‟s statements (in Italics).  
 vmPFC patients Control patient Healthy control 
Age  P1: 45; P2: 42 42 51 
Education P1: 12; P2: 13 8 13 
 
Fictitious scenario: Imagine you‟re standing in the middle of a bustling street market. Describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail 
as possible using all your senses including what you can see, hear and feel. 
 
 P1 
It‟s a market and it‟s full of people. Many 
women buying what they need, and little boys 
returning home from school. Going further I 
stop by a place where they sell sweaters, very 
nice yet cheap sweaters…[Can you tell me 
more details about this?] People are just 
normal, and they check out the stalls, for what 
is cheaper. And at the stand I stopped by there 
were highly embellished sweaters, decorated 
sweaters… [Anything else you want to tell me 
about this scenario?] There were a lot of 
people. That‟s it. Dressed rather 
conventionally, as one does when they go to 
the market. And each of them buys stuff. 
 
P2 
I imagine there are people chatting, people 
buying and people selling. Some vendors, 
persons shouting, a bunch of passers-by who 
are there because of curiosity. I imagine there 
are some thin and tall immigrants selling their 
products and I imagine there is a noisy and 
chaotic environment, and I am forced to say 
"excuse me" a hundred times in order to get 
through. I also notice that people are very 
impolite in how they behave, they do not care 
about other people, or whether people have 
mental or physical disabilities, like I do. And I 
imagine people celebrating, I would say… 
[Can you tell me more details about this?] I 
imagine I am not alone, my significant other is 
with me and some other friends, and we will 
get lost for sure. I imagine there are a lot of 
people who sell any kind of items, also silly 
things, those useless objects… and the car 
traffic. And I imagine that the square or the 
main avenues are closed to the traffic. 
 
 
It is a market located at the waterfront by 
the sea, a second-hand market, and in 
addition there are small stands with 
typical regional specialties. One walks in 
the middle of the crowd of people who 
are looking for things they need. Passing 
by the stands of typical, local, or regional 
stuff, one can smell diverse odors of 
different regions, tasting… Going on 
along the waterfront, looking at the sail 
boats and arriving at the end and after, 
we decide to come back and do another 
tour of smells, and sensations…The 
various ways to speak between people, 
other languages, and then continuing to 
walk…[Can you tell me more details 
about this?] The market is wide, located 
in a wide part of the quay at the 
waterfront with all stands situated on one 
side of the sea. They form like a barrier, 
and people in front of them, again on the 
waterfront, are speaking and engaging in 
conversation, they speak with the street 
traders. They trade pieces of cheese, of 
salami, and olives, tasting... [Is there 
anything else you want to tell me about 
this?] At a certain point we can hear the 
fanfare advancing, we turn our gaze 
towards the city square and we see the 
Bersaglieri (a corp of the Italian Army) 
moving forward with the brass-band, the 
guard of honor. And at the end they 
introduce themselves and there is the 
captain giving orders and the soldiers 
marching which itself sounds like music. 
All people clap their hands and in the 
middle of the crowd we make our way 
and we go back.  
 
I don‟t like crowded market areas 
because the idea of a market is 
something narrow. There are people who 
push you and don‟t let you look at 
anything in peace. In order to pass you 
have to push, so the market is a not really 
a nice scenario. A narrow street full of 
nice things on the right and on the left. 
Things like fruits and vegetables, fish, 
meat, clothes, or gifts. You pass by and 
you have the desire to stop for a moment 
to get a better look at an item, in order to 
buy it, then it becomes a pain, because 
then there‟s that person who pushes you, 
that one who won‟t let you pass, won‟t 
let you look around. The owner of the 
stall is completely busy with many 
customers and doesn‟t pay attention to 
you. Sure, the market is a nice place, it‟s 
a pity that there are so many people. 
There should be more space. You walk, 
trying to elbow your way through. Then 
you get to a more open area where you 
can breathe more easily. I imagine in this 
place, a bit more open, a church or a 
building that, seen from outside, is a bit 
neglected and nobody looks at it, nobody 
pays attention to it. But then you manage 
to go inside and see that it is a very 
beautiful building, where you can see 
history with your own eyes. You 
discover paintings and see beautiful 
sculptures, which nobody pays any 
attention to, but they are part of the 
history of the city that you‟re in. They 
are absolutely there and they remind you 
that this city and that square, that open 
space, has been a very important place in 
the past centuries of the history of this 
city. 
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Table 6b. Examples of future constructed experiences from two vmPFC patients (P1 
and P2), a healthy control subject, and a brain-damaged subject. We use brackets to 
indicate information added to clarify the significance of some detail, or when omitting 
information that may help identify individual patients. We use brackets to highlight the 
experimenter‟s statements (in Italics).  
 
 vmPFC patients Control patient Healthy control 
Age  P1: 45; P2: 42 42 51 
Education P1: 12; P2: 13 8 13 
 
Future Scenario: Imagine the next time you‟ll meet a friend. Describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using all 
your senses including what you can see, hear and feel. 
 
 P1 
I usually meet my friend at home or at the 
bar. We have a coffee or an 
“ammazzacaffè” (something typically 
alcoholic drank after coffee), and we then 
decide what to do and where to go… [OK, 
try to imagine the event of meeting a friend 
in the future, imagine the scene, and tell me 
all that you can about it]. So, I meet a 
friend, and we go to the bar, then we decide 
where to go. Each of us could go with their 
partners. 
 
P2 
I imagine meeting him and say Hi, but in 
fact I do not remember his name. I know 
many people so it‟s easy to forget their 
names. I ask how it is going… [Tell me 
more details about this] We see each other 
in viale Roma, (name of P2‟city)‟s 
principal street. I imagine he is really keen 
to chat with me, but I am in a hurry instead, 
because my companion wants to go home 
soon, absolutely. I would love to stay and 
have a chat… [Can you tell me more 
details about this?] I imagine meeting him 
in front of the schools. There is an 
elementary school right there, and a 
kindergarten in front of it. I imagine a 
relaxed chat with this guy.  
 
 
I hope I am going to meet him by the 
beach. It‟s been a long time since we 
have seen each other, almost 1 year. We 
hug each other, we kiss, we say hi. We 
talk about what has been going on 
during the past year, he gives me his 
news, I give him mine. We go to a kiosk, 
we drink something together. It‟s full of 
people smoking, which bothers me a lot. 
We stay there anyway, for the sake of 
being together, even though we are in 
the middle of too many people, and it is 
chaotic. And we talk, and talk, and talk. 
We then stop drinking, and take our 
shoes off, and roll up our pant legs, to go 
and see whether the water in the sea is 
warm or chilly. We stay with our feet 
immersed in the water for a while, still 
talking, and looking around to see 
whether someone else is around. 
Someone we know, or interesting to look 
at. Then we go back on the beach and we 
tap our feet to each other, this way (he 
imitates the gesture), to remove the sand, 
we put our shoes on again, and we head 
to the centre of this little city. We look at 
the stores, the people, the confusion. 
Another bar and another drink, and we 
meet other friends, we talk and we have 
fun, we whistle to some girl passing by. 
Then the wives come, and everybody 
goes back to being serious immediately. 
They have come to rescue us, we go 
back to the cars, greeting each other.  
 
I meet him at school, he comes to my 
school to meet me. I‟m working, I‟m in 
the classroom, I‟m teaching and there‟s 
this friend of mine arriving that I haven‟t 
seen in a while, and he‟s there to see me. 
Together we finish the lesson that I was 
teaching my students and afterwards we 
start to talk about our common past, about 
what we‟ve been doing, and we laugh and 
joke. We talk about what‟s happened 
since we‟ve grown apart. His life, what 
he‟s been doing, whether he‟s married, 
what kind of job he has, whether he likes 
the job he has. Obviously, I also tell him 
whether I‟m married, whether I‟m 
divorced; what job I have, whether I like 
it or not. Whether I should have done 
something else. Then, maybe I‟m done 
teaching, I‟m free, and we leave the 
school. Instead of having the usual coffee, 
I invite him to my place for lunch and we 
have lunch together. I don‟t live in a big 
apartment, it‟s just the right size. We go 
there, we hang around a bit, and finally 
we put together something to eat between 
laughs and pats on the shoulders. We sit 
down at the table. We have lunch talking 
about the old times and many other 
things. Then, after lunch we might go out, 
we each do our own thing and we go for a 
drink. Then we say goodbye and we set a 
date for another meeting. We promise to 
see each other again soon, to have another 
lunch, a dinner, or go out, or something 
along those lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
6.3.2 Spatial Coherence Index 
We first focused on the spatial coherence index (SCI; see Table 5). There was a 
significant effect of Group for future scenarios (H = 11.36, p = 0.003). Post hoc 
comparisons showed that vmPFC patients had a reduced SCI for future scenarios 
compared to healthy controls (z = -2.75, p = 0.004), and control patients (z = -2.86, p = 
0.002), with no differences between control patients and healthy controls (p = 0.17). 
Similar results were obtained for fictitious scenarios: There was a significant effect of 
Group (H = 12.30, p = 0.002), such that vmPFC patients had a reduced SCI compared to 
healthy controls (z = -2.66, p = 0.005), and control patients (z = -2.91, p = 0.002), with 
no differences between the control groups (p = 0.06). We found no significant 
differences on SCI scores for future and fictitious scenarios across groups (p > 0.07). 
These results show that vmPFC patients‟ constructed experiences were signiﬁcantly 
more spatially fragmented than those of the control groups across all types of scenario. 
 
6.3.3 Content Subscales 
For future scenarios, there were differences across groups in the number of 
spatial references (SPA) (H = 9.40, p = 0.009), and, marginally, sensory descriptions 
(SD) (H = 5.93, p = 0.05) (see Table 5). vmPFC patients provided fewer SPA than 
healthy controls (z = -3.04, p = 0.001) and control patients (z = -2.28, p = 0.02), and 
fewer SD than healthy controls (SD: z = -2.53, p = 0.01), whereas control patients did 
not differ significantly from healthy controls (p > 0.91 in both cases). No significant 
group differences emerged in the number of thoughts/emotions/actions (TEA) and entity 
presence (EP) (p > 0.059 in both cases). 
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For fictitious scenarios, there were differences across groups in the number of 
EP (H = 9.32, p = 0.009), and, marginally, TEA (H = 5.88, p = 0.05): vmPFC patients 
produced fewer EP and TEA details compared with healthy controls (EP: z = -3.13, p = 
0.0007; TEA: z = -2.28, p = 0.02), whereas no other significant differences emerged (p 
> 0.06 in all cases) (see Table 5). There were not significant group differences in the 
number of SD and SPA (p > 0.07). 
Comparing participants‟ performance in future vs. fictitious scenarios revealed 
one first source for the relative disadvantage in EFT observed in vmPFC patients: 
vmPFC patients imagined fewer SD (Sign test: z = 2.27, p = 0.02) and EP (Sign test: z = 
2.27, p = 0.02) in future compared to fictitious scenarios, whereas this difference was 
not found in control patients (p > 0.72 in both cases) and healthy controls (p > 0.14 in 
both cases). There was a significant difference across groups in the ΔSD (H = 8.56, p = 
0.01), which was higher in vmPFC patients than in healthy controls (z = 2.37, p = 0.02) 
and control patients (z = 2.80, p = 0.003), but comparable between the control groups (p 
= 0.75), confirming more marked difficulties at producing sensory descriptions for 
future vs. fictitious scenarios in vmPFC patients. No significant differences across 
groups emerged in the ΔEP (p = 0.08).  
 
6.3.4 Quality judgment 
Consistent with the results on the specific contents produced by participants, we 
also found a significant difference in quality judgment (QJ) across groups in both 
fictitious (H = 11.03, p = 0.004), and future scenarios (H = 12.09, p = 0.002). In both 
cases, vmPFC patients attained a lower QJ than both control patients (fictitious: z = -
2.28, p = 0.02; future: z = -2.70, p = 0.005) and healthy controls (fictitious: z = -3.38, p 
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= 0.0001; future: z = -3.55, p = 0.00004), whereas no differences emerged between the 
control groups (p  > 0.65 in both cases) (see Table 5). Again, vmPFC patients received a 
lower QJ when imagining future compared to fictitious scenarios (Sign test: z = 2.04, p 
= 0.04), whereas both control patients‟ (p = 0.50) and healthy controls‟ reports (p = 
0.15) were rated similarly across conditions. Group differences in ΔQJ approached 
significance (H = 5.87, p = 0.05): vmPFC patients‟ ΔQJ differed significantly from that 
of healthy controls (z = 2.37, p = 0.02), and marginally from that of control patients (z = 
1.85, p = 0.07). No significant difference was found between the control groups (p = 
0.70). 
 
6.3.5 Participants‟ Ratings  
6.3.5.1 Sense of presence and perceived salience 
No significant group difference emerged for sense of presence or perceived 
salience, neither for the future (sense of presence: p = 0.13, perceived salience: p = 
0.06) nor for the fictitious condition (sense of presence: p = 0.41, perceived salience: p 
= 0.27) (see Table 5). Sign tests did not reveal significant differences in sense of 
presence or perceived salience between future and fictitious scenarios across groups (p 
> 0.13 in both cases).   
 
6.3.5.2 Task difficulty and similarity to a memory 
The analysis on difficulty revealed group differences for imagining both future 
and fictitious experiences (future: H= 10.59, p = 0.005; fictitious: H = 7.69, p = 0.02), 
such that vmPFC patients found imagining novel experiences as more difficult than 
control patients (future: z = 2.86, p = 0.002; fictitious: z = 2.49, p = 0.01) and healthy 
111 
 
controls (future: z = 2.75, p = 0.004; fictitious: z = 2.15, p = 0.03), whereas no 
significant differences emerged between the control groups (p > 0.31 in both cases) (see 
Table 5). Sign tests did not reveal significant differences in self-assessed difficulty 
between future and fictitious scenarios across groups (p > 0.44).   
There were no group differences in ratings of similarity to a memory (p > 0.18), 
and no difference between future and fictitious scenarios within single groups (Sign test: 
p > 0.44 in all cases). Thus, consistent with EI scores, vmPFC patients found imagining 
novel experiences as more difficult than did the control groups. vmPFC patients 
occasionally complained about their problems at imagining novel experiences. One 
patient, G.V., commented that the task was difficult, and also “pointless” to him. “Even 
though I will try and think of a future event” - he said – “there is nothing like that in my 
life; I never imagine future events. What for?”  
Importantly, vmPFC patients did not try to overcome the perceived difficulty at 
imagining novel events by creating experiences more similar to actual memories than 
did the controls groups, which would have complicated the interpretation of our results. 
 
6.3.6  Future vs. fictitious cues 
Even though construction of future and fictitious scenarios was matched for 
difficulty (see 6.3.5.2), fictitious cues point to specific places (e.g., market), whereas 
future cues are more vague in this respect (e.g., next weekend) (see Hurley et al., 2011 
for a discussion). Because spatial locations are a particularly powerful retrieval cue 
(Robin and Moscovitch, 2014), we conducted additional analyses to make sure that 
vmPFC patients‟ lower performance in future vs. fictitious scenarios was not due to 
problems in accessing specific places to stage future experiences. First, vmPFC patients 
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mentioned the place in which the future experience occurred in most trials (91%), as did 
the control groups. Importantly, we restricted our analyses to future trials in which a 
specific place was mentioned, and confirmed our results: vmPFC patients attained a 
lower EI for future than fictitious experiences (z = 2.27, p = 0.02), whereas the control 
groups did not (p > 0.38 in both cases). These findings were confirmed by analyses on 
the ΔEI, which was larger in vmPFC patients than in controls (vmPFC patients vs. 
healthy controls: z = 2.45, p = 0.01; vmPFC patients vs. control patients: z = 2.06, p = 
0.04). Moreover, vmPFC patients (z = 2.27, p = 0.02), but not the control groups (p > 
0.38 in both cases), produced fewer SD for future than fictitious scenarios, and the ΔSD 
was larger in vmPFC patients than in controls (vmPFC patients vs. healthy controls: z = 
2.28, p = 0.02; vmPFC patients vs. control patients: z = 2.80, p = 0.003). Additionally, 
in our set of future scenarios one item mentioned a specific place (“Imagine something 
that may happen to you in 10 years while you are taking a walk in your hometown"). 
Still, the EI for this scenario was lower than that for fictitious scenarios in vmPFC 
patients (z = 2.27, p = 0.02), but not the control groups (p > 0.77 in both cases).  
 
6.3.7  Event construction and neuropsychological abilities: exploratory analyses 
We ran Spearman correlation analyses between neuropsychological measures 
and the EI, separately for future and fictitious and scenarios. We found a significant, 
negative correlation between the number of errors in the Stroop task and the EI for both 
future scenarios (rSpearman = -0.78, p = 0.04, two-tailed), and fictitious scenarios (rSpearman 
= -0.81, p = 0.02, two-tailed).  
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6.3.8  Event construction and vmPFC: exploratory analyses 
We investigated whether the EI for future and fictitious scenarios in vmPFC 
patients correlated with lesion volume. As anticipated, brain lesions in vmPFC patients 
overlapped maximally in BAs 11, 10, and 32. By using partial correlation analyses, we 
investigated the relation between the EI and lesion volume in each of the three BAs, 
partialing out the effect of lesion volume in the other two BAs, separately for future and 
fictitious scenarios.  
We found that lesion volume in BA 11 correlated strongly with the EI for future 
scenarios (r = -0.98; p = 0.003, two-tailed), and, though marginally, with the EI for 
fictitious scenarios (r = -0.84; p = 0.07, two-tailed): the larger the lesion, the more 
pronounced the difficulties at constructing novel experiences. Lesion volume in BA 32 
correlated with the EI for future scenarios (r = -0.95; p = 0.01, two-tailed), but not for 
fictitious scenarios (r = -0.45; p = 0.44, two-tailed), suggesting that BA 32 has a more 
prominent role in imagining personal future experience than fictitious experiences. 
Interestingly, lesion volume in BA 10 correlated positively with the EI for future 
scenarios (r = 0.92; p = 0.02, two-tailed), such that patients with bigger lesions were 
relatively less impaired at imagining future experiences. There was no relation between 
lesion volume in BA 10 and the EI for fictitious scenarios (r = 0.31; p = 0.61). 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
In this study, vmPFC patients, control patients with lesions mainly in posterior 
cortices, and healthy controls, imagined personal, future experiences as well as 
fictitious, atemporal experiences. We found that constructed experience was, in both 
cases, poor in vmPFC patients compared to healthy and brain-damaged controls, as 
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indicated by a severely reduced EI. This result is not likely to be due to reduced verbal 
fluency in vmPFC patients: first, verbal fluency was within the normal range in vmPFC 
patients, and matched between vmPFC patients and control patients, who had a normal 
EI. Second, neither phonemic nor semantic fluency correlated with the EI for future or 
fictitious scenarios in vmPFC patients (p > 0.64 in all cases). Additionally, for both 
future and fictitious scenarios, vmPFC patients also evinced a low spatial coherence 
index, and this measure does not rely on narrative abilities.  
The finding that vmPFC patients were impaired at imagining both future and 
fictitious experiences indicates that vmPFC supports constructive processes necessary 
for, but not uniquely related to, EFT (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 
2012). One candidate process is scene construction, the cognitive ability grounding 
vivid imagination and experience of complex events, be these personally-relevant and 
located in subjective time, or purely fictional and atemporal (Hassabis and Maguire, 
2007). To give rise to a recollection-like experience, indeed, any simulated experience 
needs to be “staged” within a spatial context. vmPFC patients, indeed, rated their 
constructed experiences as less spatially coherent, and provided fewer spatial details, 
than did the control groups, indicating a difficulty forming integrated scenes. This 
finding is in line with fMRI evidence of consistent activation of the vmPFC during 
scene construction (Hassabis et al., 2007a), as well as other operations requiring scene 
construction, including episodic remembering and future thinking (Addis et al., 2007, 
2009a; D‟Argembeau et al., 2008, 2010b; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Schacter et al., 
2012). Consistently, in a recent study we have found that vmPFC patients were equally 
impaired in remembering the past and imagining the future. Notably, patients were also 
impaired at imagining future experiences of close and distant others, consistent with the 
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suggestion that vmPFC may have a general role in the construction of complex 
experiences, whether self-relevant or not (Bertossi et al., 2016b). 
Together with fMRI evidence, these results indicate that the vmPFC is a crucial 
node in a network enabling construction of novel events (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; 
Schacter et al., 2012), and contribute to reveal its functional architecture. As anticipated, 
both fMRI and neuropsychological studies indicate the MTLs as crucial neural 
substrates of scene construction (Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b). Few 
neuropsychological studies have focused on brain areas outside the MTLs. Berryhill and 
colleagues have shown that the posterior parietal cortex is necessary to imagine both 
future and fictitious experiences (Berryhill et al., 2010), consistent with fMRI evidence 
(Hassabis et al., 2007a). In that study, however, patients with lesions in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which is not normally activated during scene construction (Hassabis 
and Maguire, 2007), were also impaired at imagining novel experiences. The authors, 
therefore, raised the concern that because constructed experience tasks are typically 
effortful any brain lesion may impair performance (Berryhill et al., 2010), making it 
difficult to trace brain-behavior relations. Our result that constructed experience was 
impaired in vmPFC patients but preserved in control patients argues against this 
possibility, and reinforce the hypothesis that vmPFC, the MTLs, and the posterior 
parietal cortex are crucial nodes of a well-delineated system engaged during event 
construction (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). Consistently, vmPFC, the hippocampus, 
and the inferior parietal cortex participate jointly in a “MTL-subsystem” of the DMN 
supporting construction of mental scenes based on memory (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010b).  
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Even though the present data fit with a “scene construction” account (Hassabis 
and Maguire, 2007), they are also consistent with the “episodic simulation hypothesis” 
(Schacter et al., 2008, 2012), according to which simulation of future (as well as 
fictitious) experiences relies on constructive processes necessary to make available and 
flexibly recombine all the relevant details constituting complex experiences (rather than 
assemble the spatial foundation for details to reside; Mullally and Maguire, 2013). In 
particular, Benoit and colleagues have recently demonstrated that vmPFC supports the 
simulation of novel episodes by coordinating, integrating, and summarizing knowledge 
about episodes‟ elements, stored in distributed cortical regions (Benoit et al., 2014). 
vmPFC is implicated in strategic retrieval processes needed to constrain memory search, 
and monitor the appropriateness of recovered memories, operating during episodic 
(autobiographic) as well as semantic retrieval (Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; Gilboa et 
al., 2006). vmPFC, therefore, might work in concert with the MTLs during event 
construction, orchestrating search and integration of parts of episodic memories and 
semantic knowledge to combine into a novel event.  
vmPFC and the MTLs likely differ in the nature and timing of their contribution 
to event construction, and future research should now be aimed at specifying the precise 
function of, and interplay between, nodes of the core network now known to be critical 
for event construction. Maguire and Mullally (2013) have proposed that the 
hippocampus drives an early, automatic scene construction process serving as the 
foundation upon which (re)constructed events unfold. Such a “spatial scaffold” appears 
of primary importance in guiding both retrieval of past events and the construction of 
novel events (Maguire and Mullally, 2013; Robin and Moscovitch, 2014; Robin et al., 
2016). The spatial representation arranged by the hippocampus may then be fed back to 
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other areas to perform additional integrative processes and express the subjective 
experience of the event. vmPFC is critical for appropriate processing of schema-related 
information (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Ghosh et al., 2014), and represents abstract 
summaries of frequent events (Krueger et al., 2009). During scene construction, this 
region may help activate and maintain a stable schematic knowledge of relevant events 
(e.g., the typical birthday party, the typical market) around which to construct a specific 
event, and point to a set of related, context-relevant past experiences to use as source of 
details (Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013; Benoit et al., 2014). A comparison in the EI 
(collapsed across future and fictitious scenarios) between hippocampal patients (mean 
EI = 25.88; data averaged between Hassabis et al., 2007b; Mullally et al., 2012) and 
vmPFC patients (mean EI = 29.62; this study) suggests that hippocampal patients may 
be more impaired in scene construction than vmPFC patients, as expected if patients 
were deprived of even a rudimentary medium upon which to arrange individuals‟ 
details. vmPFC patients, on the other hand, may have succeeded at creating an initial 
scene, but failed at retrieving from memory and integrating successfully additional, 
multimodal details to make it a rich mental experience. We note that vmPFC patients 
did not endorse schema-irrelevant details. They recounted very typical birthday parties, 
weekends, pub experiences, market experiences, pub experiences, etc. (see Serra et al., 
2014 for a discussion), though these experiences were poor in detail. It is possible, 
however, that vmPFC patients with spontaneous confabulation would provide 
experiences that would deviate from schema-related knowledge (Ghosh et al., 2014; 
Gilboa et al., 2006), and be highly implausible (see Cole et al., 2014).  
Although our findings highlight a pervasive role of vmPFC in the imagination of 
novel experiences, they also suggest a more pronounced involvement in EFT. Indeed, 
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vmPFC patients, but not the control groups, attained a significantly lower EI for future 
than fictitious scenarios. Future and fictitious scenarios were rated as equally difficult 
across groups, and, therefore, performance differences between future and fictitious 
scenarios observed in vmPFC patients cannot be attributed merely to task difficulty. In 
fact, vmPFC patients (as well as the controls groups) rated future and fictitious 
experiences as comparable in many respects, including spatial coherence and sense of 
presence. However, vmPFC patients (unlike the controls groups) imagined significantly 
fewer sensory details for future compared to fictitious experiences. As anticipated, 
beyond scene construction processes shared with imagining fictitious scenarios, EFT 
entails autonoetic awareness, a subjective sense of time typically accompanying MTT 
(Tulving, 1985), and is heavily constrained by self-knowledge (D‟Argembeau and 
Mathy, 2011). These elements apply to imagining fictitious experience to a much lesser 
extent, if not at all. Autonoetic awareness has been long linked to the frontal lobe 
(Wheeler et al., 1997), which may explain why EFT proved especially challenging for 
vmPFC patients. A similar impairment in imagining future vs. fictitious scenarios, 
indeed, has been documented in older adults (Rendell et al., 2012), who show 
disproportionate prefrontal lobe atrophy (Raz et al., 2005).  
EFT is also intimately linked to self-knowledge: it is through introspecting on 
who they were, are, and wish to become that individuals construe plausible personal 
future events. These must maintain a tie to past memories, representing their natural 
continuation, but also obligatorily deviate from them, to reflect changes in goals and 
preferences with time (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). D‟Argembeau and Mathy 
(2011) have shown that self-knowledge is crucial to frame search and integration of 
episodic details during EFT, as well as during episodic remembering. Knowledge about 
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personal goals is especially effective in driving EFT. vmPFC patients‟ impairment in 
EFT, therefore, may be related to an inability to drive search processes appropriately 
based on relevant self-knowledge. vmPFC, indeed, supports self-referential processing 
(D‟Argembeau et al., 2012; Philippi et al., 2012), and is more active during imagination 
of future events related (as opposed to unrelated) to personal goals (D‟Argembeau et al., 
2010b).  
vmPFC patients‟ more severe difficulty at “seeing” the future (compared to the 
fictitious) had not been reported in patients with lesion to the MTLs (Hassabis et al., 
2007b) or the posterior parietal cortex (Berryhill et al., 2010), and, therefore, may be a 
specific signature of vmPFC damage on EFT. This finding may relate to vmPFC 
patients‟ steep TD (Sellitto et al., 2010): patients may devalue future rewards because 
they cannot pre-experience their future richly, at least as richly as they can experience 
fictitious events (Boyer, 2008; Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino, 2011; Schacter et al., 
2012). Steep TD, indeed, is not observed in MTLs patients (Kwan et al., 2013), who 
show impaired EFT (Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011), but not a disadvantage in 
imagining their own future as opposed to purely fictional events (Hassabis et al., 
2007b). It would be important to confirm vmPFC patients‟ imbalance in the 
construction of temporal vs. atemporal experiences in future studies probing 
construction of past, future and atemporal events within the same paradigm, and with 
more controlled cues. The cues we used were matched for difficulty, and we made sure 
that the presence of a precise location in fictitious vs. future cues was not the factor 
driving performance differences in vmPFC. However, some of the fictitious cues 
contained information that may have been useful to prime associations (e.g., a bustling 
market, a tropical beach), at least in vmPFC patients. Using a more controlled set of 
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cues will help determine whether temporality significantly and consistently interact with 
scene construction in these patients. 
Despite gathered from a relatively small group of patients, correlation analyses 
suggest that general deficits in scene construction and specific deficits in EFT may have 
different roots within vmPFC. Lesion volume in BA 11 correlated negatively with the 
EI for both future and fictitious scenarios, suggesting that the most ventral part of 
vmPFC may mediate constructive processes needed to simulate any novel event. 
Differently, lesions in BA 10 and BA 32 had a more specific impact on the EI for future 
scenarios. Specifically, lesion volume in BA 10 correlated positively and lesion volume 
in BA 32 correlated negatively with the EI. Constructing truly novel events based on 
highly familiar cues (e.g., a birthday party) requires resisting interference from similar 
past memories. The EI, indeed, correlated with interference in the Stroop task. BA 10 is 
preferentially associated with retrieval of real (vs. imaginary) episodic memories 
(Hassabis et al., 2007a; Addis et al., 2009a). In the context of impaired strategic 
retrieval processes, a reduced input from BA 10 may have paradoxically protected 
vmPFC patients from memory-interference during EFT. On the other hand, the anterior 
cingulate region BA 32 is engaged while detecting response conflict, as in the Stroop 
task (Botvinick et al., 2004), and competition among memory traces (Kuhl et al., 2007). 
During EFT, therefore, BA 32 may help control interference from similar episodic 
memories, allowing construction of future events that are not a mere copy of the past, 
but reflect relevant, updated self-knowledge (e.g., goals).  
We note that, in a recent report, patients with medial prefrontal lesions proved 
able to imagine future events (Kurczek et al., 2015). While differences between our 
results and the results by Kurczek and collaborators may depend on the site of brain 
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lesions (i.e., centered on BA 11 in the present study and on BA 10 in Kurczek et al.‟s 
study), the two studies also had important methodological differences. For example, in 
this study patients constructed “entire events”, in line with previous literature (e.g., 
Addis et al., 2009b, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Race et al., 2011), whereas in Kurczek 
et al. (2015) patients narrated circumscribed fragments of previously selected events. 
The two procedures likely placed different demands on event contruction processes. 
To conclude, we have shown that vmPFC patients are impaired at imagining 
both future and fictitious experiences, indicating that vmPFC is necessary for the 
construction of novel experiences, including personal future experiences (EFT). vmPFC 
may support core construction/retrieval processes critical for EFT (e.g., scene 
construction). However, vmPFC patients‟ impairment was more marked for future than 
fictitious experiences, suggesting that vmPFC may mediate additional components of 
EFT, beyond core constructive processes. We propose that different regions within 
vmPFC support distinct component processes of EFT. BA 11 may underlie constructive 
processes needed to assemble and stage any complex experience: future as well as 
atemporal. BA 10 and BA 32, on the other hand, may be engaged specifically during 
simulation of those experiences that, considering our own history and current goals, 
most likely await us in the future.  
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7 Experiment 3 - Impaired future thinking following vmPFC 
damage: a deficit of prospection, narration, or scene maintenance? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In order to construct a complex scenario it is necessary to combine different 
elements that compose the scenario in a coherent manner, maintaining a complex 
scenario in mind, and verbally describe it, creating an extensive narrative (Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). As we noted before (see 2.3), 
patients with lesions in the MTLs are impaired at remembering the past and imagining 
the future (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; but see Squire et al., 2010). In that study, 
participants were shown drawings of scenes and they were instructed to tell a story 
about what was going on in the scenes. Patients and controls showed preserved ability 
to construct narratives (Race et al., 2011). In another study (Race et al., 2013), amnesic 
patients (with MTL lesions) and healthy controls were asked to describe pictures of 
scenes in as much detail as possible without creating stories. Patients and controls 
described a similar number of total details, suggesting that narrative descriptions were 
intact in amnesic patients. 
However, other studies demonstrated that amnesic patients may perform poorly in 
describing complex scenes (Zeman et al., 2013). Zeman and colleagues asked amnesic 
patients and healthy participants to imagine complex scenes and describe two complex 
paintings and two real-life settings. Amnesic patients provided fewer details in 
imagining scenes and described fewer elements of the current scenes compared to 
healthy controls. Moreover, the superior performance of the healthy controls in the 
imagination condition became non-significant after controlling for performance in the 
scene description condition. These results show that amnesic patients deficit in 
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imagining complex scenarios may be explained by a difficulty in describing any kind of 
experiences also when experiences are not imagined. In another study amnesic patients 
showed impoverished discourse integration abilities (Race et al., 2015). Narratives of 
remembered events and imagined future events provided by amnesic patients and 
healthy controls were analyzed using a scoring of narrative cohesion and coherence. For 
the “narrative cohesion scoring”, linguistic elements that work as a cohesive ties, such 
as pronouns and conjunctions (e.g., “My pencil is broken. I need a new one”), were 
counted. For the “narrative coherence scoring”, points were assigned to narratives 
oriented in time and space, considering the degree to which the actions could be ordered 
on a timeline, and the extent the narrator stayed on topic.  
Amnesic patients produced fewer cohesive ties and they showed a reduced 
coherence score than healthy participants in both past and future narratives (Race et al., 
2015). Together, these results suggest that the deficit in autobiographical memory and 
EFT shown in patients with lesions to a node of the DMN, such as MTLs, may be, at 
least in part, caused by non-episodic mechanisms, for example poor narrative abilities 
(Gaesser et al., 2011). Indeed, tasks that are often used to investigate autobiographical 
memory and EFT involve the creation of extended narratives. 
It has been hypothesized that also executive functions may be crucial to sustain 
prospection (Addis et al., 2008; D‟Argembeau et al., 2010a; Hill and Emery, 2013). For 
instance, in a study on young and old adults, working memory performance correlated 
with internal details produced during an EFT task and autobiographical memory 
retrieval (Zavagnin et al., 2016). In another experiment (Hill and Emery, 2013), 
participants completed measures of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory, as well 
EFT and episodic memory. In one task, participants were cued to recall specific events 
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occurring in their personal past and imagine specific events that might occur in their 
personal future. The total number of specific events generated for each temporal 
condition was counted. The results showed that a composite score of working memory 
capacity was significantly correlated with future specificity (Hill and Emery, 2013). 
These findings demonstrate that working memory may support EFT and suggest that it 
is important to consider working memory capacity when EFT is investigated. 
As we demonstrated before, the vmPFC plays a critical role in supporting the 
ability to construct past and future experiences (see Experiments 1 and 2). Potentially 
compromised narrative abilities, however, may be one factor hindering vmPFC patients' 
performance in recalling and imagining any type of event. In a study on older adults 
(Gaesser et al., 2011) who may show frontal atrophy (Raz et al., 2005), old and young 
participants described details about a picture or imagined future events using the picture 
as cue. A deficit in EFT was found in older adults who showed also poor abilities in 
describing pictures compared to young participants. Thus, the impairment in older 
adults in imagining the future may be explained, at least in part, by their poor narrative 
abilities.  
In Experiment 2, however, we showed that vmPFC patients were more impaired 
at imagining future than fictitious experiences and this effect was not present in control 
patients and healthy controls. One may argue that vmPFC patients are impaired at 
imagining the future because vmPFC mediates other processes rather than 
episodic/constructive ones, such as working memory abilities, crucial for EFT. It is well 
known that the prefrontal cortex is involved in working memory performance (for a 
review see D‟Esposito & Postle, 2015). The vmPFC activity, together with the activity 
of other brain areas, has been found relevant for executive processing in a working 
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memory task. In a study Luu and colleagues (2014) employed EEG methodology for 
examining both the time course and cortical networks involved in working memory, as 
assessed by the n-back task. Before the stimulus onset, visual cortex network (pre-
stimulus network), which includes also the posterior cingulate cortex, was found active 
reflecting anticipatory and attentional processes. Right after the stimulus onset, the 
vmPFC, together with other brain regions, becomes associated with the pre-stimulus 
network. This second network appears to reflect executive control processes, suggesting 
an involvement of the vmPFC in working memory. Considering also other experimental 
evidence (Barbey et al., 2009), authors hypothesized that the vmPFC may be critical for 
the maintenance, manipulation, and monitoring of information (Luu et al., 2014). In a 
study on Social Working Memory (SWM), that is the capability of maintaining and 
manipulating social information about others, for example personality traits and mental 
states (Meyer et al., 2015), participants encoded two, three or four of their friends‟ 
names, they were asked to rank the friends along a trait dimension during a delay 
period, and answered a true/false question about their rank order. In addition, 
participants completed classic working memory trials in which they reordered friends‟ 
names alphabetically during the delay period. The results identified regions that were 
more strongly increasing with SWM load level compared to load level in the classic 
working memory task, which involved the mentalizing network, including the vmPFC. 
Considering that vmPFC is engaged during SWM and that EFT often involves social 
information, a lesion to the vmPFC may affect working memory capacity and, in turn, 
performance in EFT tasks. 
To date it is not clear whether the vmPFC mediates processes as working 
memory or narrative abilities that may explain vmPFC patients' impoverished capability 
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of imagining future events. In the current study, we are firstly interested in replicating 
the results we found in experiment 1 on the role of vmPFC in imagining future 
experiences. Second, we investigated whether vmPFC patients' deficit in EFT may be 
due, at least in part, to a lack of narrative construction (narrative loss hypothesis) and/or 
an inability to maintain complex scenes in working memory (working memory loss 
hypothesis). To test these hypotheses, we asked vmPFC patients and healthy 
participants to imagine future episodes using pictures as cues and to perform a picture 
description task in two conditions: in the presence of a picture (description condition) 
and in absence of a picture after an observation phase (working memory condition). The 
results showed that the poor performance of vmPFC patients in imagining future events 
does not depend on a working memory loss or on a deficient capability of describing 
complex images. Indeed, group differences in imagining the future remained also when 
we controlled for these factors.  
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1. Participants 
Participants included 6 patients with vmPFC damage (vmPFC patients) and 11 
healthy individuals (see Table 7 for demographic information). Healthy individuals 
were matched to patients in terms of age (t = 0.45, p = 0.66) and education (t = 0.26, p = 
0.79). Patients were recruited at the Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. In all cases, vmPFC patients‟ lesions were the results of 
the rupture of an aneurysm of the ACoA. Lesions were bilateral, though often also 
asymmetrical (see Figure 9). Patients taking part in the study were in the stable phase of 
recovery (at least 3 years post-morbid), were not receiving psychoactive drugs, and had 
no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or interfere with the participation in the 
127 
 
study (e.g., significant psychiatric disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular 
disease).  
Also, the healthy individuals were not taking psychoactive drugs, and were free 
of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by case history. 
Participants gave informed consent to take part in the study, according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and 
the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna. 
 
7.2.1.1  Neuropsychological assessment 
Patients‟ general cognitive functioning was generally preserved, as indicated by 
the scores they obtained in the Raven Standard Matrices (RMS) that were within the 
normal range, and similar between groups (t = -1.62, p = 0.12) (see Table 7). 
vmPFC patients also received a more extensive neuropsychological evaluation 
aimed at qualifying their cognitive profile further. vmPFC patients reported normal 
scores in verbal short-term memory (Digit Span: Mean equivalent score (ES) = 3; note 
that the equivalent score ranges from 0 = impaired performance, and 1 = borderline 
performance, to 2 - 4 indicating normal performance) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), 
spatial short-term memory (Corsi test: ES = 3.17), and working memory assessed with 
the 2-back task from the Test Battery for Attentional performance (TEA) (false alarms: t 
= 37.5, reaction times: t = 42.8, cut-off = 30) (Zoccolotti et al., 1994; Zimmermann and 
Fimm, 2002). Patients exhibited normal performance in several tests tapping executive 
functions, such as the Tower of London test (t = 43.57, cut-off = 30) (Culbertson and 
Zillmer, 2000), phonemic (ES = 2.17) and semantic fluency (ES = 2.83), and the Stroop 
test (mean number of errors = 0.91, cut off > 7.5) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). vmPFC 
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patients showed a borderline performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which 
was characterized by many perseverative errors (t = 30.5, cut-off = 30), suggesting an 
impoverished cognitive flexibility. Long-term memory was weak, as assessed with the 
Buschke–Fuld list-learning Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974; Long Term Retrieval ES = 
1.17) and a prose-passage recall test (ES = 1.5) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987).  
  
Table 7. Participants‟ demographic and clinical information  
Group N 
Age 
(Years) 
Education 
(Years) 
Sex SRM 
vmPFC 
patients 
6 55.66(2.75) 11.50(1.11) 6 Males 35.50(3.08) 
Healthy 
controls 
11 54.09(1.81) 11.54(1.16) 
10 Males; 
1 Female 
40.81(1.74) 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; SRM = Standard Raven Matrices; For SRM we report the 
mean uncorrected scores. The values in brackets are standard errors of the mean.    
 
7.2.2 Lesion analysis 
Patients‟ individual lesions, derived from the most recent magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI; N = 1) or computerized tomography (CT; N = 5) images, were manually 
drawn by a neurologist or by M.M. (both were not involved in the present study, and 
blind to task performance) and then verified by the same neurologist, directly on each 
slice of the normalized T1-weighted template MRI scan from the Montreal Neurological 
Institute provided with the MRIcro software (Rorden and Brett, 2000) (see also Karnath 
et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2008; Tsuchida and Fellows, 2012). This template is 
approximately oriented to match Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and is 
distributed with MRIcro. This manual procedure combines segmentation (identification 
of lesion boundaries) and registration (to a standard template) into a single step, with no 
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additional transformation required (Kimberg et al., 2007). MRIcro software was used to 
estimate lesion volumes (in cc) and to generate lesion overlap images.  
Figure 9 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in vmPFC patients. BAs 
affected in the vmPFC group were areas BA 10, BA 11, BA 24, BA 25, BA 32, BA 46, 
BA 47, with region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 22.55 cc, SD = 8.80, 
about 34% of BA 11‟s volume), BA 10 (M =  14.14 cc, SD = 4.36, about 38% of BA 
10‟s volume), and BA 32 (M = 9.25 cc, SD = 2.76, about 29% of BA 32‟s volume). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Extent and overlap of brain lesions. The figure represents vmPFC patients‟ 
lesions projected on the same six axial slices and on the sagittal view of the standard 
Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines on the sagittal view 
are the positions of the axial slices, and the white numbers under the axial views are 
the z-coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping 
lesions. Maximal overlap occurs in BA 11, 10, and 32. The left hemisphere is on the 
left side. 
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7.2.3 Stimuli 
Eleven colored pictures (size, 640 × 480 pixels) were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). 
Pictures depicted people in different environments/situations: nine pictures were used in 
the main task (picnic, street, football field, park, office, sea, living room, fast food, and 
city) and two were used for the practice sessions (fishing and theater). We selected all 
pictures with positive valence (mean valence = 6.31, SD = 1.12). The 9 photographs 
used in the main part of the task were randomly assigned to the three conditions for each 
participant (3 pictures for each condition; see paragraph 7.2.4 for a description of the 
three conditions). 
 
7.2.4  Experimental task 
For each trial, participants completed a computerized adapted version of the 
Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002; Gaesser et al., 2011). Participants 
either imagined an event using the picture as cue (future condition), or described the 
details in picture in two conditions. In the description condition, participants described, 
verbally, details about a picture that remained on the screen for the entire duration of the 
description. In the working memory (WM) condition, participants first observed the 
picture for a maximum of 5 minutes. When participant felt ready to describe it, the 
picture was taken away and they were required to remember and verbally describe the 
elements in the picture. In the future condition participants were required to imagine 
three future events using the pictures as cues. In all conditions, participants provided as 
many details as possible for a maximum of 5 minutes per picture. Trials were blocked 
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by condition to facilitate compliance with the instructions. Presentation order of 
conditions and pictures were randomized across subjects. 
General prompts were given when necessary to clarify instructions or solicit 
further details. For description and WM trials, participants were required to describe the 
different people, objects, and environment in the picture and their relationship to one 
another (e.g. What are the people doing? What do they look like? Where are they?). 
Participants were instructed to report only what was depicted in the picture without 
embellishing. For future trials, participants imagined personal events that could possibly 
occur in the next 2-3 years with the picture as the general setting. Imagined experiences 
did not need to strictly involve the elements presented in the picture. Participants were 
instructed to experience events from a field perspective (through their own eyes) rather 
than from an observer perspective (from an external vantage point). Events generated 
for imagination trials were required to be specific in time and place, lasting several 
minutes to hours, but not exceeding a day.  
After each trial in all conditions, participants were asked to answer three 
questions: (1) how detailed was the imagination of future event or the picture? (Detail: 1 
– Not detailed at all; 4 – Very detailed); (2) How much were you touched by the 
event/the picture (Emotion: 1 – I was not touched at all; 4 – I was very touched); (3) 
How difficult was the task? (Difficulty: 1 – Very easy; 4 – Very difficult).  
While imagining the future and describing the pictures, in both description and 
WM conditions, participants were recorded. The time participants employed to describe 
the future event and describe/observe the pictures, in both description and WM 
conditions, was also recorded. 
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7.2.5 Scoring 
Participants‟ reports were recorded, transcribed, and scored using the 
Autobiographical Interview protocol developed by Levine et al. (2002) and adapted 
following the study by Gaesser and colleagues (2011).  
 For each trial, the central event was identified and, if more than one event was 
mentioned, the event described in more detail was considered the main event. Each 
event was divided into distinct details (unique bits of information), and these details 
were classified as internal (episodic details) or external (semantic information, 
repetitions, and information not specific to the main event). Verbatim descriptions of 
items part of the picture were scored as external details for future condition trials so that 
only imagined future events were considered as internal details. The verbatim 
descriptions were scored as internal details for both description and WM conditions. 
Inferences about the picture (e.g. speculations, providing explanations for peoples‟ 
actions) were scored as external details for description trials in both description and 
WM conditions. For the WM condition, wrong elements remembered by participants  
were considered as external details (e.g., wrong position of the elements). Raters took 
into account the related pictures to classify details as internal or external information. 
 Two raters scored the transcripts independently. A main rater, blind to group 
membership and to the hypothesis of the study, scored all events/descriptions, and a 
second rater scored 62% of the events/descriptions. Inter-rater reliability for internal and 
external details between the two raters were assessed with intra-class correlation 
(McGraw et al., 1996), which indicated high agreement between the two scorers. 
Coefficient (Cronbach‟s α) for internal detail was 0.98 and for external detail was 0.89.   
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Ratings 
The mean ratings of Detail, Emotion, and Difficulty are presented in Table 8. 
We examined possible differences between groups on characteristics that could have 
influenced somehow the performance of participants in the task. Ratings did not always 
follow normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test: d > 0.36, p < 0.05), hence, 
group differences on ratings were analyzed using Mann-Whitney U tests. Across 
conditions, healthy controls and vmPFC patients gave similar ratings of Detail, 
Emotion, and Difficulty (z > -1.75, p > 0.07).  
 
Table 8. Mean values of Detail, Emotion, and Difficulty ratings  
 
Future 
condition 
  
Description 
condition 
  
WM 
condition 
  
Group Det Emo Diff Det Emo Diff Det Emo Diff 
vmPFC  2.03(0.24) 2.42(0.33) 2.75(0.23) 2.53(0.27) 1.87(0.25) 2.10(019) 2.42(0.16) 1.65(0.21) 2.30(0.28) 
HC 2.49(0.16) 2.92(0.21) 2.03(0.28) 3.05(0.05) 2.19(0.16) 1.94(0.17) 2.81(0.12) 1.88(0.23) 2.43(0.19) 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; HC = Healthy controls; WM = working memory; Det = 
Detail; Emo = Emotion; Diff = Difficulty. The values in brackets are standard errors of the mean.    
 
7.3.2 Duration of trials during future, description, and WM conditions 
The mean values of response times that participants employed in performing 
each trial are presented in Table 9. Group differences were analyzed using t-tests 
because values did not violate normality assumptions. vmPFC patients and healthy 
controls needed a similar amount of time to imagine future events (t = 0.44, p = 0.66), to 
describe the pictures in the description (t = -1.64, p = 0.12), and in WM conditions (t = -
1.59, p = 0.13). Groups did not differ in the amount of time they used to observe the 
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pictures in the WM condition (t = -0.52, p = 0.61). These findings suggest vmPFC 
patients were not impulsive in providing their narratives, so they did not hasten to 
imagine future experiences or describe pictures, and that they took a sufficient amount 
of time to observe the pictures. 
 
Table 9. Mean values of response times that participants employed to perform the task 
(in minutes) 
 
Future 
condition 
Description 
condition 
WM  
condition 
 
Group   Observation Description 
vmPFC  
3.55(0.56) 2.25(0.40) 0.71(0.07) 1.44(0.26) 
HC 
3.29(0.31) 3.12(0.32) 0.86(0.19) 2.25(0.34) 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; HC = Healthy controls; WM = 
working memory; Observation = phase of observation in working memory 
condition; Description = phase of description in working memory condition. 
The values in brackets are standard errors of the mean.    
 
7.3.3 Details 
The mean number of internal and external details across conditions are depicted 
in Figures 10 and 11. We assessed group differences in the number of details in future, 
description and WM conditions by conducting a 2 (Group: Healthy controls, vmPFC 
patients) × 3 (Conditions: Future, Description, WM) × 2 (Detail: Internal, External) 
ANOVA. Significant main effects of Group (F(1,15) = 11.25, p = 0.004) and Detail (F(1,15) 
= 10.60, p = 0.005) were qualified by a significant Group x Detail interaction (F(1, 15) = 
4.68, p = 0.04). A Fisher post-hoc test showed that vmPFC patients provided fewer 
internal details compared to details provided by healthy controls in all conditions (11.50 
vs. 28.54, p = 0.0004), however, no significant differences between groups emerged in 
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the number of external details (p = 0.24). A main effect of Condition (F(2,30) = 4.12, p = 
0.02) was qualified by a Condition x Detail interaction (F(2,30) = 19.41, p = 0.000004): 
both groups provided more internal details in the description (29.02 vs. 13.88, p < 
0.000001) and WM (24.68 vs. 13.88, p = 0.00005) conditions than in the future 
condition, and more external details in the future condition compared to the WM 
condition (15.33 vs. 7.86, p = 0.0002). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all p values > 0.53). 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean number of internal details by participant group and type of 
condition. Bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM).  
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Figure 11. Mean number of external details by participant group and type of 
condition. Bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM).  
 
Having established that vmPFC patients produced fewer internal details in all 
conditions we were interested in understanding if group differences in the future 
condition remained after controlling for performance in the description and WM 
conditions. A 2 Group x 2 Detail ANOVA on future condition was run using the 
number of internal and external details from the description and WM conditions as 
covariates. Results showed that the interaction Detail x Group was still significant 
(F(1,11) = 6.44, p = 0.02): Fisher post-hoc tests revealed that vmPFC patients provided 
fewer internal details compared to healthy controls (4.28 vs. 19.12, p = 0.0004) and no 
significant differences emerged between groups in external details (p = 0.47). The 
effects of covariates were not significant. Therefore, vmPFC patients' difficulties at 
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imagining future events do not fully depend on poor abilities to describe a scenario or to 
maintain it in working memory. 
In order to account for possible differences in the length of narratives, we ran an 
additional analysis on the proportions of internal details to the total number of details 
(total = internal + external details) (see Figure 12). A 2 Group x 3 Condition ANOVA 
on the proportions of internal to total details indicated a main effect of Condition (F(2,30) 
= 46.05, p < 0.000001) qualified by a Group x Condition interaction (F(2,30) = 10.52, p = 
0.0003): a Fisher post-hoc test showed that vmPFC patients produced a smaller 
proportion of internal to overall details compared to healthy controls in the future 
condition (0.23 vs. 0.53, p = 0.00002) and no differences between groups were found in 
the description (0.72 vs. 0.67, p = 0.37) or WM conditions (0.74 vs. 0.74, p = 0.98). 
This result indicates that when findings are controlled for the total number of details the 
vmPFC patients‟ performance on description and WM conditions was similar to healthy 
controls‟ performance. On the other hand, there was a significant difference between 
groups uniquely for the future condition. This evidence supports again the hypothesis 
that the prospection difficulty that emerged in vmPFC patients is not fully explained by 
a working memory or narration loss.    
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Figure 12. Mean number of proportions internal-to-total number of details by 
participant group and type of condition. Bars represent standard errors of the 
mean (SEM). 
 
7.4 Discussion 
 
In the present study we investigate the role that non-episodic abilities, such as 
narrative abilities and working memory, play in the capacity to construct future episodic 
experiences in a group of patients with lesions to vmPFC and matched healthy controls. 
Results confirm that the ability to imagine future experiences was strongly 
compromised in patients with lesions to the vmPFC compared to healthy controls. 
Narrative abilities and working memory performance of vmPFC patients were also 
impaired. However, when controlling for both abilities, evidence for the diminished 
capability to imagine future episodes in vmPFC patients compared to healthy controls 
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remained, demonstrating that narrative abilities and working memory performance do 
not fully explain group differences in constructing novel episodic experiences. 
In the current study we could replicate results we found in experiments 1 and 2. 
Specifically, the current pattern of results on EFT is similar to the pattern that emerged 
in experiment 1: in both cases vmPFC patients produced fewer internal details than 
healthy controls while imagining personal future episodes but a similar number of 
external details (note that the same autobiographical interview scoring was employed in 
both experiments; Levine et al., 2002), indicating a selective impairment of the episodic 
system. Again, as we showed in experiment 1, poor performance in vmPFC patients in 
imagining the future is unlikely to be due to a general problem in detail generation 
because vmPFC patients provided a similar amount of external details as those provided 
by healthy controls (see also Discussion of experiment 2). 
These findings show that vmPFC patients have difficulty in imagining episodic 
future events consistently across different experimental paradigms: in experiment 1 cue 
words were employed to remember and imagine different experiences, whereas in the 
current experiment pictures were used as cues. This diverse modality could have 
produced different effects on EFT (Williams et al., 1999; Goddard et al., 2005), for 
example, pictures could have facilitate performance eliciting more details during 
imagining future events than using words. However, the results are consistent across 
cueing modality, reinforcing the finding that vmPFC damage disrupts the ability to 
construct specific future episodes.  
Considering previous studies, narrative abilities in describing scenes were intact 
in patients with amnesia (Race et al., 2011, 2013). However, in a study with a similar 
task, patients with amnesia showed an impaired performance in describing pictures 
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(Zeman et al., 2013). Race and colleagues (2013) hypothesized that a diminished 
narrative capacity in patients included in Zeman et al. (2013)‟s study can be caused by 
brain damage extending beyond the MTL. Our findings are in line with Race et al.‟s 
hypothesis suggesting that a brain lesion, not necessarily in the MTL, may be associated 
with weak performance in a picture description task. As we mentioned before, 
performance on a picture description task was found compromised also in aged-
participants (Gaesser et al., 2011; Schacter et al., 2013), who often show frontal lobe 
atrophy (e.g., Raz et al., 2005). However, Gaesser et al. (2011) showed that a residual 
deficit in EFT related to age survived even after controlling for performance in picture 
description, similar to what we found in vmPFC patients. Consistently, when 
participants' performance in the present study was considered in terms of quality, using 
internal-to-total details ratios, a damage to vmPFC was found to provoke a qualitative 
disruption of EFT, whereas a preserved quality of narrative and working memory 
abilities emerged. 
 In a recent fMRI study, Zeidman and colleagues employed a very similar task to 
investigate the involvement of the hippocampus in constructing, describing, and 
maintaining scenes (Zeidman et al., 2015). They observed the involvement of the 
hippocampus in both perceiving and constructing scenes, but not in maintaining scenes 
in mind. A possible explanation is that other brain areas are involved in the scene 
maintenance, for example frontal regions. Recent experimental evidence showed the 
involvement of the vmPFC in a working memory task (Luu et al., 2014). Consistently, 
our results suggest that vmPFC may be critical for supporting working memory. We 
believe that the WM condition in the current study engages processes similarly to the 
SWM (Meyer and Lieberman, 2012; Meyer et al., 2015). SWM is a kind of working 
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memory specialized for social information and it involves processes similar to 
mentalizing, in that individuals access, maintain, and work with information concerning 
the self or others (Meyer and Lieberman, 2012). Similar processes occur during the WM 
condition in the current task, because participants have to observe a complex scene 
depicting people doing different activities, have to maintain the scene in mind, and 
manipulate (work with) the information in memory in order to describe the picture. In 
accordance with this hypothesis, it has been found that SWM is associated with 
activation in a network of areas partially overlapping with that involved in mentalizing, 
including dMPFC, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, tempoparietal junction, and the 
vmPFC (Meyer et al., 2015). That said, our results support a role of vmPFC in EFT 
above and beyond that played in SWM.   
An alternative possible explanation for the few internal details produced by 
vmPFC patients in both description and WM conditions is a visual search impairment 
(Adolphs, 2014; Wolf et al., 2014). Previous study demonstrated the engagement of 
vmPFC together with lateral occipital cortex in visual search tasks (Peelen and Kastner, 
2011; Pantazatos et al., 2012). For example, in the study by Pantazatos and colleagues 
(2012) participants were instructed to indicate the presence and location of a specific 
object that varied in the size and location in a complex natural visual scene. Findings 
showed a positive functional connectivity between vmPFC and the lateral occipital 
cortex during the search task. Both description and WM conditions require visual search 
in order to detect and describe details. Hence, vmPFC damage may cause an impairment 
in visual search, and, in turn, poor performance in both the description and WM 
condition. Further investigation is needed to verify this possibility. Again, this does not 
fully explain vmPFC patients' deficit in EFT.  
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To conclude, this experiment shows that vmPFC patients can show poor 
narrative and working memory abilities, but their deficits do not fully explain vmPFC 
patients' poor EFT. The results confirm that vmPFC is critical for constructing 
experiences alternative to the present and pre-experience possible future situations. 
 
8 Experiment 4 - Reduced mind wandering following ventromedial 
prefrontal damage 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Mind wandering occurs when attention shifts away from an ongoing task, or 
events in the external environment, towards self-generated thoughts that are often 
completely unrelated to the current perceptual experience, and focused instead on 
current goals and concerns, memories, and plans for the future (Antrobus et al., 1966; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2015; Maillet and Schacter, 2016). Common examples are 
planning the next vacation in Greece while washing the dishes, or replaying mentally 
your last meeting with a friend while attending a class (see 3.1).  
Given the pervasiveness of the experience of mind wandering and its important 
psychological function (see 3.1.2), much research is being devoted to reveal its neural 
and cognitive bases. fMRI evidence indicates that mind wandering is associated with 
activation of the DMN whose activity is enhanced during relatively passive states (e.g., 
rest) as compared to most goal-directed tasks, and by internally focused thought (Binder 
et al., 1999; Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Wang et al., 
2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Mind wandering is also associated with activity in 
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regions of the „executive network‟, including the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex (Christoff et al., 2009; 
for a meta-analysis see Fox et al., 2015). Activity in the DMN and the executive 
network is positively correlated during mind wandering, suggesting these networks 
govern different, complementary component processes of mind wandering (Christoff, 
2012; see also Smallwood et al., 2012). Activity in the DMN has been linked to the 
production of the mental content that commonly populates mind wandering episodes, 
which generally consists of remembered or simulated experiences involving the self and 
others (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Consistently, remembering the past, 
envisioning the future, and conceiving the thoughts of other people all activate multiple 
regions within the DMN (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012). The 
executive network may mediate additional processes related to mind wandering, such as 
working memory and cognitive control (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015; Maillet and 
Schacter, 2016). 
Although fMRI studies have detected activity in the DMN during mind 
wandering, it is not clear whether activity in different nodes of this network is crucial 
for the emergence of mind wandering. Here, we focus on the vmPFC. There are several 
reasons to suspect that vmPFC is a crucial neural substrate of mind wandering. vmPFC 
is a core component of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; Spreng and Grady, 
2010), and it is consistently engaged in association with mind wandering (Mason et al., 
2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Fox et al., 2015). Moreover, the thickness of mPFC and 
anterior/midcingulate cortex is positively related to individuals‟ tendency to engage in 
mind wandering under low-demanding conditions (Bernhardt et al., 2014). Consistently, 
patients with prefrontal cortex lesions are anecdotally reported as not interested or 
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unable to daydream and introspect (Ackerly and Benton, 1948; Wheeler et al., 1997), 
„stimulus bound‟ (Knight et al., 1995), and „stuck in the present moment‟ (Ingvar, 
1985). More recent research has shown that patients with lesion to vmPFC are impaired 
at remembering past events and constructing future events (see Experiments 1 and 2), 
make “shortsighted” choices during decision-making (Bechara et al., 1994; see also 
Knight and Grabowecky, 1995), and exhibit steep TD of future rewards (Sellitto et al., 
2010), suggesting that these patients may have difficulties at conceiving or constructing 
scenarios alternative to the immediate environment.  
To test whether vmPFC is necessary for mind wandering, we investigated the 
intensity and quality of mind wandering in vmPFC patients, control patients with 
lesions outside the vmPFC, and healthy controls. Participants performed three tasks 
varying in their demands on controlled processes, and were presented with periodic 
thought probes prompting them to report whether their current thoughts pertained to the 
task being performed/here and now, or their minds had, to some extent, wandered away 
from it (mind wandering). As an additional index of the proclivity to engage in 
spontaneous (as opposed to goal-directed) forms of thought, we assessed participants‟ 
self-reported tendency to daydream, a phenomenon related to (yet not coincident with) 
mind wandering. Based on fMRI evidence that vmPFC activity is associated with mind 
wandering (Fox et al., 2015), we predicted that vmPFC patients would exhibit a 
reduction in mind wandering compared to healthy controls and control patients with 
brain lesions not involving vmPFC. 
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8.2 Methods 
8.2.1  Participants 
Participants included 18 patients with brain damage and 20 healthy individuals 
(see Table 10 for demographic information). Patients were recruited at the Centre for 
Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. Patients were selected 
on the basis of the location of their lesion evident on MRI or CT scans. Seven patients 
had lesions involving the vmPFC (vmPFC patients). Lesions were the results of the 
rupture of an aneurysm of the ACoA in all cases. Lesions were bilateral in all cases, 
though often asymmetrically so (see Figure 13). Eleven patients were selected on the 
basis of having damage that did not involve the vmPFC (control patients). In this group, 
lesions were unilateral in 9 cases (four in the left hemisphere, and five in the right 
hemisphere), and bilateral in 2 cases, and were all caused by ischemic or hemorrhagic 
stroke. Lesion sites mainly included the occipital cortex (7 cases), and extended, in a 
few cases, to the lateral fronto-parietal cortex (2 cases), and the cerebellum (2 cases). 
Included patients were tested at least 3 months after the brain insult, were not receiving 
psychoactive drugs, and had no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or interfere 
with the participation in the study (e.g., significant psychiatric disease or alcohol abuse). 
There was no significant difference in lesion volume between vmPFC patients and 
control patients (58.79 vs. 33.66 cc, t test: t = 1.61; p = 0.13). Note that in one vmPFC 
patient artifacts induced by a metallic clip made it impossible to identify precisely the 
extension of the (small) lesion (see below). 
The healthy control group comprised 20 individuals matched to patients on mean 
age and education. ANOVA with Group (vmPFC patients, control patients, healthy 
controls) as factor confirmed no group differences in age (F(2,35) = 0.33, p = 0.72) or 
education (F(2,35) = 0.27, p = 0.77). Control participants were not taking psychoactive 
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drugs, and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined 
by history. Participants gave informed consent, according to the Declaration of Helsinki 
(International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee 
of the Department of Psychology (University of Bologna). 
 
8.2.1.1  Cognitive profile 
Patients' general cognitive functioning was generally preserved, as indicated by 
the scores they obtained in the Raven Standard Matrices (RMS), the phonemic fluency 
test (PF), and the digit span test (DS), which were within the normal range in all cases, 
and similar between patient groups (t test: t < 0.83, p > 0.41 in all cases). All groups 
were also evaluated on working memory and cognitive flexibility, two aspects of 
executive functioning that may have an impact on mind wandering and be impaired 
following prefrontal cortex lesions (Baldo & Shimamura, 2002; DeLuca & Diamond, 
1995; Mesulam, 2002; Shallice, 1982; Stuss & Benson, 1984). Working memory was 
assessed with a 2-back task (based on Zimmermann & Fimm, 2002), requiring to 
monitor a series of numbers, and signal whether the number currently presented 
matched the number presented two trials back (1 control patient was no longer available 
for testing). Cognitive flexibility was assessed with the Weigl Color-Form Sorting Test 
(Weigl, 1927), which requires classifying a series of stimuli according to different 
criteria, for example shape, color, and size, and switch to a different classification 
criterion upon request (2 control patients and 2 healthy controls were no longer 
available for testing). Group differences in accuracy in the 2-back task did not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance (F(2,34) = 2.76, p = 0.08), although vmPFC 
patients‟ performance (M = 0.52) tended to be weaker than control patients‟ (M = 0.66) 
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and healthy controls‟ (M = 0.80). As well, there was a marginally significant difference 
in the WCFT accuracy score (highest possible score = 15; Weigl, 1927) across groups 
(F(2,31) = 3.14, p = 0.06): vmPFC patients‟ performance (M = 8.43) tended to be weaker 
than control patients‟ (M = 11.56) and healthy controls‟ (M = 11.50).  
vmPFC patients also received a more extensive neuropsychological battery, 
aimed at qualifying their cognitive profile further. This revealed normal performance in 
standard tests of executive functioning, such as the Tower of London test (t-score = 
43.57; cut off = 30) (Culbertson and Zillmer, 2000), phonemic fluency (mean equivalent 
score (ES) = 2.29. Note that the equivalent score ranges from 0 = impaired performance, 
and 1 = borderline performance, to 2 - 4 indicating normal performance), semantic 
fluency (ES = 3), and the Stroop test (mean number of errors = 0.79, cut off > 7.5) 
(Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). Verbal short-term memory (Digit span; ES = 3.14) and 
spatial short-term memory (Corsi test; ES = 3) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987) were also 
preserved. Long-term memory was weak, but within the normal limits, as assessed with 
the Buschke–Fuld list-learning Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974; Long Term Retrieval ES = 
1.57) and a prose-passage recall test (ES = 1.86) (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). In 
previous studies, however, we have shown that vmPFC patients (including a subset of 
patients described here) have impaired episodic memory and future thinking (Bertossi et 
al., 2016a, 2016b; see also Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; Levine, 2004). More recently, 6 
of the 7 vmPFC patients involved in the present study also participated in an experiment 
requiring to imagine personal future events using pictures as cues (see Experiment 3). 
The results confirm that vmPFC patients are impaired in imagining specific personal 
future events compared to healthy controls, producing fewer internal (episodic) details 
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(4.28 vs. 19.12, Mann-Whitney test: z = -3.17, p = 0.0003) but a similar number of 
external (semantic) details (13.67 vs. 16.24, z = -1.05, p = 0.30). 
 
Table 10. Participants‟ demographic and clinical information  
Group N 
Age 
(Years) 
Education 
(Years) 
Sex 
2-back 
(Accuracy) 
SRM PF DS 
vmPFC 
patients 
7 56.00(3.01) 11.71(1.21) 6 M; 1 F 0.52(0.12) 34.29(3.14) 26.57(2.29) 5.57(3.14) 
CP 11 55.36(3.20) 10.64(1.30) 10 M; 1 F 0.66(0.10)* 32.9(3.50) 33.12(2.75) 5.62(3.50) 
HC 20 52.85(2.53) 11.50(0.69) 20 M 0.80(0.05) - - - 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; CP = control patients; HC = healthy controls; M = male; 
F = female; SRM = Standard Raven Matrices; PF = phonemic fluency; DS = digit span. For SRM, PF, 
and DS, we report the mean uncorrected scores and, in brackets, the mean equivalent score (with 0 = 
pathological performance, 1 = borderline performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance). For age and 
education, the values in brackets are standard errors of the mean. * Results based on 10 control patients. 
 
 
8.2.2  Lesion analysis 
Patients‟ individual lesions, derived from the most recent magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI; N = 12) or computerized tomography (CT; N = 5) images, were 
manually drawn by an expert neurologist (not involved in the present study, and blind to 
task performance), or by E.B., and then verified by the same neurologist, directly on 
each slice of the normalized T1-weighted template MRI scan from the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (Rorden and Brett, 2000). This template is approximately 
oriented to match Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and is distributed 
with MRIcro (Rorden and Brett, 2000). This manual procedure combines segmentation 
(identification of lesion boundaries) and registration (to a standard template) into a 
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single step, with no additional transformation required (Kimberg et al., 2007). MRIcro 
software was used to estimate lesion volumes (in cc) and generate lesion overlap 
images. As anticipated, for one patient artifacts due to the presence of a metallic clip 
made it impossible to reconstruct precisely the extension of the lesion. The lesion 
appeared relatively small, and located in the ventral part of vmPFC, in line with the 
etiology (ACoA aneurysm). We, therefore, included the patient in our vmPFC sample 
(the results do not change if we excluded this patient from the analyses). 
Figure 13 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in the remaining 6 
vmPFC patients. Brodmann's areas (BA) affected were areas BA 10, BA 11, BA 24, BA 
25, BA 32, BA 46, BA 47, with region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 
22.55 cc, SD = 8.80), BA 10 (M =  14.14 cc, SD = 4.36), and BA 32 (M = 9.25 cc, SD = 
2.76). 
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Figure 13. Extent and overlap of brain lesions. The figure represents vmPFC patients‟ 
lesions projected on the same six axial slices and on the sagittal view of the standard 
Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines on the sagittal view 
are the positions of the axial slices, and the white numbers under the axial views are the 
z-coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. 
Maximal overlap occurs in BA 10, 11, and 32. The left hemisphere is on the left side. 
 
8.2.3  Mind wandering assessment 
Participants underwent three computerized tasks varying in cognitive demands 
and conduciveness to mind wandering: a working memory task (WM), a choice reaction 
time task (CRT), and a “Passive” task, modified from previous studies (Smallwood et 
al., 2009, 2011b). The WM task required monitoring a series of digits (1-8), presented 
in black ink and appearing in the center of the screen (non-target stimuli). Non-target 
stimuli presentation rate was 1 item every 1500 ms (followed by a 2000 ms fixation 
cross). Interspersed with the digit presentation were question marks presented in green 
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ink (target stimuli), appearing for 2000 ms. The appearance of a green question mark 
cued participants to report whether the previous digit was even or odd using one of two 
keys. In the CRT task, individuals saw a similar stream of digits (from 1-8), written in a 
black ink and appearing in the center of the screen (non-target stimuli). This time, target 
stimuli were digits presented in green ink, which cued participants to report whether the 
currently presented number was even or odd. In both tasks, a total of 156 non-targets 
and 25 targets were presented. Non-target and target stimuli were arranged in five 
blocks containing approximately 5 targets and 31 non-targets each, so to have target 
stimuli distributed over the course of the task. The order of the five blocks was 
randomized for each participant. In the Passive task, participants were told to merely 
observe a series of 180 digits (from 1-8), written in a black ink and appearing in the 
center of the screen. Similar to the WM and CRT tasks, presentation rate in the 
“Passive” task was 1 item every 1500 ms (with a 2000 ms fixation cross), and the 
stimuli were arranged into 5 blocks, whose order was randomized for each participant.  
Mind wandering was assessed through the presentation of 5 “thought probes”, 
one for each block, during each of the three tasks. Thought probes were presented 
visually on the computer screen. Firstly, participants were required to rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale the degree to which their current thoughts were on-task, i.e., focused on the 
task being performed, or off-task, i.e., pertaining to something different (from 1 – 
completely on-task, to 7 – completely off-task; see below). If participants provided an 
answer from 2 to 7, meaning they were, to some extent, off-task, they then classified 
their thoughts in one of 5 categories: 1) Past (i.e., the thought pertained to the past; e.g. 
“My latest trip to Rome was the best”); 2) Present (i.e., the thought pertained to the 
present; e.g. “I wonder what my wife is doing now”); 3) Future (i.e., the thought 
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pertained to the future; e.g. “Next week I will go to the dentist”); 4) Time not clear (i.e., 
the thought was not easily classified into time categories, e.g. “I‟m lucky to have a 
friend like him”); 5) Unaware (i.e., the participant is not aware of the contents of her/his 
thoughts). Participants then specified whether their thoughts were 1) Self-related (i.e., 
the thought mainly pertained to the self; e.g. “I am going to bed after this”), 2) Other-
related (i.e., the thought mainly pertained to other people; e.g. “My son is growing up so 
fast”), or 3) Unrelated to people (i.e., the thought did not involve people; e.g. “The new 
car was a good deal”). The three tasks were administered in 3 different testing sessions, 
each lasting approximately 12 minutes, in a counterbalanced order. The 3 testing 
sessions took place, in general, on different days. Five patients (4 control patients and 1 
vmPFC patient), who were unavailable to come to the lab three times, performed 2 tasks 
the same day, with a 30-minute break in between.  
Our experimental procedures rest on the assumption that patients understood the 
distinction between on-task and off-task thought, and were able to classify occurring 
thoughts based on that distinction. To make sure this was indeed the case, we adopted 
several measures. First, before the start of the first testing session, patients were 
familiarized with the concept of mind wandering, off-task thought and on-task thought. 
We told them that individuals‟ thoughts may occasionally depart from current activities, 
and focus instead on something unrelated to the task at hand. We paid attention not to 
give either a positive or negative connotation of mind wandering to avoid social 
desirability biases. We provided an example of mind wandering: mentally planning the 
next vacation while washing the dishes. We told them that thoughts deviating from the 
task at hand were to be considered off-task (next vacation), whereas thoughts focused 
on the current activity (washing dishes) were to be considered on-task. All participants, 
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including vmPFC patients, immediately related to the concept of mind wandering, and 
could provide additional examples on their own. The distinction between on-task and 
off-task was reiterated in the context of the WM, CRT, and “Passive” tasks. Participants 
were instructed to classify as “on-task” thoughts strictly related to the execution of the 
computerized tasks, focusing on the stimuli and task procedures (e.g., “5 is odd, so I am 
pushing this button!”), and to classify as “off-task” thoughts that were irrelevant to the 
task being performed (e.g., “I need to see the dentist later”). All participants understood 
the instructions and could recall them back to the experimenter.  
As an additional check, at the end of the experiment we had a subset of vmPFC 
patients and healthy controls classify another person‟s thoughts as on-task or off-task. In 
the context of a pilot experiment using the CRT task, participants reported the content 
of thoughts they had classified as on-task or off-task. We chose 20 such thoughts, of 
which 5 on-task (e.g., “5! So that‟s odd”) and 15 off-task. The 15 off-task thoughts 
comprised 5 past-related thoughts (e.g., “When we purchased that washing machine we 
made a big mistake”), 5 present-related thoughts (e.g., “I‟m wondering what my son is 
doing right now”), and 5 future-related thoughts (e.g., “Next week beach for sure”). 
Five vmPFC patients and twelve healthy controls were presented with the 20 thoughts 
in a randomized order. They were told that another (hypothetical) individual, Mario, had 
performed a task requiring to monitor black and green digits on a computer screen, and 
classify green digits as even or odd. At the end of the task, Mario had reported 20 
thoughts that had popped into his mind while doing the task, and we now wanted their 
opinion as to whether they would consider each thought as on-task or off-task. We 
found no significant difference in classification accuracy (on-task/off-task) between 
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vmPFC patients and healthy controls (0.96 vs. 0.91, t = -0.88, p = 0.39), suggesting 
vmPFC patients could comply with task instructions.    
 
8.2.4  Imaginal Processes Inventory  
Participants completed the daydreaming and night dreaming frequency scales of 
the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI, Singer and Antrobus, 1972), a questionnaire 
designed to examine individual differences in inner mental life. In a series of 12 
daydreaming and 12 night dreaming items, individuals rated the frequency with which 
they experienced daydreaming in their daily life (i.e., Daydreaming frequency scale: 
e.g., “Whenever I have time on my hand I daydream”, from 1 – Never to 5 – Always), 
and night dreaming (i.e., Night dreaming frequency scale; e.g., “A night‟s sleep for me 
contains a dream”, from 1 – Rarely or never to 5 – Once a night). In each scale, the 
score ranges from 12 to 60, with higher scores indicating a higher propensity toward 
daydreaming and night dreaming.   
 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1  WM and CRT: accuracy and reaction times 
Table 11 portrays accuracy (number of correct odd/even responses) and reaction 
times (RTs) data by Group (vmPFC patients, control patients, and healthy controls) and 
Task (CRT, WM). A Group x Task ANOVA on the number of correct responses 
showed no significant main effect or interaction (p > 0.45 in all cases). The same 
ANOVA on RTs for correct responses revealed a main effect of Group (F(2,35) = 5.04, p 
= 0.01), which was qualified by a significant Group x Task interaction (F(2,35) = 3.38, p 
= 0.04). Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests showed that in the WM task vmPFC patients 
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were slower than healthy controls (1321 vs. 883 ms, p = 0.005) and control patients 
(1321 vs. 1007 ms, p = 0.04), whereas no difference emerged between control patients 
and healthy controls (p = 0.53). Group differences in RTs in the CRT task were not 
significant (p > 0.21). Thus, vmPFC patients had a weaker working-memory 
performance than the control groups, in line with the results in the 2-back task. 
 
Table 11. Accuracy and reaction times of CRT and WM tasks  
 CRT  WM  
Group Accuracy  RT Accuracy RT 
vmPFC 
patients  
23.29(0.68)  1147.44(106.81) 23.00(0.53) 1321.11(106.59) 
CP 23.27(0.88)  1070.67(78.55) 22.27(1.06) 1006.64(92.00) 
HC 23.55(0.65)  921.06(47.58) 23.60(0.56) 883.03(61.17) 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; CP = control patients; HC = healthy controls; CRT = 
Choice reaction times; WM = Working Memory; RT = Reaction Times for correct responses. In 
parenthesis: the standard errors of the mean. 
 
8.3.2  Mind wandering  
8.3.2.1  Intensity  
As Figure 14 illustrates, the reported intensity of mind wandering was lower for 
vmPFC patients than both control groups across tasks. An ANOVA on mean mind 
wandering ratings with Group as between-subject factor and Task (WM, CRT, Passive) 
as within-subject factor showed a main effect of Group (F(2,35) = 6.74, p = 0.003): 
vmPFC patients evinced lower mind wandering ratings than healthy controls (1.33 vs. 
3.17, p= 0.002) and control patients (1.33 vs. 2.59, p = 0.02), whereas no significant 
difference emerged between healthy controls and control patients (p = 0.25). Group 
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differences on mind wandering were confirmed using more robust, non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney tests: vmPFC patients mind-wandered less than healthy controls (CRT 
task: z = 3.50, p = 0.0001; WM task: z = 3.55, p = 0.0001; “passive” task: z = 2.86, p = 
0.003) and control patients (CRT task: z = 2.99, p = 0.002; WM task: z = 2.53, p = 0.03; 
“passive” task: z = 2.42, p = 0.02), whereas no significant differences emerged between 
control groups (p values > 0.09). The ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of Task 
(F(2,70) = 28.74, p < 0.000001), such that all participants mind-wandered more in the 
Passive task than in the CRT task (3.59 vs. 2.43, p = 0.0001), and mind-wandered more 
in the CRT task than in the WM task (2.43 vs. 1.97, p = 0.01). Several studies have 
shown that mind wandering is modulated by the complexity of the ongoing task, and it 
tends to be less frequent when the external task is more difficult (Teasdale et al., 1993; 
Kane et al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011b; Levinson et al., 2012). We observed 
this normal modulation of mind wandering in all groups, including vmPFC patients. 
This result suggests that patients complied with task instructions.  
This first set of analyses confirms that vmPFC patients experience mind 
wandering less frequently than healthy and brain-damaged controls. We note that 4 
vmPFC patients never reported mind wandering. Even patients who did report mind 
wandering, however, evinced lower intensity ratings (collapsed across the CRT, WM, 
and “passive” tasks) than healthy controls (1.17 vs. 3.17, Mann-Whitney test: z = 2, p = 
0.04). We asked the vmPFC patients who never reported mind wandering whether mind 
wandering had occurred far from the thought probes, and therefore had not been 
recorded. They stated confidently that mind wandering had never occurred. We also 
asked a vmPFC patient, G.V., to describe what exactly was in his mind while being on-
task in the “Passive” task. He said: “I just look at the numbers, inspect them, examine 
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their shape”, confirming a tendency to stick to external stimuli, as opposed to mind-
wander toward internal information.  
Because there was a significant difference in RTs in the WM task between vmPFC 
patients and controls, we ran again the ANOVA on mind wandering ratings adding RTs 
in the WM task as a covariate. The effect of the covariate was significant (F(1,34) = 5.63, 
β = 0.34 p = 0.02) such that, in general, a strong tendency to mind-wander was 
associated with a slow performance in the ongoing WM task. The effect of Group 
remained significant (F(2,34) = 10.45; p = 0.0003), with vmPFC patients showing less 
mind wandering than both healthy (p = 0.001) and control patients (p = 0.01), and no 
difference between the control groups (p = 0.22). The effect of Group in the ANCOVA 
remained significant also if we added accuracy in the 2-back task and the Weigl Color-
Form Sorting Test as two additional covariates (F(2,28) = 7.42; p = 0.003), with vmPFC 
patients exhibiting less mind wandering than healthy (p = 0.002) and brain-damaged 
controls (p = 0.04), and no difference between the control groups (p = 0.12). The effect 
of the covariates was not statistically significant (p > 0.053 in both cases). These 
findings suggest that vmPFC patients‟ problems in working memory and cognitive 
flexibility do not significantly explain their abnormally low tendency towards mind 
wandering. 
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Figure 14. Intensity of mind wandering by participant group and type of task (WM, 
CRT, “Passive” tasks). Bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
 
8.3.2.2  Intensity of mind wandering and cognitive profile: exploratory analyses  
Given that mind wandering ratings varied in vmPFC patients, we explored 
whether these correlated with several aspects of vmPFC patients‟ neuropsychological 
profile, running non-parametric Spearman correlation analyses. We found that mind 
wandering ratings (collapsed across the CRT, WM; and Passive task, but similar results 
were obtained considering the 3 tests separately) did not correlate with vmPFC patients‟ 
scores in short-term and long term memory (digit span test, Corsi test, Buschke-Fuld 
task, prose-passage recall task), non verbal reasoning (Raven Standard Matrices), verbal 
fluency and executive functioning (verbal fluency, Tower of London task, Stroop task) 
(p > 0.19 in all cases). However, mind wandering ratings correlated with the number of 
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details (collapsed across internal and external details) produced while imagining 
personal future events (r = 0.88, p = 0.02).  
 
8.3.2.3  Content of mind wandering 
We also investigated whether, beyond decreasing the tendency to mind-wander, 
vmPFC damage altered the content of mind wandering episodes. We counted the 
number of times participants described the contents of their thoughts (collapsing across 
the WM, CRT, and “Passive” tasks, but conceptually similar results were obtained 
considering the 3 tasks separately) as belonging to different content categories (Past, 
Present, Future, Time not clear, Self-related, Other-related, Unrelated to people, 
Unaware), and compared the obtained values across groups using non-parametric tests 
(data were, in most cases, non-normally distributed).  
As Table 12 shows, vmPFC patients tended to show fewer instances of mind 
wandering across content categories, and, notably, they never reported future-related 
thoughts. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs run on each content category separately, 
however, revealed statistically significant group differences only for the Future category 
(χ2 = 8.81, p = 0.01) and Past category (χ2 = 7.48; p = 0.02). Post hoc comparisons, run 
with the Mann–Whitney‟s test, revealed that vmPFC patients experienced fewer future-
related thoughts than healthy controls (0 vs. 2.85, z = 3.22, p = 0.001) and control 
patients (0 vs. 1.45, z = 2.80, p = 0.008), whereas no difference emerged between 
control patients and healthy controls (p = 0.14). Analogously, vmPFC patients 
experienced fewer past-related thoughts than healthy controls (0.14 vs. 1.65, z = 2.57, p 
= 0.01) and control patients (0.14 vs. 1.91, z = 2.53, p = 0.01), while no difference 
emerged between the control groups (p = 0.64). The deficit in producing future-related 
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mind wandering emerged even if we restricted our analyses to vmPFC patients who did 
experience mind wandering (vmPFC patients vs. healthy controls: Mann-Whitney z = 
2.23, p = 0.02; vmPFC patients vs. control patients: Mann-Whitney z = 1.96, p = 0.049), 
and even if we compute the proportion of future to total mind wandering episodes 
(vmPFC patients vs. healthy controls: Mann-Whitney z = 2.22, p = 0.03; vmPFC 
patients vs. control patients: Mann-Whitney z = 1.94, p = 0.05). This second set of 
findings suggests that vmPFC damage alters not only the tendency towards mind 
wandering, but also the content of mind wandering, reducing thoughts that depart from 
the here and now, and totally abolishing those directed towards the future.  
 
 
Table 12. Contents of thoughts collapsed across WM, CRT, and “passive” tasks and 
counted for each content category  
Group Past  Present Future Time not clear Unaware Self Other None 
vmPFC 
patients  
0.14(0.14)  1.00(0.58) 0 0.29(0.29) 0 0.57(0.30) 0.57(0.57) 0.29(0.29) 
CP 1.91(0.49)  4.00(0.71) 1.45(0.39) 1.45(0.54) 0.27(0.14) 2.36(0.70) 3.91(0.62) 2.54(0.61) 
HC 1.65(0.36)  4.70(0.66) 2.85(0.57) 1.50(0.33) 0.35(0.13) 3.25(0.68) 4.75(0.67) 2.70(0.65) 
Note. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; CP = control patients; HC = healthy controls; In brackets: 
the standard errors of the mean. 
 
8.3.3  Night dreaming and daydreaming frequency subscales 
An ANOVA on daydreaming frequency scores with Group as a between-subject 
factor yielded a significant effect of Group (F(2,35) = 3.53; p = 0.04). Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc tests revealed that vmPFC patients reported less frequent daydream than 
healthy controls (27.14 vs. 37.30, p = 0.02) and control patients (27.14 vs. 37.64, p = 
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0.03), whereas no differences emerged between the control groups (p = 0.93). The same 
ANOVA on night dreaming frequency scores revealed no significant effect of Group (p 
= 0.62). These results indicate a reduced self-report of daydreaming, but not night 
dreaming, in vmPFC patients (see Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15. Scores on Daydreaming scale of Imaginal Processes Inventory by 
participants group. Bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
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8.4 Discussion 
 
The present study investigated the neural correlates of mind wandering, an 
extremely frequent (and likely necessary) expression of humans‟ mental life that 
complements goal-oriented, externally-driven forms of cognition. Previous fMRI 
studies have pointed to the DMN as an important neural substrate of mind wandering, 
and, in particular, prominent loci of activations have been detected consistently in the 
vmPFC (Fox et al., 2015). However, fMRI studies are correlational, and cannot 
establish causal links between brain and behavior. Here, we showed that patients with 
focal lesions to the vmPFC exhibit a reduced propensity to mind-wander during three 
experimental tasks, and claim less frequent daydreaming than healthy individuals. 
Notably, a reduction in spontaneous forms of cognition is not a general consequence of 
brain damage. Indeed, control patients with lesions mainly affecting the occipital cortex, 
a region which is not part of the DMN, showed the same tendency to self-report mind 
wandering and daydreaming than healthy controls. The results are also unlikely to 
depend on problems in understanding concepts like mind wandering, on-line thought, 
and off-line thought on the vmPFC patients' part, or a tendency to underreport any type 
of inner experience. vmPFC patients, indeed, correctly detected instances of mind 
wandering produced by others, and their tendency to mind-wander, though scant, was 
related to the demands of the ongoing task, as it was in the control groups. Moreover, 
they reported similar night dreaming rates than the control groups, suggesting they can, 
to some extent, introspect on inner experiences. 
These findings point to a significant reduction of mind wandering following 
vmPFC damage, indicating that the vmPFC plays a causal role in mind wandering, in 
line with fMRI evidence (Binder et al., 1999; Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; 
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Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a). We propose two mechanisms by which vmPFC may 
contribute to the emergence of mind wandering episodes. vmPFC is part of the so called 
MTL subsystem of the DMN, and is functionally connected with the MTL during 
construction of mental simulations based on memory (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; see 
also Benoit and Schacter, 2015). Consistently, vmPFC patients are impaired at 
remembering personal past events and imagining future events (Bertossi et al., 2016a, 
2016b). As anticipated, mind wandering occurs when attention shifts from the external 
ongoing task towards inner contents. If, however, vmPFC patients have lost the neural 
machinery needed to construct events alternative to perceptual reality (Bertossi et al., 
2016a, 2016b), there would be no internal event capable to overtake the saliency of 
ongoing external events, resulting in low mind wandering rates. On this view, vmPFC 
damage would downregulate mind wandering directly, by reducing the 'raw content' 
mind wandering episodes are made of. An alternative possibility is that vmPFC damage 
reduced meta-awareness, i.e., one's explicit knowledge of the current contents of 
thought (Schooler et al., 2011), and, in turn, the frequency with which patients became 
aware and reported mind wandering episodes, without necessarily affecting the 
occurrence of mind wandering itself (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Anterior and 
medial regions of prefrontal cortex, damaged in our vmPFC patients, have previously 
been implicated in meta-awareness of one’s own internal mental contents (Gilbert et al., 
2007; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). Moreover, regions implicated in mind wandering, 
including vmPFC, were found differentially engaged by unaware vs. aware mind 
wandering (Christoff et al., 2009). It is possible, therefore, that vmPFC damage caused a 
difficulty in noticing the contents of mind wandering, or the mind wandering process 
itself. We cannot determine to what extent vmPFC patients' reduced self-report of mind 
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wandering in this study depended on impaired construction or detection of mind 
wandering, but we favor the first interpretation for a number of reasons. First, vmPFC 
patients were externally probed to report mind wandering, which minimizes demands on 
meta-awareness. Moreover, vmPFC damage reduced most dramatically mind wandering 
episodes focusing on future and past events, consistent with vmPFC's involvement in 
MTT (Bertossi et al., 2016b), and not those in which participants claimed they were 
unaware of the contents of mind wandering, as one would have expected in case of a 
prominent deficit in meta-awareness. Future studies using indirect (e.g., physiological) 
indices of mind wandering, or sampling both self-caught and probe-caught mind 
wandering, will be useful to reveal if, and to what extent, lack of meta-awareness 
contributed to reduced mind wandering in vmPFC patients (e.g., Franklin et al., 2011; 
Hawkins et al., 2015; Mittner et al., 2014).  
A few other studies have tested whether brain regions active during mind 
wandering during fMRI play a causal role in mind wandering. Axelrod et al. (2015) 
showed increased propensity to mind-wander following anodal (excitatory) transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) 
(see also Kajimura and Nomura, 2015). Despite using different methodologies, Axelrod 
et al. (2015)'s study and ours converge in showing that prefrontal cortex regions are 
crucially implicated in mind wandering. One important question is whether the role 
played by vmPFC and dlPFC in supporting mind wandering can be differentiated. tDCS 
has low spatial resolution, and therefore it is not possible to determine with certainty 
whether the effects observed by Axelrod and colleagues were due specifically to the 
stimulation of dlPFC, or also of nearby regions such as medial prefrontal and 
frontopolar cortices. One aspect of Axelrod et al. (2015)'s data, however, suggests that 
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the results were likely to be mediated by dlPFC. In addition to mind wandering, tDCS 
over dlPFC enhanced, to some extent, performance in the ongoing external task (i.e., the 
SART; Axelrod et al., 2015), which required sustained attention and cognitive control. 
The authors reasoned that dlPFC stimulation had increased the capacity of the executive 
system (Miller and Cohen, 2001), resulting in increased performance as well as mind 
wandering. There is evidence, indeed, that the executive system supports some 
components of mind wandering (Teasdale et al., 1993; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; 
Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011b; Levinson et al., 2012). Differently, even though our 
vmPFC patients were mildly impaired in tests of working memory and cognitive 
flexibility, we have no evidence that patients' low mind wandering ratings were related 
to poor executive functioning or lack of cognitive resources. First, group differences in 
mind wandering held after controlling for working memory and cognitive flexibility 
performance. Moreover, vmPFC patients evinced extremely low mind wandering 
ratings even in the Passive task, which had minimal cognitive demands, if not at all. 
Finally, mind wandering ratings did not correlate with any aspect of vmPFC patients 
executive/cognitive functioning, while they did correlate significantly with the number 
of details produced while imagining future events, which further reinforces our 'event-
construction' account of the role of vmPFC in mind wandering. Interestingly, in Axelrod 
et al. (2015)'s study, tDCS over a control site in the occipital cortex had no effect on 
mind wandering, in line with our results of normal mind wandering in control (mainly 
occipital) patients. These findings reinforce the idea that a reduction of mind wandering 
is not merely the effect of damage to (or interference on) any brain region, but, more 
likely, of damage inflicted on a well-delineated system supporting the emergence of 
mind wandering (Fox et al., 2015), and including the DMN.  
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The DMN has been thought of as a neural device to escape the here and now 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2012). This study 
provides support to this conceptualization, showing that, even while doing a boring task 
with minimal demands, vmPFC patients' mind tended to stay focused on the ongoing 
task, rather than take the chance to wander towards, and explore, possible alternative 
scenarios. This finding aligns to previous evidence that vmPFC patients are impaired at 
constructing past and future events voluntarily (Bertossi et al., 2016a, 2016b), 
suggesting that a deficit in conceiving events alternative to those unfolding in the 
present can extend from goal-directed to spontaneous cognition, and to evidence that 
vmPFC patients show steep temporal discounting of future rewards (Sellitto et al., 
2010), indicating preference for immediacy during choice. A recent study has 
demonstrated that cortical thickness in medial prefrontal regions predicts both the 
proclivity to mind-wander and the ability to resist immediate temptation in a temporal 
discounting task (Bernhardt et al., 2014). Thus, reduced mind wandering, MTT, event 
construction, as well as steep temporal discounting are likely to be different expressions 
of the same underlying deficit in transcending the present and projecting one's self in 
alternative realities (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Hassabis and 
Maguire, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012). 
To conclude, we have shown that vmPFC patients report significantly fewer 
mind wandering episodes than healthy as well as brain-damaged controls, indicating 
that vmPFC plays a crucial role in mind wandering, possibly by mediating construction 
of events alternative to the here and now. Future studies will be needed to specify the 
precise nature of the contribution of vmPFC, as well as other nodes of the DMN, to 
mind wandering. For the time being, we have shown that vmPFC patients' conscious 
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experience is abnormally bound to the external, perceptual reality, which deprives 
vmPFC patients of the possibility to conceive, foresee, and 'visit' alternative scenarios, 
and, more generally, to integrate external with internal experiences while constructing 
(understanding) their own reality.  
 
9 Experiment 5: Transcranial direct current stimulation of the 
medial prefrontal cortex modulates mind wandering   
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In Experiment 4, we found that patients with damage to the vmPFC showed 
reduced intensity of mind wandering. Indeed, vmPFC patients‟ propensity to mind-
wander was diminished relative to patients with lesions to posterior brain regions 
(control patients), and healthy controls, while control patients and healthy participants 
had a similar propensity for mind wandering. These findings, in line with previous 
neuroimaging results (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009), showed a specific 
role of vmPFC in spontaneous cognition. The current study is aimed to replicate our 
previous experimental findings using tDCS in healthy individuals. tDCS involves 
continuous administration of weak currents through the skull using a pair of electrodes. 
tDCS modifies spontaneous neuronal excitability hyperpolarizing neurons (e.g., Nitsche 
et al., 2008) and several studies have shown that cathodal tDCS reduces cortical 
excitability in the targeted brain regions (Nitsche et al., 2003; Nitsche and Paulus, 
2011). 
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The main goal of this study is to investigate whether the modulation of cortical 
excitability of the mPFC affects the intensity of mind wandering in a group of healthy 
young participants. Considering results derived from experiment 4, we predicted that an 
inhibitory effect of cathodal tDCS over the mPFC would decrease mind wandering, 
whereas, a similar modulation of activity in a control (occipital) region would have no 
effect on mind wandering. 
Modulation of mind wandering using tDCS was previously studied (Axelrod et 
al., 2015; Kajimura and Nomura, 2015). Axelrod and colleagues (2015) employed a 
SART paradigm to study mind wandering. They found that anodal (excitatory) 
stimulation over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increased the propensity to mind-
wander relative to occipital stimulation and sham stimulation. This indicates that the 
frontal lobes are causally involved in mind wandering but not the occipital lobe. In 
another study, Kajimura and Nomura (2015) stimulated the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) using anodal (the anode was placed over the right 
IPL and the cathode over the left LPFC) or cathodal (cathode was positioned over the 
right IPL and the anode over the left LPFC) tDCS in two different groups, and another 
group underwent sham stimulation. After the stimulation a perceptual load task was 
administered (Lavie and Cox, 1997): participants searched for possible target letters 
among central non-target letters. During the perceptual load task thought probes, which 
required the participants to classify the contents of their thoughts, were administered. 
The study revealed that mind wandering propensity was significantly decreased in the 
anodal tDCS group compared to the cathodal tDCS group. Specifically, mind wandering 
propensity was reduced by anodal tDCS over the right IPL and cathodal tDCS over the 
left LPFC compared to cathodal/anodal tDCS of the same sites. These results are in line 
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with findings by Axelrod and colleagues (2015), indeed, in both studies anodal 
stimulation over the LPFC augmented the propensity to mind-wander. Moreover, 
Kajimura and Nomura (2015) showed also evidence that cathodal/anodal tDCS over the 
left LPFC and the right IPL, respectively, diminished mind wandering. Again, results 
suggest a critical role of the lateral frontal lobes in mind wandering, showing that 
inhibitory effects of (cathodal) tDCS over the LPFC may diminish mind wandering and 
excitatory tDCS effects in the same site may increase propensity to mind-wander.  
Here, we first localized the brain region within the mPFC more consistently 
associated with mind wandering conducting an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) 
meta-analysis on neuroimaging studies that investigated mind wandering and 
spontaneous cognition. We then recruited three groups of healthy individuals who 
performed the CRT task with thought probes (see Experiment 4) both before and after 
tDCS stimulation. In one group, cathodal tDCS was applied to mPFC (mPFC-tDCS), in 
a second group cathodal stimulation was applied to the occipital cortex (OC-tDCS) as a 
control region, and the third group underwent sham stimulation, in which the tDCS 
device was turned off after a few seconds. We found that cathodal stimulation over 
mPFC provoked a decreased propensity for mind wandering compared to sham and OC-
tDCS groups, but only in males.  
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9.2 Methods  
 
9.2.1  Meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of mind wandering 
9.2.1.1  Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
To determine neuroimaging studies that investigate mind wandering, we 
conducted a search of the literature using PUBMED 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) for papers containing the words “mind 
wandering”; “spontaneous thought”; “stimulus-independent thought”; “task-unrelated 
thoughts”; or “daydreaming” from the first published neuroimaging study on 
spontaneous cognition (Mcguire et al., 1996). The final search was conducted on May 
31, 2014. We selected only papers that reported functional neuroimaging studies (i.e., 
fMRI or PET). The studies had to report specific peak foci of activation in a standard 
reference frame (MNI or Talairach space), report group results, and involve healthy 
participants. Included studies had to employ some form of reports that indicated 
experiences of spontaneous thoughts (e.g., retrospective or online reports, or 
questionnaires). For papers showing more than one experiment with independent 
samples, each experiment was considered individually (e.g., Mcguire et al., 1996). 
Experiments on spontaneous cognition in which mind wandering was not explicitly 
measured were not considered in this meta-analysis (e.g., Christoff, Ream, & Gabrieli, 
2004). Studies that reported Region Of Interests analysis were excluded as they are not 
compatible with the ALE meta-analysis. We excluded studies that reported contrasts 
calculated on two conditions that have similar processes in common. For example, 
studies were excluded when they reported tasks that involved internal thinking and 
those tasks were compared/contrasted to rest/navigation conditions (e.g, D‟Argembeau 
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et al., 2005; Spiers & Maguire, 2006a, 2006b). Table 13 shows the list of included 
studies. 
9.2.1.2  The ALE 
Analyses were conducted using GingerALE, Version 2.3 
(http://brainmap.org/ale/). GingerALE is used for performing meta-analyses of human 
brain imaging studies with published coordinates. The ALE method is typically used to 
identify concordance across imagining studies of a cognitive process.  
A detailed description of the ALE meta-analysis procedure can be found 
elsewhere (Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012). Here, the 
procedure will be summarized. To find convergences of peak coordinates across 
contrasts, the reported foci for each study are modeled as the center of a Gaussian 
probability distribution whose width is empirically determined and automatically 
included (Eickhoff et al., 2009). Probability values of all foci in a particular experiment 
are calculated and combined for each voxel, resulting in a Modeled Activation map that 
represents a summary of the results of that specific experiment taking into account the 
spatial uncertainty associated with each reported coordinate. Next, ALE scores are 
calculated by taking the union of these individual Modeled Activation maps. In order to 
calculate each Modeled Activation map, a non-additive ALE method was chosen to 
restrict the number of inflated ALE values resulting from contrasts with many closely 
located activation foci. This method was employed to reduce the risk for within-
experiment effects rather than the between-experiment concordance to be the cause of 
significant ALE values (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). The significance of ALE values is 
assessed using a random-effects significance test against the null hypothesis that 
localization of activity is independent between studies. To correct for multiple 
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comparisons, we used cluster-level inference. A cluster forming threshold of P < 0.001 
(uncorrected at the voxel-level) was used and the size of the resulting supra-threshold 
clusters was compared (with a threshold of P < 0.05) to a null distribution of cluster 
sizes determined by 1000 random permutations of the data (Eickhoff et al., 2012; 
Stawarczyk and D‟Argembeau, 2015). When a foci file is opened with GingerALE, the 
coordinates are compared against a mask defining the outer limits of Talairach (or MNI) 
space. A less conservative (larger) map size was employed. Three coordinates fell 
outside the mask. In order to avoid omissions of information they were included into the 
analysis (note that similar results were obtained also excluding those coordinates). We 
analyzed a total of 151 foci from 10 neuroimaging studies (see Table 13). 
Table 14 shows clusters of brain activation from the ALE meta-analysis. Brain 
areas commonly active across different neuroimaging studies during mind wandering 
are mainly parietal, temporal, and frontal and correspond generally to the main nodes of 
the DMN (Buckner et al., 2008) that was found critical for spontaneous cognition (e.g., 
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a). The larger cluster involved parieto-temporal-occipital 
regions, showing peak coordinates in BA 39 and BA 19, two brain regions that are often 
active during self-related and social-related processing (e.g, Murray, Schaer, & 
Debbané, 2012). A second cluster includes temporal regions, BA 36 and 37, likely 
related to remembering autobiographical event and simulating future experiences (e.g., 
Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008). A third cluster, the insula/claustrum, may be 
associated with the ability to switch from external to internal focus of attention and vice 
versa (see Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Finally, the last two clusters 
(in terms of extension) encompassed the frontal lobe with a prevalence of activity in the 
left BA 10. Specifically, the larger cluster (frontal cluster 1) show a peak of activation 
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in x = -8, y = 50, z = -8 (Talairach space). These coordinates were employed in our 
tDCS experiment. 
Table 13. Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Study N Foci Mind wandering Condition 
a. Mcguire et al., 1996 – Study 1 5 5 Retrospective Correlation between regional 
cerebral blood flow and 
stimulus independent thoughts 
b. Mcguire et al., 1996 – Study 2 6 1 Retrospective Correlation between regional 
cerebral blood flow and 
stimulus independent thoughts 
c. Binder et al., 1999 30 8 Inferential Rest - tone 
d. Mason et al., 2007 19 31 Inferential and 
questionnaire 
Practiced blocks > novel blocks; 
Correlation with daydreaming 
questionnaire 
e. Christoff et al., 2009 15 17 Online Activation before mind 
wandering reports 
f. Wang et al., 2009 12 8 Questionnaire Correlation between regional 
homogeneity and spontaneous 
thoughts 
g. Dumontheil et al., 2010 16 18 Retrospective Condition 1: mind wandering 
h. Stawarczyk et al., 2011 22 28 Online Mind wandering, external 
distraction, task related 
interference > on-task 
i. Hasenkamp et al., 2012 14 18 Online Awareness of mind wandering > 
mind wandering; 
Mind wandering > shift 
j. Kucyi et al., 2013 51 17 Online Mind wandering > pain 
Note. N = sample size; Mind wandering = how mind wandering experiences were collected; condition = 
experimental condition added to the ALE meta-analysis. 
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Table 14. Brain area commonly activated during spontaneous cognition 
   Peak in Talairach   
Cluster Size 
(mm3) 
Extreama 
value X Y Z 
Areas Studies 
contributing to 
the cluster 
1. Temporo-parieto-occipital cluster 960 0.014 -42 -70 26 39/19 c, d, f, h, i, j 
  0.013 -44 -74 20   
  0.013 -38 -80 18   
2. Temporal cluster 688 0.019 -28  -38 -12 36/37/20 c, f, h, j 
3. Insula/claustrum 648 0.014 36 -2 10 13, insula,  
claustrum 
d, g, i 
  0.013 42 0 4   
4. Frontal cluster 1  352 0.015 -8 50 -8 10 d, h 
5. Frontal cluster 2 320 0.011 0 52 8 10/32 h, j 
  0.011 -2  54 2   
Note. a: Mcguire et al., 1996 – Study 1; b: Mcguire et al., 1996 – Study 2; c: Binder et al., 1999; d: Mason 
et al., 2007; e:(Christoff et al., 2009); f: Wang et al., 2009; g: Dumontheil et al., 2010; h: Stawarczyk et 
al., 2011; i: Hasenkamp et al., 2012; j: Kucyi et al., 2013. 
 
9.2.2  tDCS experiment  
9.2.2.1 Participants  
 
Seventy-two healthy right-handed participants with no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disease participated in this study (for demographic information see Table 
15). Participants were randomly assigned to three groups: medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC-tDCS) group, occipital cortex (OC-tDCS) group, and a sham group (types of 
stimulation and location of the electrodes are explained in the next paragraph). 
Participants were all blind to the group they belonged to. Group (mPFC-tDCS, OC-
tDCS, Sham) x Gender (Male, Female) analyses of variance (ANOVA) revealed no 
differences across participants in terms of age (F < 2.8, p > 0.06) and years of education 
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(F < 0.52 , p > 0.59). They gave informed consent, according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical 
Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna. 
 
9.2.2.2  tDCS  
Direct current (2 mA, 15 minutes) was delivered by a constant current electrical 
stimulator (DC STIMULATOR PLUS) connected to a pair of electrodes. The electrodes 
used for tDCS were covered by saline-soaked sponges (scalp electrode size: 35 cm
2
; 
deltoid electrode size: 40 cm
2
). We ramped the current up over the first 15 s of 
stimulation and down over the last 15 s. To guarantee safety we applied a current at a 
density of 0.057 mA/cm
2 
(calculated on the scalp electrode) and 0.05 mA/cm
2 
(calculated on the deltoid electrode). Two different montages were employed.  
In 24 participants (mPFC-tDCS group; 12 males), the cathode was located on the 
forehead (BA 10) and the center of the electrode was placed on the left side of Fpz (10-
20 system). This location was chosen based on the ALE meta-analysis. The findings of 
the ALE meta-analysis showed two frontal clusters, both revealed a main activation of 
BA10, and the larger cluster indicated a peak of activation in x = -8, y = 50, z = -8 
(Talairach space). This peak of activation was transformed in 10-20 
electroencephalography system coordinates using the Münster T2T-converter software 
(Deppe et al., 2003) (wwwneuro03.uni-muenster.de/ger/t2tconv/; see Figure 16A and 
16B). To place the center of the electrode on the scalp, the distance of the scalp position 
from Cz was calculated for each participant using participants‟ Fpz-Cz distance, their 
T3-Cz distance, and using the 10-20 reference coordinates provided by Münster T2T-
converter corresponding to the position x = -8, y = 50, z = -8 (2D coordinates: x = -0.5, 
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y = 1.8). As shown in Figure 16A, in Münster T2T-converter the portion of the scalp 
covered by the 10-20 system is mapped to [-2,2]
2
. Cz represents the origin of the 
coordinate system and each other 10-20 electrode position is mapped to an integral 
coordinate. Any other point in this representation can be mapped back to the scalp by 
interpreting its 2D coordinate relative to the locations of the surrounding 10-20 
electrodes.  
In other 24 individuals (OC-tDCS group; 12 males), the cathode was placed over 
the occipital cortex (10-20 system: Oz). In both groups cathodal stimulation was 
employed and in both cases the reference electrode was placed over the right deltoid 
muscle. This extracephalic montage maintains a low impedance and the current travels 
ventrally from the frontal surface to the right arm, stimulating the most ventral portion 
of the prefrontal cortex (Holdefer et al., 2006; Miranda et al., 2006; Fumagalli et al., 
2010). Extracephalic montages might create larger total current densities in deeper brain 
regions. Indeed, increasing the distance between the anode and the cathode, as it occurs 
in an extracephalic montage, leads to stimulate regions located deeper in the brain 
(Miranda et al., 2006; Noetscher et al., 2014).  
In a different sample of 24 participants (sham group; 12 males) the stimulator 
was turned off after 30 s (cathodal stimulation). Thus, participants felt the initial itching 
sensation associated with active tDCS, but they received no active current for the rest of 
the stimulation period. This method has been shown to be trustworthy in experts and 
non-experienced participants (Gandiga et al., 2006). In sham group the same montage of 
mPFC-tDCS group was employed.  
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Figure 16. 2D map of the 10-20 system. The red dot represents BA 10 (x = -8, y = 50, z 
= -8 in Talairach space) (Panel A). 3D representation of the positions of Fpz, BA 10 (x 
= -8, y = 50, z = -8 in Talairach space), and Fp1(Panel B). Figure was created using 
Münster T2T-converter (wwwneuro03.uni-muenster.de/ger/t2tconv/; Deppe et al., 
2003). 
9.2.2.3 Tasks 
9.2.2.3.1  Daydreaming frequency subscale 
Before starting the experimental session participants completed the daydreaming 
frequency subscale of the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI, Singer and Antrobus, 
1972), a questionnaire designed to examine individual differences in inner mental life. 
In a series of 12 daydreaming items, individuals rated the extent to which they 
experienced mind wandering in their daily life (e.g., “Whenever I have time on my hand 
I daydream”, from 1 – Never to 5 – Always). The score ranges from 12 to 60, with 
higher scores indicating a higher propensity toward daydreaming. 
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9.2.2.3.2  The 3-back task 
After completing the daydreaming frequency subscale all participants were 
evaluated on working memory, an aspect of executive functioning that may have an 
impact on mind wandering (Teasdale et al., 1995; Levinson et al., 2012; Kam and 
Handy, 2014). Working memory was assessed with a 3-back task (based on 
Zimmermann & Fimm, 2002), which requires to monitor a series of numbers (from 1 to 
8), and signal, using the spacebar, whether the number currently presented matches the 
number presented three trials back. Each number was presented for 2000 ms and 
interspersed with fixation crosses lasting 1500 ms. There were 100 stimuli in total and 
15 possible correct responses. Correct responses, false alarms, and reaction times were 
recorded. 
 
9.2.2.3.3  Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task  
Participants then underwent a choice reaction time (CRT) task modified from 
previous studies (Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011b). The CRT task was performed by 
participants before and after the tDCS or sham stimulation. In the CRT task, individuals 
saw a stream of digits (1-8), written in a black ink and appearing in the center of the 
screen (non-target stimuli) or digits written in green (target stimuli). Upon presentation 
of a green digit, participants had to report whether that number was even or odd using 
the keyboard. A total of 312 non-targets and 50 targets were presented. Non-target and 
target stimuli were arranged in ten blocks containing approximately 5 targets and 31 
non-targets each, so to have the targets roughly distributed all over the entire task. The 
order of the ten blocks was randomized for each participant. Presentation rate was 1 
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item every 1500 ms for non-targets and 1 item every 2000 ms for targets (with a 2000 
ms fixation cross).  
Mind wandering was assessed through the presentation of 10 thought probes, 
one for each block. The distance between two thought-probes varied from 20 to 50 
presented stimuli in order to avoid predictability of the thought-probes occurrence. The 
thought-probes were presented visually on the computer screen. Firstly, participants 
were required to rate the locus of their current thoughts using a visual analog scale 
(from 0 – completely on-task to 100 – completely off-task). If participants provided an 
answer from 1 to 100, they were then invited to classify their thoughts in one of 6 
categories: 1) Past (i.e., thoughts that involved past events; e.g. “My latest trip to Rome 
was the best”); 2) Future (i.e., thoughts that involved future events; e.g. “Next week I 
will go to the dentist”); 3) Present (i.e., thoughts about events that occur in the present 
moment; e.g. “I wonder what my wife is doing now”); 4) Current distractions (i.e., 
thoughts that involved current distractor stimuli unrelated to the task; e.g., “I‟m hearing 
thunder”) 5) Time not clear (i.e., when a thought is not easily classified into time 
categories, e.g. “I‟m lucky to have a friend like him”); 6) Unaware (i.e., not aware about 
the contents of thoughts). If participants provided an answer from 1 to 5 (meaning they 
were aware of the contents of their thoughts), they further classified them into one of 3 
„target categories‟: 1) Self (i.e., self-related thoughts; e.g., “I am going to bed after this”; 
2) Other people (i.e., other-related thoughts; e.g., “My son is growing up so fast”); 3) 
None (i.e., when a thought does not involve a person; e.g., “The new car was a good 
deal”). 
Before the start of the CRT task, participants familiarized with the concept of 
mind wandering, off-task thought and on-task thought. We told them that individuals‟ 
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thoughts may occasionally depart from current activities, and focus instead on 
something unrelated to the task at hand. We paid attention not to give either a positive 
or negative connotation of mind wandering so to avoid social desirability biases. We 
provided an example of mind wandering: mentally planning the next vacation while 
washing the dishes. We told them that thoughts deviating from the task at hand were to 
be considered off-task (next vacation), whereas thoughts focused on the current activity 
(washing dishes) were to be considered on-task. We then explained further the 
distinction between on-task and off-task thought in the context of our experiment. On-
task thoughts were those strictly related to the computerized tasks, in which attention is 
completely directed toward the task, that is when  individuals think about the stimuli 
and task procedures (e.g., “I have to answer because this number is green”), whereas 
off-task thoughts were those unrelated to the current activity (e.g., “After, I‟ll go to the 
supermarket”). We have also provided examples of off-task thoughts for each category 
(examples that we reported before to describe the content categories). 
 
9.2.2.3.4  Discomfort after the stimulation 
Participants in all groups (mPFC-tDCS, OC-tDCS, Sham), immediately after the 
stimulation, were asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale the discomfort experienced 
during the stimulation (from 1: “no discomfort” to 5: “extreme discomfort”). 
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9.3 Results 
 
9.3.1 The daydreaming frequency subscale 
Daydreaming frequency scores were generally non-normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d > 0.16, p < 0.05), therefore non-parametric analysis was 
employed. A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA with Group as factor (Sham-males, Sham-
females, mPFC-tDCS males, mPFC-tDCS females, OC-tDCS males, OC-tDCS 
females) showed no significant differences across groups (p = 0.36). These findings 
indicate that groups (and genders) were matched in terms of frequency of daydreaming.  
9.3.2 The 3-back task 
Because working memory may support mind wandering (e.g., Levinson, 
Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993), we 
analyzed group differences in working memory capacity. The 3-back task accuracy 
(correct response rate – false alarms rate) and reaction times of correct answers were 
analyzed separately using a Group (mPFC-tDCS, OC-tDCS, sham) x Gender (Male, 
Female) ANOVA. No significant differences on accuracy on the 3-back task were found 
across groups and genders (p > 0.36). The same ANOVA on reaction times showed no 
significant main effects or interactions (p > 0.47). These findings show that participants, 
across groups and genders, have similar working memory abilities. 
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9.3.3 CRT Task 
9.3.3.1  Accuracy and reaction times 
Mean accuracy (ACC; number of correct odd/even responses) and reaction times (RT) 
for correct answers in the CRT task were calculated separately for each participant 
before and after the stimulation. We analyzed possible group and gender differences in 
the performance of CRT task before the stimulation. A Group (mPFC-tDCS, OC-tDCS, 
sham) x Gender (Male, Female) ANOVA on the accuracy for correct responses showed 
no significant main effects or interactions (p > 0.09). The same ANOVA on RT 
indicated no significant effects (p > 0.32). Thus, before the stimulation participants 
showed comparable abilities in accomplishing the task. 
Then, we calculated, for each participant, the difference (Δ) in accuracy and RTs 
in the CRT task obtained before and after the stimulation. For example, the difference in 
accuracy was calculated as ΔACC = mean accuracy after the stimulation – mean accuracy 
before the stimulation. The same formulae was employed for computing the difference 
in RTs (ΔRT). Δ-scores were analyzed using a Group x Gender ANOVA and Fisher tests 
as post-hoc analyses.  
Table 16 shows Δ-scores of accuracy and RTs data. We observed that the 
performance on CRT tasks was similar across groups and genders. A Group x Gender 
ANOVA on ΔACC showed no significant main effects or interactions (p > 0.37 in all 
cases). The same ANOVA on ΔRT revealed no significant results (p > 0.62 in all cases). 
Again, performance on CRT task before and after the stimulation was similar (see Table 
16). 
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Table 15. Demographic information, daydreaming frequency subscale, 3-back 
accuracy, 3-back accuracy RTs, and discomfort rating across groups and gender 
  N Age Education Daydreaming 
subscale 
3-back 
(accuracy) 
3-back 
(RTs) 
Discomfort 
Females mPFC-tDCS 12 23.42(0.54) 17.08(0.36) 45.58(1.79) 0.67(0.08) 817.30(52.56) 1.33(0.14) 
 OC-tDCS 12 22.17(0.34) 16.92(0.26) 48.00(1.60) 0.74(0.05) 804.34(38.77) 1.58(0.19) 
 Sham 12 23.42(0.67) 16.67(0.55) 45.50(2.05) 0.68(0.05) 852.14(76.26) 1.17(0.11) 
Males mPFC-tDCS 12 23.50(0.42) 16.92(0.38) 42.25(1.76) 0.74(0.06) 882.56(62.43) 1.42(0.19) 
 OC-tDCS 12 22.58(0.64) 16.42(0.52) 44.00(3.74) 0.76(0.06) 865.53(81.63) 1.33(0.14) 
 Sham 12 23.75(0.66) 17.00(0.32) 42.00(2.61) 0.73(0.06) 835.22(49.51) 1.17(0.11) 
Note. mPFC-tDCS = participants who underwent to cathodal stimulation on medial prefrontal cortex; 
OC-tDCS = participants who underwent to cathodal stimulation on occipital cortex; RTs = Reaction 
Times. In brackets we report the standard errors of the mean. 
 
Table 16. Δ-scores of accuracy and reaction times across groups and gender 
  ΔACC ΔRT 
Females mPFC-tDCS -0.25(0.37) 25.97(21.35) 
 OC-tDCS  0.17(0.44) 30.17(33.58) 
 Sham -0.42(0.34) 34.92(20.68) 
Males mPFC-tDCS -0.17(0.24) 14.78(19.83) 
 OC-tDCS -0.58(0.72) 58.51(30.95) 
 Sham -0.75(0.46) 47.82(31.50) 
Note. ΔACC = mean number of accuracy (number of correct 
odd/even responses) after the stimulation - mean number of 
accuracy before the stimulation; ΔRT = mean number of reaction 
times (of correct responses) after the stimulation - mean number of 
reaction times before the stimulation. In parenthesis we report the 
standard errors of the mean. 
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9.3.3.2  Mind wandering 
Mean ratings of mind wandering collected during the CRT task were calculated 
separately for each participant before and after the stimulation. Initially, we explored 
whether group and gender differences emerged in the propensity for mind wandering 
before the stimulation. A Group (mPFC-tDCS, OC-tDCS, sham) x Gender (Male, 
Female) ANOVA on the mean number of mind wandering ratings collected before the 
stimulation revealed no significant main effects or interactions (p > 0.27), indicating a 
comparable initial propensity to mind-wander across groups and genders.  
Next, we calculated, for each participant, the difference (Δ) in the ratings of 
mind wandering obtained, in the CRT task, before and after the stimulation. The 
difference in the mind wandering rating was calculated as ΔMW = mean number of mind 
wandering rating after the stimulation – mean number of mind wandering rating before 
the stimulation. Δ-scores were analyzed using a Group x Gender ANOVA and Fisher 
tests as post-hoc analyses. Figure 17 represents the ΔMW by participant groups and 
genders. As is evident, males in mPFC-tDCS group showed a reduced ΔMW compared to 
males in sham and OC-tDCS groups. On the other hand, a comparable trend on mind 
wandering propensity emerged in males in sham and OC-tDCS groups. An ANOVA on 
Δ-scores with Group and Gender as factors showed a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,66) = 3.30, p = 0.043) qualified by a significant Group x Gender interaction (F(2,66) = 
3.49, p = 0.036). For males, Fisher tests showed a reduced ΔMW in mPFC-tDCS group 
relative to OC-tDCS group (-9.96 vs. 9.44, p = 0.006), and the sham group (-9.96 vs. 
12.75, p = 0.001). No significant difference emerged between OC-tDCS and sham 
groups (9.44 vs. 12.75, p = 0.63). No group difference emerged in females (p > 0.25). 
The results indicate that cathodal stimulation over the mPFC diminished mind 
185 
 
wandering propensity. However, this effect was specific in males and did not emerge in 
females. 
 
Figure 17. Mean Δ-scores of mind wandering by groups (mPFC-tDCS, OC-tDCS, 
sham) and genders. Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
9.3.3.3  Contents of spontaneous thoughts 
We then investigated whether, in addition to the reported intensity of mind 
wandering, the tDCS on mPFC or occipital lobe affects the contents of mind wandering.  
To perform content analyses, we counted the number of times participants 
described the contents of their thoughts as belonging to different categories (past, 
present, future, current distractions, time not clear, unaware, self-related, other-related, 
and unrelated to people). For past, present, future, current distractions, time not clear, 
and unaware categories we computed ratios dividing these numbers by the total number 
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of mind wandering episodes claimed (i.e., receiving a rating from 1 to 100). Whereas, 
for self-related, other-related, and unrelated to people categories we computed ratios 
dividing the frequencies by the total number of mind wandering episodes claimed (mind 
wandering episodes that received a rating from 1 to 100) excluding the unaware 
thoughts (see paragraph 9.2.2.3.3). Ratios were calculated separate for CRT task before 
and after the stimulation and independently for each individual. Contents of mind 
wandering were non-normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d > 0.17, p < 
0.05), therefore analyses were performed using Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs by Ranks and 
Mann-Whitney as post-hoc tests. 
Firstly, non-parametric ANOVAs run on each content category ratios collected 
during CRT task before the stimulation revealed no statistically significant group or 
gender differences (H < 10.81, p > 0.05).  
Next, Δ-scores were calculated as content ratio after the stimulation – content 
ratio before the stimulation, for each category (ΔCONTENT) and each participant. We run 
separate analysis in females and males on the ΔCONTENT. In females, no significant 
difference across groups of stimulations was found (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs: H < 
0.34, p > 0.18).  
In males, non-parametric ANOVAs on ΔCONTENT  revealed a significant main 
effect of group for other-related contents (H = 7.40, p = 0.02), showing a lower ΔOTHER 
in sham group than ΔOTHER in mPFC-tDCS group (-0.246 vs. -0.069, z = -2.02, p = 0.04) 
and a lower ΔOTHER in sham group relative to ΔOTHER in OC-tDCS group (-0.246 vs. 
0.016, z = -2.37, p = 0.02), but no differences between mPFC-tDCS and OC-tDCS 
groups (p = 0.24). These findings indicated that participants in the sham group produced 
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more rarely other-related thoughts after the stimulation (relative to other-related 
thoughts before the stimulation), whereas the same decrease in other related thoughts 
was not observed after mPFC-tDCS and OC-tDCS stimulation. No other significant 
main effects of group emerged (p > 0.09). Observing the means of contents ratios before 
and after the stimulation separately for each group in males, we noted that, only in the 
sham group after the stimulation there was an enhanced self-referential effect and a 
diminished other-referential effect relative to before the sham stimulation. This 
observation was supported by statistical analysis: only participants belonging to sham 
group showed a significant higher self-related thoughts ratio after the stimulation 
compared to before (before: 0.28 vs. after: 0.39, Wilcoxon test: z = 1.89, p = 0.05). The 
opposite occurred for other-related contents (before: 0.45 vs. after: 0.20, z = 2.76, p = 
0.006). This effect was not present in the other two groups (p > 0.17). Thus, in the sham 
group, the decrease in other related thoughts with time came along with an increase in 
self-related thoughts. When the mPFC or the occipital lobe are inhibited by the 
stimulation this effect was abolished. Hence, these results may suggest an involvement 
of mPFC and occipital lobe in sustaining self-related (as opposed to other-related) 
thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
Table 17. Contents (Δ-scores ratios) of mind wandering episodes 
  ΔPAST ΔPRESENT ΔFUTURE ΔDISTRACTIONS ΔT_NOT-
CLEAR 
ΔUNAWARE ΔSELF ΔOTHER ΔNONE 
F mPFC-tDCS 0.024 
(0.044) 
0.024 
(0.047) 
 
-0.030 
(0.050) 
-0.083 
(0.011) 
0.057 
(0.040) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.083) 
 
0.037 
(0.082) 
-0.055 
(0.036) 
 OC-tDCS -0.058 
(0.034) 
-0.050 
(0.069) 
 
0.108 
(0.051) 
-0.050 
(0.048) 
0.008 
(0.040) 
0.042 
(0.040) 
0.041 
(0.091) 
 
0.003 
(0.041) 
-0.044 
(0.068) 
 Sham 0.004 
(0.057) 
-0.046 
(0.063) 
 
0.045 
(0.052) 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
-0.004 
(0.045) 
0.043 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.053) 
 
-0.042 
(0.069) 
0.046 
(0.058) 
M mPFC-tDCS -0.034 
(0.036) 
-0.075 
(0.071) 
 
-0.034 
(0.042) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
0.124 
(0.046) 
0.054 
(0.060) 
-0.009 
(0.078) 
-0.069 
(0.044) 
0.079 
(0.052) 
 OC-tDCS -0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.190 
(0.079) 
 
0.084 
(0.079) 
0.015 
(0.085) 
0.133 
(0.082) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.094 
(0.075) 
0.016 
(0.085) 
0.078 
(0.068) 
 Sham 0.025 
(0.058) 
-0.053 
(0.038) 
 
0.025 
(0.061) 
-0.041 
(0.035) 
0.012 
(0.044) 
0.032 
(0.023) 
0.110 
(0.057) 
-0.246 
(0.064) 
0.136 
(0.026) 
Note. F = females; M = males; mPFC-tDCS = cathodal stimulation on medial prefrontal cortex; OC-tDCS 
= cathodal stimulation on occipital cortex; T_NOT-CLEAR = time not clear. In parenthesis we report the 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
9.3.4  Discomfort after the stimulation 
Finally, we analyzed possible differences on discomfort experienced during the 
stimulation across groups and genders. Discomfort ratings were non-normally 
distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d > 0.43, p < 0.01), therefore Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVAs by Ranks were employed.  
As it is possible to observe from Table 15, discomfort ratings were substantially 
low and similar across groups (Sham-males, Sham-females, mPFC-tDCS males, mPFC-
tDCS females, OC-tDCS males, OC-tDCS females): a Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA showed 
no significant main effects or interactions on discomfort rating (H = 4.76, p = 0.45). 
Also, Spearman correlation analyses revealed no significant correlations between ΔMW 
and discomfort ratings in each group (all p values > 0.28), suggesting that there is no 
association between discomfort and mind wandering. 
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9.4 Discussion 
 
In the current experiment we aimed to investigate the causal role of mPFC in 
supporting mind wandering. Using an ALE meta-analysis we investigated which brain 
regions are consistently active during mind wandering. Then, we employed peak 
coordinates resulted from that meta-analysis to stimulate the mPFC (BA 10), in order to 
modulate the propensity to mind-wander employing tDCS. Previous experimental 
findings demonstrated that several regions belonging to the DMN are active during 
mind wandering (Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a), such as fronto-
temporal-parietal regions, including occipital areas and insula (Fox et al., 2015). The 
brain regions resulted from the current ALE meta-analysis reveal consistent activation 
in BA 39, 19, 10, 32, 36, and 13 (see also Fox et al., 2015). Brain areas, that we found 
active during mind wandering are overall linked to the capabilities to remember, 
imagine the future, navigate, simulate complex experiences, or mentalizing. These 
mental activities may occur also spontaneously and, thus, may represent typical contents 
of mind wandering experiences (Spreng et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b, 
2014). Several studies showed that the mPFC contributes to support mind wandering 
and deliberate MTT (e.g, Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Moreover, in previous 
experiments we found that the ventral part of the mPFC, including BAs 10, is critical 
for supporting the simulation of any kind of complex experience (see Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3) also for mind wandering (see Experiment 4). The current ALE meta-analysis 
revealed two clusters of activation of frontal lobes. Those clusters include mainly BA 10 
and also BA 32, in addition other regions in the parieto-occipital cortex (BAs 39, 19), 
temporal lobes (BAs 36, 37), and insula/claustrum. Therefore, BA 10 may be an 
adequate target area to stimulate in order to modulate mind wandering propensity and, 
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thus, coordinates of BA 10 have been employed in a tDCS experiment to reach this 
goal.  
Findings show that cathodal tDCS over the mPFC leads to a decrement of mind 
wandering intensity compared to sham and occipital tDCS in males. We also confirmed 
results from a previous study (Axelrod et al., 2015) that the effect of tDCS on occipital 
cortex does not disrupt mind wandering. However, the current study differs from the 
previous investigation on mind wandering using tDCS (Axelrod et al., 2015; Kajimura 
and Nomura, 2015) because we exclusively found modulation of mind wandering 
propensity in males.   
These results are unlikely to be due to differences between groups and genders 
in working memory capacity, that is an ability critical for supporting mind wandering 
(Teasdale et al., 1993; Kam and Handy, 2014), because all groups were matched by 
working memory performance assessed at the beginning of the session. Participants 
were also matched by performance on CRT task before the stimulation. This result 
excludes the possibility that CRT task was too difficult for some participants leading to 
a greater engagement of resources in the task, so that those resources were not available 
anymore for maintaining mind wandering. Furthermore, no significant differences 
emerged across groups of stimulation and genders on discomfort ratings that could have 
affected contents and propensity to mind-wander.  
Although no significant differences emerged between males and females on 
daydreaming frequencies, we noticed that females tended to have a higher score on 
daydreaming frequency scale than males (see Table 15), suggesting a higher tendency in 
females to mind-wander in daily life, or to notice mind wandering. Gender differences 
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on the phenomenology of mind wandering emerged in previous works. Females 
reported more vivid mental imagery in mind wandering than males (Christian et al., 
2013), and they tend to ruminate more often than males (Nolen-Hoeksema and Jackson, 
2011; Miyamoto and Kikuchi, 2012). Sex differences emerged also in the contents of 
spontaneous cognition, indeed, females tend to report more often social daydreaming 
than males (Mar et al., 2012). Moreover, sex roles predict daydreaming. For instance, 
masculine, compared to feminine and undifferentiated groups, showed the leastlevel of 
mind wandering (e.g., Golding & Singer, 1983). If females have a general higher 
tendency to daydream in daily life, this could have caused an increased difficulty in 
modulating mind wandering using tDCS. Alternatively, females might be more 
accustomed to daydreaming in daily life, and therefore more able to become aware of 
mind wandering and exert control on its effects during performance, being less 
susceptible to external (tDCS) stimulation.  
Interestingly, other tDCS studies showed differential effects on task performance 
according to the gender (Boggio et al., 2008; Fumagalli et al., 2010; Lapenta et al., 
2012; Conson et al., 2015). In those studies tDCS stimulation was applied over different 
brain regions (left temporal, dLPFC, mPFC, and superior temporal cortex) and while 
performing different tasks (facial expression recognition, utilitarian decisions, and 
speech perception). Results demonstrated that stimulation affected performance 
differentially in females and males, also provoking opposite results (e.g., Boggio et al., 
2008). Therefore, a possible explanation to the gender difference in modulation of mind 
wandering could be a different brain connectivity in male and female participants. In a 
resting state fMRI study, greater regional homogeneity was shown in females compared 
to males in the right middle cingulate gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, leſt inferior parietal 
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lobule, leſt precentral gyrus, leſt supramarginal gyrus, and leſt postcentral gyrus (Xu et 
al., 2015). In another study, gender differences were also found in gray matter density. 
Females showed higher grey matter density than males in parahippocampal gyrus, 
middle frontal gyrus/orbital, superior frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, cerebellum, 
and cuneus (Wang et al., 2012). Another study showed better communication between 
hemispheres in females (Ingalhalikar et al., 2014). A higher proportion of myelinated 
fibers within hemispheres were found in males. In this study results suggest that male 
brains have a superior communication within the hemispheres, whereas female brains 
perform better in interhemispheric communication. Interhemispheric connectivity 
dominance in females was present mainly in the frontal lobe during adolescence but was 
more distributed during adulthood (Ingalhalikar et al., 2014). Males and females may 
also differ in terms of brain activity during autobiographical memory retrieval, and 
autobiographical memories are a typical content of mind wandering experiences (see 
3.1). Females showed increased hemodynamic activity compared to males in the 
dLPFC, dorsal anterior insula, and precuneus while recalling specific autobiographical 
memories (Young et al., 2013). Together these studies show that males and females 
have differences in brain structural and functional connectivity. Taking into account the 
several studies that found gender differences on the effects of tDCS, we hypothesize 
that stimulation may have affected differently males and females because females could 
have shown a better compensation/ re-organization of brain connectivity during and 
after the stimulation. However, further studies are necessary to better understand gender 
differences in brain activity and if and how this may influence spontaneous cognition.   
Results on content of mind wandering experiences showed differences on self-
related and other-related thought frequencies between and within groups of stimulation 
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in males. An increased self-related frequency and a decreased other-related frequencies 
after the stimulation emerged only in the sham group, indicating that, in normal 
circumstances, mind wandering tend to focus relatively more on the self than others 
over time. This effect was abolished by tDCS, which affected self vs. other-related 
processing when applied to both mPFC and the occipital cortex. There are several 
studies supporting the role of the mPFC in self-referential processing (see also chapter 
4). For instance, it has been shown that simulating personal future events and reflecting 
on one‟s personality traits show activation in the mPFC (D‟Argembeau et al., 2010b), 
moreover, the mPFC is more active when thinking about personal past and future 
compared to simulating the non-personal past and future (Abraham et al., 2008). In an 
ALE meta-analysis, brain activation during self-related processing compared to other-
referential processes were observed mainly in the mPFC (Murray et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an inhibition of the mPFC may provoke a reduced 
frequency of self-referential thoughts. Interestingly, our results showed also that 
occipital cortex may contribute to self/other related processing. In a fMRI study by 
Herold and colleagues (2015), participants were shown self-referential and non-self-
referential (but conveying social information) pictures. Participants had to answer 
questions about self-referentiality of the stimulus (“Does this picture personally relate to 
you?”) and episodic memory retrieval (“Is this picture familiar to you?”). Brain 
activations show different effects on self-referential processing compared to social 
processing, in various regions of the mPFC and parietal lobe but additional activation 
was found in occipital cortex (Herold et al., 2015). Moreover, occipital areas are also 
involved in supporting egocentric reference frames. In an fMRI study (Saj et al., 2014), 
participants evaluated the alignment of a bar relative to the middle of their body 
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(egocentric) or another stimulus (allocentric) during fMRI. Results demonstrated that 
the occipital areas are active preferentially during taking egocentric perspectives. A 
possibility is that the occipital cortex is important for self-related (egocentric) 
processing as is mPFC. Another possibility is that self-related processing is more 
complex than other-related processing, and therefore interference with any brain region 
would hinder performance. However, other studies are necessary to specifically test this 
hypothesis. 
To sum up, we have found that applying cathodal tDCS over the mPFC affects 
the degree to which individuals engage in mind wandering experiences but this does not 
occur when occipital cortex was stimulated. However, this effect was specific in males. 
These findings reinforce our interpretation of medial prefrontal regions as crucial to 
support mind wandering. Moreover, they suggest the possibility that the content - not 
only the frequency - of mind wandering can be modulated by tDCS, paving the way to 
future studies on the neural bases mediating different aspects of the phenomenology of 
self-reflection. 
10 General discussion 
 
The experiments we conducted allowed us to answer several questions we 
formulated earlier in the introduction (see chapter 1). Firstly, we demonstrated that the 
vmPFC supports equally the capability to remember the past and to imagine the future 
but also the ability to imagine episodes belonging to other individuals. Secondly, we 
discovered that vmPFC is critical for the construction of complex coherent mental 
scenarios as well as those that are not staged in a particular time. However, a lesion to 
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vmPFC affects more markedly the ability to imagine personal future events than the 
ability to imagine fictitious experiences. Thirdly, we revealed that the results we found 
are not explained by non-episodic processes, such as narrative or working memory 
abilities. Therefore, vmPFC plays a specific role in constructing experiences that allow 
individuals to imagine scenarios alternative to the present and its role is not mediated by 
other non-episodic abilities. Finally, we highlighted for the first time, in two 
experiments using a lesion approach, the involvement of the vmPFC in mind 
wandering. 
Considering the brain like a network of areas that work in concert to allow 
individuals to escape from the here and now, in the present thesis I asked a main 
question: what happens to the experience of MTT when a node of this network, in our 
case the vmPFC, does not work properly?  A lesion to the vmPFC provokes a reduced 
ability to simulate complex experiences alternative to the present, when individuals 
deliberately remember episodes and imagine novel experiences and also when their 
attention shifts away from the main task toward off-task thoughts in a spontaneous way. 
Our findings reflect the fractionation of the DMN that Andrews-Hannah and colleagues 
(2010b) found in a previous study (see 4). Considering their results, vmPFC is a node of 
DMN part of the MTL subsystem that has been hypothesized to support self-related 
future decision making. Within the MTL subsystem vmPFC has connection with other 
brain areas, such as hippocampal formation. Moreover, vmPFC is also connected with 
the main core of the DMN, so with anterior medial prefrontal cortex and posterior 
cingulate cortex, but also its activity correlates with the dLPFC system that is 
hypothesized to be involved in mentalizing. Therefore, in line with the fractionation of 
the DMN, a lesion in vmPFC is likely to cause a disconnection with the other 
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subsystems and the consequence will be a reduced capability to simulate any kind of 
complex experience, as we found in our experiments. Thus, it is likely that vmPFC 
works in concert with other brain regions, such as the MTLs, for allowing the 
individuals to escape from the here and now. 
vmPFC might be important for integrating different episodic, affective, and 
perceptual details necessary for retrieving and imagining complex experiences  (see also 
Benoit, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2014; Nieuwenhuis & Takashima, 2011; Zeithamova, 
Dominick, & Preston, 2012). In previous literature Nieuwenhuis and Takashima (2011) 
suggested that the vmPFC likely integrates information which is represented in separate 
areas of the limbic system. This integration of information may become more important 
over time, thanks to the involvement of the vmPFC in memory consolidation. Also 
Benoit and Schacter (2014) hypothesized that vmPFC may be necessary for the 
integration of knowledge that is present in different cortical regions during the 
simulation of complex experience, such as imagining the interaction with other 
individuals. It is possible that vmPFC is necessary for integrating different kinds of 
information in a whole coherent picture of the episode/scenario. The role of vmPFC as 
an “integrator” may explain the result that vmPFC patients were not able like controls to 
construct fictitious experiences, showing also a diminished capacity to integrate details 
in a spatial coherent manner, indeed, vmPFC patients demonstrated to possess a lower 
spatial coherence index than control groups (see Experiment 2).  
However, our findings indicate that the vmPFC patients‟ deficits in EFT was 
more pronounced compared to their deficit in constructing fictitious scenarios, 
suggesting that vmPFC is particularly engaged in EFT. A possible reason why vmPFC 
patients had deeper impairment in EFT is that sub-regions that belong to the vmPFC 
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have different roles in supporting complex experiences and EFT. In our studies we 
found evidence to support this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, despite the fact that a small 
group of patients were tested, findings showed that EFT correlated with lesion volume 
in two areas part of the vmPFC: BA 11 and BA 32. Moreover, correlation analyses in 
Experiment 2 suggested that general deficits in scene construction and specific deficits 
in EFT may have different roots within vmPFC. Lesion volume in BA 11 correlated 
negatively with a measure of the quality of imagining future and fictitious scenarios, 
suggesting that the most ventral part of vmPFC may mediate constructive processes 
needed to simulate any novel event. Differently, lesions in BA 10 and BA 32 had a 
specific impact on the EI for future scenarios. As we mentioned before, lesion volume 
in BA 10 correlated positively and lesion volume in BA 32 correlated negatively with 
the EI. A reduced input from BA 10 may have protected vmPFC patients from memory-
interference during EFT. On the other hand, the BA 32 may help control interference 
from similar episodic memories, allowing construction of future events that reflect 
relevant and updated self-knowledge. According to these results and observations, we 
speculate that BA 11 may support the construction of any kind of complex experiences, 
whereas, BA 10 and 32 may be sensitive to experimental conditions that load maximally 
on MTT processes, such as during future thinking, when individuals have to filter out 
irrelevant information in order to imagine plausible novel future experiences.  
This reduced ability to construct complex experiences may also be linked to the 
impoverished capability to mind-wander that emerged in vmPFC patients. Mind 
wandering might be considered as a type of spontaneous process of MTT and scene 
construction, hence, the inability to create complex mental experiences may have 
affected also the quality and the genesis of spontaneous cognition. If vmPFC patients 
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have lost the neural foundation needed to construct events alternative to external reality, 
there would be no internal event capable to generate the internal train of thoughts 
typical of mind wandering experiences. vmPFC damage may decrease mind wandering 
by reducing the content of mind wandering experiences. Thus, reduced mind wandering, 
MTT, event construction are likely to be different expressions of the same underlying 
deficit in projecting one's self toward alternative realities. It would be interesting, in the 
future, to further investigate the differential roles of the sub-regions of vmPFC in MTT, 
scene construction, and mind wandering in larger samples of patients with 
circumscribed lesions or employing neuroimaging techniques.  
Together our findings highlight the dynamic nature of memory. Individuals can, 
consciously or not, deliberately or not, retrieve episodes, model and manipulate them, 
choose some pieces, mix them together and transform them into a novel temporal or 
fictitious mental experience. This capability permits to navigate mentally into other 
places and times. We could say that probably memory is one of the most creative and 
malleable abilities that human beings possess and it affects pervasively individuals‟ 
lives; especially concerning modern day life. How can a person who lives entirely in the 
present, be able to organize events, plan actions, solve problems, anticipate possible 
dangers, make effective decisions and at the same time be competitive and successful at 
school, at work, and in the society? Well, this looks like a rhetoric question. Recent 
findings have shown that even during mere eye contact between two individuals the 
DMN is active, suggesting that DMN is pervasively engaged while interacting with 
other individuals, even if the interaction concerns non-verbal communication (Lee, 
2015). Indeed, an intact ability to imagine different scenarios and surf across them is 
likely to be critical for allowing individuals to adaptively interact with each other. Let‟s 
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just consider a complete opposite perspective for a moment. A number of studies 
investigated the importance of being in the present moment, for example the studies on 
mindfulness that is a practice used in different domains that promotes awareness 
moment by moment. It derives from a Buddhist concept that through living in the 
present moment, the nature of all phenomena and people is experienced. There is a large 
number of studies that show the advantages of mindfulness, for example, stress 
reduction, emotion regulation, pain reduction, etc. (Davis and Hayes, 2011; Reiner et 
al., 2013). Hence, there are many positive effects of not being able to escape from the 
here and now. Although we do not deny that there are advantages in being in the present 
moment, we can certainly observe that the normal balance between being in present and 
escaping from the here and now is disrupted in patients with vmPFC lesions.  
The lesion approach, together with neuroimaging studies, offers an important 
and rare opportunity to investigate and understand how brain regions work and how 
brain networks contribute to cognition. Specifically, the lesion approach allows to study 
the brain and cognitive functioning when a brain area does not give a continued and 
intact contribution to brain functioning because of damage. In the domain of the MTT, a 
few studies investigated the role of frontal lobe in remembering the past and imagining 
the future (see 2.3). Therefore, our results revealing the importance of vmPFC in 
constructing and simulating experiences offer new insights into the functioning of high 
order cognition and may be useful to reach future new advances in the understanding 
how human beings create mental complex experience, and, possibly, support social 
interaction. Indeed, it would be interesting to study the social function of DMN 
investigating the brain activity of individuals, simultaneously, while communicating 
with each other. This experimental procedure could be implemented also in patients 
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with brain damage (see Gordon et al., 2014; Stolk et al., 2015) to test how a lesion in the 
DMN may affect social communication. Another possible future project could involve 
the creation of specific training to help individuals having a reduced capability of 
remembering the past and imagining the future to improve MTT. In previous studies on 
patients with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis, who have deficits in MTT, it has 
been shown that a training in mental visual imagery can improve their MTT abilities 
(Ernst et al., 2015). Therefore, a training based on the task we utilized in our 
experiments, could be validated and employed to improve the capability of constructing 
complex scenarios in patients with vmPFC damage. Finally, in order to strengthen the 
validity of our findings it would be interesting to study MTT and mind wandering on 
patients with lesions to vmPFC using neurophysiological measures, such as 
electroencephalography, eye movement, and skin conductance, in real time, that can 
provide reliable and non-introspective measures of cognition. This would give the 
possibility of better understanding the neural correlates of deliberate and spontaneous 
cognition using a more multifaceted neuroscientific approach.  
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